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ABSTRACT

The document examines social science influence in the policy-making process through interviews with proponents of various major positions in the policy arena. A wide variety of responses is presented in order to more clearly assess needs of a changing society, investigate how social science education might be changed to reflect those needs, record the most pressing concerns in policy making studies, and provide a collective portrait of how social scientists view their role and performance in government. Twelve social scientists, who have experience working in U.S. government, discuss political allegiance of social scientists; ways of achieving equity, justice, and democracy; problems of policy implementation; rates and specific methods by which general goals should be reached; and methodological contributions of social scientists to policy formation. Among the specific topics dealt with are policies made during the "Great Society" and the adjustments and changes wrought by these policies; planning for full employment; the role of paraprofessionals in improving society; politics of urban research; domestic and foreign policy; social research on women in politics; and the influence of intellectuals in policy making. General tendencies noted by those interviewed include increased concern with policy-related matters in the social science community, declining interest in theory in favor of social action, a closer integration of pure social science with applied disciplines, and a high degree of accomodation to governmental needs by professionals from all social science disciplines. The conclusion is that social scientists' dedication to solving conflicts through reason warrants increased participation by them on middle levels of government and on advisory levels to all bureaus and agencies. (Author/DB)

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NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLICIES EFFECTING EQUITY AND JUSTICE

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NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLICIES EFFECTING EQUITY AND JUSTICE

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My thanks are due to Rutgers University which provided me with the sabbatical leave of absence to conduct the interviews and dialogues upon which these observations are based; and to the Department of Health, Education, And Welfare and its National Institute of Education, for providing the financial support for conducting these researches across the widest spectrum of educated opinion available to me. [Grant No. NIE-G-76-0106].

NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF POLICIES EFFECTING EQUITY AND JUSTICE

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PREFACE

This preface is necessarily and painlessly brief since so much of what has to be explained is contained in the discussions themselves. For what is here registered is not simply a series of interviews, but in a true sense, a dialogue in which I have sought to make clear the foundations of policy-making, at least in the areas covered by the people being interviewed.

I cannot help but reflect on the enormous strides that have been made in the growing sophistication of policy-making studies. My own work bears testimony to this growing sophistication. Starting with The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot in the mid-1960's, and the apparent shock at the degree of involvement by social scientists in the policy-making apparatus, and concluding with Social Science and Public Policy in the United States in the mid-1970's, there has been a growing appreciation of the extent to which the concept of policy rests on definite philosophical commitments to the idea of social change as a whole. For without such a commitment to the potential of change and the ability of people to direct their own affairs to reach desired outcomes, there cannot be any policy, and hence there cannot be any policymakers.

In this sense, the question of policy is beyond good and evil. It is not simply a question of whether we like or dislike certain decisions taken; but whether American society can bring about real policies affecting real people and having real consequences. At this level, I would say that there is a near universal consensus that policy making is important, and that it is at least feasible. The opposite of such a starting point is to assume that policy making is impossible short of Armageddon. The worth of such an epistemology is clearly outside the purview of such an analysis.

Ultimately, policy involves a philosophic belief that alternatives exist, can be implemented, and have specific consequences. Further, that the world, if not entirely wide open, is at the same time, not entirely closed either. The rise of policy making has given not just social scientists, but public officials, a new sense of the possible: a belief that wrongs can be righted, and evils corrected. In that sense, policy is the opposite of history. It is a record of decisions taken amongst choices available rather than inevitabilities presented as a chronology of events.

There are, however, wide areas of disagreement that cannot be entirely ignored. First, sharp differences remain between those who believe in equity and those who believe in equality: or more simply, all who believe everyone should have an equal starting point and end at different marks, and those who believe that wherever one starts, outcomes should be muted. There are also real differences between those engaged in domestic vis-à-vis foreign policy. The goals seem to be far more clear in domestic affairs; whereas those engaged in foreign policy analysis often have a rather cavalier, or at least make a casual distinction between policy work and political apparatuses.

Then again, there are always problems of sampling. However fine and refined these interviews have been, their representativeness is open to question. What would happen, for example, if a greater geographical proportion were chosen from mid-western rather than east coast and west coast agencies and institutions? What would be the results if there were a greater proportion of women vis-à-vis men, or blacks vis-à-vis whites? What would be the outcomes if discussions were held with psychologists rather than political scientists, or anthropologists rather than sociologists? How would these dialogues be weighted if a wider proportion were chosen from private enterprise rather than from public universities? These sorts of questions clearly are crucial and deserving of every consideration. I will not venture a guess as to how different the outcomes would be if the sample size were increased ten-fold or one-hundred fold. Likewise, one might argue that the focused interview techniques herein used are too impressionistic an instrument to carefully measure exact attitudes and sentiments. Here too it is clear if the sample size was to be increased by ten-fold or one-hundred fold, a different kind of sampling technique would be called for. But it is questionable if the outcomes would have been different.

When all critical sentiments are registered, it remains the case that this is the first, and as far as I know, the only systematic attempt to record the central tendencies and major positions in the policy arena in the words of the participants. Above all, it is an attempt to answer the nagging question: to what extent do background variables such as social science training, determine or define policy relevant analysis? If the wide variety of response is not exactly encouraging, it at least provides some sense and measure of the need to reform the future of social science education so that it more accurately reflects and gauges the needs of the larger society. This constant need to refocus the educational system is an ongoing activity.

Finally, and at the same time, the growth of policy making, the emergence of policy relevant social science, is a strong indication of the preeminence of the goals of equality in the lives of state and citizen alike. It is no longer problematic but a given that society has responsibilities for basic support levels to all citizens. The only problematic is how this is to be effectuated. The panoply of response herein provided gives us a fascinating first glance at how the social science community is attempting to cope with, or better, grope through the policy apparatus in search of a more perfect society.

Irving Louis Horowitz

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August 30, 1977

THE GREAT SOCIETY FALLOUT

An Interview with Sar A. Levitan
Research Professor of Economics and
Director of the Center for Social Policy
Studies at the George Washington University.

THE GREAT SOCIETY FALLOUT - Sar A. Levitan

HOROWITZ: How do you perceive the relationship between information gathered and its uses at the policy level? Is there any correlation between data and decisions, or is there simply animal faith? Does your work reflect a general impulse toward social reforms, or does it provide causal input into policy discussions?

In short, does policy precede or follow decisions already made by the political establishment? What is the relationship, therefore, between types of policy, kinds of information, and the actual consequences of the research performed?

LEVITAN: Your questions imply that there are correct courses of action--certain evidence that argues for certain policies -- which are good for all seasons. The Theme of *The Promise of Greatness* (Harvard University Press, 1976) is that there is no such thing.

There has been a complete reversal of policies in the 1970s based almost entirely not on changed conditions or new information, but on new approaches. A decade ago it was fashionable to argue that all sorts of programs worked. We presumably knew exactly what to do and which programs to pursue. All we needed was the money. But in the late sixties or early seventies this spirit of optimism and confidence was replaced by attitudes of negativism and defeatism.

It is too simplistic to suggest that the change of administration in 1969 alone accounted for these changes, but the then new administrators did display a different attitude than their predecessors toward social experimentation. Though the programs were continued largely unchanged through the first Nixon administration, it became clear that both Nixon and later Ford did not believe that the programs worked and were sympathetic to evidence that they were failures.

It became politic to claim that the programs did not work. On the other hand, some liberals, radicals, and their allies felt that too little rather than too much was being done. Fearing that the claims of success would justify slackened effort, they kept charging that the social programs were merely token efforts.

The negativism pervading academia and the fourth estate is difficult to explain. One answer may be found in the long-accepted predisposition of scribes, pencil pushers, and evaluators to serve the prince in power. We know exactly what the prince wants and give him what he wants.

Most people want to be in the mainstream. To be in the mainstream in the sixties required pronouncements that programs worked. Today the party line is that intervention does not work. Our instruments for observing the social environment and our instruments for measuring the impact of social measures on this environment are primitive. Hence the turnaround we have seen in the thinking on social policy does not reflect proven failures, but does suggest a new party line reacting differently to similar conditions.

HOROWITZ: A dilemma in examining the negative viewpoint of private sector ideologists toward public spending is the continued, unabated spending by the federal bureaucracy. Economically, as your own data properly describe, the actual amounts of federal outlays have either increased or reached a plateau with respect to health, education, and welfare.

Thus at the economic level there is no loss of steam behind federal welfare expenditures or programs dealing with increasing equity or equity demands. But there is a slowing up at the level of community organization, self-management, and new careers--what we can call new types of public sector concern. These innovative features have either plateaued or phased out.

Thus, from an economic point of view, old programs remain intact. But culturally there is clearly a backlash against further public sector growth. Would you not agree that this programmatic gulf has been strengthened by the negative attitudes of the conservative political establishment?

LEVITAN: The negativism we are seeing does spring largely from noneconomic factors; to a large extent the cause is political. The rewards for this new thinking may be more psychological than pecuniary. It does not behoove President Ford to extol--as Johnson would--the virtues of social programs, because there is a fellow from California who wants his job.

But the economic connection cannot be ignored. In the climate of the Great Society the central thrust was to have full employment so that society could afford to help those people who needed aid most. In the Nixon-Ford administration the economic philosophy is that inflation is more serious than unemployment.

The Nixon economic game plan was to fight inflation with a restrictive economic policy that would raise unemployment. However, world economic conditions did not behave as expected. The Arab oil embargo and pessimistic expectations drove prices up and put millions out of work, constraining the advancement of social policy focusing on the needs of the poor.

The best antipoverty program is not to add more dollars for social programs, but to have tight labor markets. In contrast, the Nixon-Ford social and economic policy has been to create loose labor markets as well as hold tight reigns on social expenditures. Other implications aside, the two goals are contradictory. We are spending approximately twenty billion dollars a year to pay unemployment insurance because we have created unemployment.

Inflation can be fought with unemployment without increasing social spending. In the antedeluvian pre-New Deal days the choice was clear: either you worked or you starved. During the past forty years, however, we have become less cavalier about the welfare of the unemployed. We no longer let them starve; in fact, we transfer quite a bit of income to them.

While some analysts criticize these expenditures as inflationary, their fears are unjustified. We can do a lot more even in these hard times and still not suffer much inflation. But the present administration not only overestimates the changes and ill-effects of these changes; it also does not recognize that its policies perpetuate a pattern in which we will continue to spend billions and billions for those people who are not working, while denying them the opportunity to become self-supporting.

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HOROWITZ: In The Promise of Greatness you argue that these transfer funds are only marginally effective in determining the character of the economy. Now you are saying that these programs profoundly affect the character of the economy.

In your work you claim that the notion that the welfare state has sapped the nation's human resources by sustaining a vast idle underclass is falacious. Now you are stating that these transfer funds do have a considerable inflationary effect on the character of the economy.

LEVITAN: Let me clarify the distinction. I am arguing that the effect of transfer programs on the entire economy is minimal, but that the effect on the poor--just one sector of society--is great. In comparing the early 1930s and the early 1970s we must distinguish the transformation of the structure of society (i.e., its distribution of wealth) from the impacts on the poor.

We have not experienced radical changes in income redistribution. But, at the same time, social outlays have helped those people at the bottom of society, even if the mainstream of the economy has been affected only marginally. The mainstream of the American economic society, despite 7.5 percent unemployment, is working and earning a steadily rising real income. It has been unaffected by any redistribution of income.

It we look at the numbers, we find that the lowest fifth of the population has been receiving approximately 5 percent of the total income consistently for the past three decades, while the highest fifth has been receiving about 40 percent. But, given the tendency for the income distribution to becomes increasingly skewed in a laissez faire capitalist economy, even this static distribution may be an achievement. And if we shifted 1 percent of the total income from the top bracket to the lowest fifth, we would improve the welfare of the poorest fifth while barely harming the affluent. To some extent we have tried to effect this shift by no longer letting people starve in our society.

My point about these transfer funds having a great negative benefit on the character of society must be kept in the context of transfer programs offered in lieu of a tight labor market policy. We are seeing the ill effects not in a "vast and idle underclass," but in a complacent and lazy economic leadership that feels little pressure to pursue high-employment economic policies.

HOROWITZ: There is an implicit assumption in the liberal call for greater public participation that the crucial intervening variable is political party. It is unstated, or stated gingerly in your work, but one receives the distinct impression that between the Democratic and Republican parties there is a vast difference in attitudes leading to a difference in economic policies relating to economic and social equity. Yet your data either disprove this impression or cast grave doubts that political parties make much difference in the welfare structure. What difference does party preference play in your interpretation of events? Does party preference matter?

LEVITAN: I am not making a distinction between Republicans and Democrats as such, because I am not sure that party label matters as much as philosophical position. But there is a wide gap between Johnson and Nixon-Ford. Johnson was one of the most liberal presidents we have had in American history--and certainly the most active in trying to change the social scene as far as minority groups are concerned.

Nixon continued the Johnson policy. Indeed, social outlays--social security, Medicaid, Medicare, and housing--expanded more rapidly during the first Nixon term (1969-73) than during the Johnson era. The Great Society gave the impetus; Nixon continued, sometimes under congressional and other pressures.

In the second Nixon administration he tried to change the rules of the game and reverse the reforms. While this effort did not succeed, it did put an end to the initiative, development, and growth of many programs; and Ford is continuing in the footsteps of his predecessor.

In the administrations of my lifetime I can distinguish between the social philosophy of Republicans and Democrats. While these differences in philosophy make little difference from year to year in terms of appropriations, the long-term impacts in terms of limited initiatives, unattended social ills, and eroding progress are visible.

HOROWITZ: Let us take this discussion one step further and inquire whether Nixon represented anything other than a change of heart or a change of administrative climates. Is it not rather than during the Nixon era the oil embargo and the economics of scarcity were reintroduced into the American climate? Is it not less a matter of policy recommendations, and more the reintroduction of the Malthusian themes of scarcity, famine, and warfare that compelled a reconsideration of American welfare priorities?

The world of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and even the first years of Nixon, were years of distributional and allocational problems. Is not your own work in terms of allocating and distributing a large pie? And is not the problem increasingly one of parceling out pieces of a diminishing pie, or managing external factors over which no administrator has effective control?

As a result, a different picture of the world emerges in terms of the processes you speak of. Whether we are dealing with manpower programs or direct federal outlays for poverty programs, extrinsic phenomena of raw material shortages rather than policy or administration shifts truly explain these changes in attitudes toward further public sector growth.

LEVITAN: You are questioning a belief fashionable in the sixties: that there are no limits of growth. The assumption was that we will continue to grow indefinitely at 3 percent annually. Put this figure in the computer and every twenty-four years income doubles, ad infinitum. On the other hand, most of us knew that there were limits.

Then there were the futurists. You push a button and the machine will do the rest. We will need only 2 or 3 percent of the work force, and the rest of us will be poets and philosophers. There will be no need to work. Well, anybody with an iota of sense knew that this prediction was foolish. It was as nonsensical a view as the currently prevailing spirit of pessimism that we are on the brink, that we are falling off the precipice.

During the past few years the administration has contributed to the recession accompanied by high unemployment and declines in productivity. Having created these conditions, the policymakers have argued that the country cannot afford to spend on social programs. According to secretary of the treasury Simon, social spending is going to drive us into bankruptcy and, therefore, it is good for the American soul to suffer. The best thing for business is a good recession.

True, there has been some real decline in the growth rate. The Arab nations, and the underdeveloped nations, have realized that they can increase their share of the world pie by taking it, leaving less for us than we are accustomed to. Ecological and environmental problems have required increased resources. But the vast resources of American society have not been stretched to the limit, and we are doing more than we realize.

Let me illustrate the subject we are addressing here in terms of the Great Society from what transpired in the field of poverty. When Johnson became president in 1963 there were thirty-six million poor people in the United States; by the time he left in 1969 there were twenty-four million poor. There was a one-third reduction in the number of poor people in the United States in six years. In the 1974 figures, the number of poor was still recorded at twenty-four million. What then do we good guys say? "Benign neglect under Nixon; no decline in poverty." Nonsense. Progress has continued.

If alleviating poverty means supplying a command of certain goods and services, overessential caloric intake, shelter, and basic needs, we have continued to advance. During recent years, under the Nixon-Ford administration, we have tremendously increased expenditures on housing, food stamps, Medicaid, and other similar aid to the poor. If you cash it out, what do you have?

In 1964 we spent $329 dollars (in 1974 dollars) per poor person; 80 percent of this figure was in cash, 20 percent in goods and services. In 1974 we spent $1197 per poor person, but only 40 percent of this figure was in cash; the rest was in housing, food stamps, etc. The census counts only cash income, so the numbers of poor people remained constant. But if we look at the real number of poor people--in real income terms--we find that the number of poor people has continued to decline, possibly by as much as 25 to 30 percent.

Why is this fact a secret? The secrecy does not result from census people falsifying the data. Rather, the point is that the White House does not want to claim any credit or assume a leadership role in social policy. Therefore, what is true and what is perceived to be true are entirely different things.

HOROWITZ: I was alluding to this contradiction earlier. Economic indicators now reveal the same trends and tendencies established in the last decade. In fact, your data reveal that there is a steady concern with problems of impoverishment, a continuing push toward equity, and a widespread effort toward creating an economic floor beneath which people are not allowed to fall.

Is not what you are describing more a difference in party rhetoric than economic policy? You are disconcerted by the implications of your data, and return to a belief that there is a difference between party positions toward welfare, What is this difference which we know exists, not in rhetoric but in reality?

LEVITAN: The Kennedy and Johnson administrations tried to create as many jobs as possible--tight labor markets were their major goal. The economic conditions they generated had important effects on social efforts. Social programs could be expanded without taxes becoming too burdensome: manpower programs were successful because jobs were plentiful.

The atmosphere or Gestalt engendered by recent administrations has differed. While Johnson and Kennedy espoused progress and extolled their own initiatives, the Nixon administration had little good to say about any of them. The talk was of "welfare chiselers," "deadbeats," etc. Even though the Nixon administration continued the programs--in

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large measure it had no choice given the laws on the books and the Democratic Congress--the Nixon people badmouthed the welfare state enough to discredit it in the eyes of many of the public. We are contending with this antiprogress ethos now--a set of beliefs fostered by the Nixon-Ford administration.

Instead of saying that we want to help, and that people deserve help from an affluent, just, and compassionate society, we hear attacks on "welfare cheaters" and calls for a return to the "good old days" when laissez faire presumably dominated economic decisions and policy. But America has not given up supporting those people in dire need.

What we are trying to do in our society, whether Democratic or Republican, is eliminate absolute deprivation. If poverty is a lack of basic needs, we have almost eliminated poverty in the United States. We should be proud of this accomplishment; we should sing "Hallelujah!" Instead, we hide the facts--because of administration policy.

HOROWITZ: Is this consequence only a result of the administration? Is it not also a function of the poor and the formerly dispossessed? In other words, is it not the response mechanism to relative deprivation rather than any rebellion against absolute deprivation?

Are you not loading down the administrative, political elites with a burden not uniquely theirs? Have reform tendencies not been stimulated by the leadership of the black, women's, and other minority movements? Is there not a belief that public sector support and self-help would be different?

The silence of the multitudes at cutbacks in public outlays for new programs aiding the poor indicates a real shift in attitudes on the part of those people formerly supporting public spending programs.

LEVITAN: It would be comforting to analyze public policy and differentiate between Republicans and Democrats based on hard empirical evidence, just as there is the urge to predicate social policy on proven performance. In neither case are the mechanics of cause and effect so simple. Granted that there may not have been perceptible changes in appropriations from year to year with different administrations; but I still detect a differentiated product in the subjective element of leadership. Presidents and administration mold public opinion, aspirations, and--most important--expectations.

As I suggested in response to your first questions, there are certain people who always complain that nothing has been accomplished. There is rarely a shortage of prophets of gloom and critics of tokenism. But if we had an administration that demonstrated leadership and pointed out our accomplishments and achievements, stressing the progress we have made, an administration that highlighted the right statistics showing poverty continuing to decline, we would be able to counter these critics.

Look, for example, at the president's economic report for 1976. There is a chapter on welfare and unemployment. The report argues that real unemployment would be much smaller than it presently is, except that unemployment insurance induces or encourages idleness. This statement is partly true. If we give people a choice between income and work, and if the rewards from working are small, some will choose not to work. This decision is rational rather than an indication of indolence; it should be a sign that we need to provide more good jobs rather than cutting off unemployment insurance.

If the administration keeps telling us that we are spending too much money on no-good people, this message begins to become the conventional wisdom. The administration is pointing out the facts selectively--as they support its case. There are different ways to present the facts, and my approach is a fair and accurate way of looking at the issues. For example, look at the youth unemployment situation. Approximately 1.6 million youths between sixteen and twenty-one are unemployed, out-of-school, and looking for a full-time job. For these youths there are training and employment programs costing approximately one billion dollars annually.

Administration spokesmen have used this amount as evidence that there is plenty of money to help unemployed youths. But if we put one billion dollars in the numerator and 1.6 million youths in the denominator, the result is six hundred dollars per unemployed youth per year. Is this amount excessive?

A black leader looking at the ghetto where one-third or more of the youths are unemployed would say that nothing is being done. But the facts show that something has been accomplished, especially in creating summer jobs.

One way to point out the salutary impact of the social programs is to view the social scene in 1975. There were no armies of unemployed camped in Washington. No one was storming the barricades, even though there were about ten million unemployed people in the United States. They received unemployment insurance, welfare and veterans benefits. These social programs do work; they provide for the welfare of people in need. For this reason the Great Society worked.

The most telling difference between the Great Society and the Nixon-Ford administration is in the way the respective administrations formulated their social policy hypotheses. Policymakers in the Great Society hypothesized that social programs did work, and they continued to operate on this assumption unless presented with evidence showing the contrary. The Nixon-Ford policymakers, on the other hand, have presumed that the social policies do not work, and they must be shown conclusive evidence of success to change their minds. The presumptions have changed and the burden of proof has shifted.

HOROWITZ: How much impact did interagency strife have on curbing new welfare programs? Within a decade the same people who were initially pleased with federal programs changed their minds. Was agency competition over scarce resources an aspect of the changing character of welfare programs? Or did the change in political leadership stimulate such reevaluations? What effect did new data have on policy programs?

LEVITAN: New data alone provide no basis for these shifts. There have been no new facts to show that programs have changed and no longer work. Yet the evaluators have changed their tune. I do not know why.

I do know, having observed these people, that they are swayed by a desire to please their superiors and their public. Every once in a while we show a bit of independence, depending on the political and economic climate. Essentially, however, we do what the princes want us to do and not necessarily for crass economic reasons. The incentives may be as diverse as an invitation to the White House or an appointment to a governmental advisory committee, a promotion or a grant. None of us is immune to these enticements.

There are some people who, in the mid-sixties, claimed to be the architects of the war on poverty, but later favored benign neglect. Most people realize who their benefactors are, and they seldom bite the hand feeding them.

HOROWITZ: Now that you have indicated why there has been stagnation and stagflation in the Great Society programming, I am curious to know how the working classes fit into this scheme. Working-class demands for more work and less welfare have been at least as important as political shifts in changing attitudes toward the public sector. Your work avoids any mention of the negativism on the part of huge masses in reaction to any kind of new program, not necessarily welfare programs.

It may have to do with the greening of rural America, the inability of many people to feel that the wages they work for count for anything (as a result of the distribution mechanism); or it may reflect an awareness of military defeat which always translates ultimately into domestic insularity and isolation.

There is a Hobbesian element within American life: demands of the poor that the rich should behave themselves; demands for a society in which work is honorable, and leisure is no longer viewed as the highest goal; where ordinary people once again count, and the foibles and follies of the rich are no longer the only prized possession; where media heroes are discounted and reduced to proper size. This proletarian resentment has paralleled shifts in political party domination; indeed, it has been far more pronounced than elite shifts.

The mood of your work continues to be strangely optimistic in the face of all stated obstacles. When blame is assessed you play it out in terms of ethnic minorities who were once poor but became affluent, who have had a change of ideological heart, and who have led the country down a narrow, conservative patheway from liberal programming.

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But what is the role of working-class conservatism? What is the role of trade unionism with respect to continuing large-scale federal programs? Is the real issue of the 1970s poverty as an abstraction, or the differentiation between an impoverished class, an underclass, and a working class? Are there not new forms of class polarization--not in terms of bourgeoisie versus proletariat, but in terms of organized unionists on the one hand and marginal demimonde workers on the other--so that the essential struggle is between new class formations?

One does not have the feeling that you are addressing the existence of class contradiction in such contemporary terms. Does not this contradiction between proletarians and marginals more adequately explain hostility to public welfare programming than any betrayal of the Great Society by Republicans?

The appeals being made by the Democratic New Frontiersmen, or Great Society people, continue to be directed toward a marginal underclass; whereas the new rhetoric, both within the Democratic and Republican parties, is directed to satisfying the demands of the organized working class. I do not see any effort in your work to come to terms with proletarian (class) versus marginal (race) demands.

What do you consider the master dilemma of the 1970s, if it is not the struggle between class and race, proletarians and poor? What conditions are possible between them against the empire of wealth?

LEVITAN: Since you have shifted the discussion from social programs to middle America, or the working class, we should shift our perspective and center on a separate set of issues. The basic responsibility of the unions has historically been to obtain an ever greater share of the pie and ever greater measure of freedom and recognition in the workplace for the American worker. In the thirties I would have said, along with many people, that the working class had attained the millennium. Now what happens when working-class people obtain what they want?

In today's context the status of the teamsters comes to mind. It is not unusual for a teamster or an operating engineer to earn $15,000 or more. These people do not want to share their hard-earned gains with the new immigrants or minorities.

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Some labor leaders fully appreciate the contradictions between union aspirations and reality and try to minimize this friction--a Walter Reuther or a Leonard Woodcock. George Meany certainly appreciates the emerging conflicts; they are deep and not easily resolved. Giving blacks an ever greater share of job security means compromises on seniority rules. Giving better jobs to blacks or women means that some whites are going to be hurt, at least in times of high unemployment. These continuing conflicts exist in society.

Work Is Here To Stay, Alas, which I coauthored with William Johnston, tries to show that the conflicts and development of work and class consciousness are following a steady, unsurprising path. In the Great Depression we were talking about how wonderful it was to have a job. Tomorrow our conflicts may be over a new issue. But it is a law of human nature that there will always be too little pie for everyone to eat all he wants.

HOROWITZ: Is there not a less psychologically worn caveat than a belief that people always want more than they have? Maybe the problem is with the model we are using. Perhaps the demand is less for change than for security.

The demand for order is related to a feeling that federal programs favor people who shout rather than those who toil. This welfare model does not lead to any deceleration or defusing of strong working-class feelings of hostility toward a cowardly ruling class that have built up during the postwar years.

LEVITAN: You keep talking about models. We are living in a highly complex society. It includes people on welfare and the working class; these groups and many others are segments of society. Is there any solid evidence that these groups are more dissatisfied with government than the usual griping and disagreement with authority? Were there riots when thousands of blue-collar workers were laid off during the recent recession? There was unhappiness and discouragement, and rightfully so; there were real hardships.

To assert that working-class hostilities spring from government and social programs is an oversimplification. The real issue is "for whom is the government creating the social programs?" If it attempts, as it has during the past few years, to try to improve the lot of certain sections of the population who have not shared in American plenty, it will inevitably arouse the ire of many who are being asked to contribute. These people feel insecure. Somebody is brought up to their level--whether a woman, a black, or a Chicano--and they perceive their position as threatened.

These problems are difficult, and theories or models and class struggles shed little light on them and do not contribute to their solution. Instead, they act as diversions that confuse or obscure the real issues. Then, when we try to solve a problem by dealing with a proxy issue, a sense of failure and frustration sets in that contributes to the negativism which is becoming pervasive and fashionable.

Consider,for example, the recent headlines that we can no longer afford social security and that the system is facing bankruptcy. Why? Because productivity, instead of increasing by 3 percent per year, is only going to rise by 2.4 percent each year. At the same time the ratio of workers to retirees is going to fall as the baby boom reaches retirement and the next generation's small families are left to support the older population.

Does this situation mean that the system is going bankrupt? Not necessarily. There is no reason to fear bankruptcy. It is a question of looking at the meal on the table and saying it is not enough to feed us for the rest of our lives. There is really nothing to be concerned about.

The income of the American people is increasing; people are living longer. At the same time we are having fewer children, and so we will be able to afford to support the older generation. The system can be perfectly sound. Indeed, it is sounder than we think.

We will have to make some changes. The system--as it is constituted now--will need careful watching. And even if we assume the worst and say that the social security system definitely is unhealthy, we can predicate its downfall only on an extremely big "if"; if we do nothing. But if all the "ifs" -- or only half of the "ifs" -- in our history had come to pass, much more than social security would have passed on long ago.

This attitude is part of a malaise: we are creating a fashionable pessimism. Our age identifies hope with sentimentality. This age makes it chic to point out that something is wrong: that the working class is suffering, the working class is losing out; everybody is losing out! The Philistines are upon us.

HOROWITZ: You have a strong tendency to revert to psychological explanations at crucial points in your argument. Whey you say that Americans have a spirit of negativism, and that there is a malaise gripping us, there is a need to explain the material source of this malaise. You are denying any economic or social bases to this spirit and that these bases are in the realm of negativism. Indeed, you are claiming that there is no foundation in the economic arena for this policy malaise.

If you can say that there is no economic foundation for this cultural malaise which you call negativism, from whence derives the malaise? You are providing an assumption of class irrationality which you insist on accepting at face value. Does the resistance of the working classes to further taxation or public sector growth have a rational foundation?

LEVITAN: Of course there is a base. Since 1967 there has been little progress in the real earnings of American workers. For married workers there has been a slight rise, but there has not been the 3 percent annual increase we expect.

You want me to make an either/or choice. Certainly there is an economic base to the problems faced by middle America. But at the same time we must remember that every time we solve a social problem we create another one. If we make people live longer, we have to create a social security system to support them.

Each age has its problems and ours is no exception. But the danger is to be blinded by momentary problems. In the 1950s there was talk that we had finally solved the problem of controlling the economic cycle. Last year there was talk that we might never resume our pattern of long-term growth. The truth is never so one-sided.

If you accuse me of becoming metaphysical at some crucial moments, I plead guilty. But I become metaphysical because I have learned that facts and empirical data alone are not going to give us the answers. There is not an unbroken chain of deductions building one one another to finally present us with the satisfactory answer. Somewhere in that chain subjective judgments and value-laden assumptions must enter. They are there, either out front where we recognize them, or obscured behind a wall of facts.

Either we assume that society owes nothing to its unfortunate members and that there is a distinction between "us" and "them," or we assume that there is an obligation. You are repeating, or implying, the fashionable line among intellectuals and college professors in 1976: that we must pacify the angry masses and retreat from our war on poverty.

I do not see any malaise in American society except the ones we choose to recognize. Again, if we had polled the 10 percent black population ten years ago, if we had bothered to, we would have learned that there was a great deal of unhappiness then too. But we never asked. We are discovering that we are not completely, ecstatically happy. We are surprised, but why should we be? Do we always expect real life to fit our models?

HOROWITZ: An organized working class has come to realize that the distribution of wealth in the United States--the relative distribution of wealth--has not accrued proportionately to itself. It is not simply a matter of the top retaining its privileges, but that it does so by buying off a volatile bottom.

A great many people in the working class feel that they have not benefited from public spending any more than from private accumulation. They have not partaken of the general surge of the twenty million people who have stock pf the ten million people in the academic profession;

of all the people in the white-collar and upper-income white-collar realm. They feel, and not without a degree of sensitivity, that they did not partake equally, proportionately to the general rise in public sector spending for the welfare of the marginal classes below them in rank.

So when the working classes look up they see groups moving rapidly beyond their own ability to expand. When they look down at the marginal underclasses they see a similar movement. All kinds of people are moving to a point where their income is close, at the lower end at least, to the income possibilities for work; reward for not working becomes almost similar to amount earned for working. Once taxes are accounted for, the actual take-home, baseline pay of many blue-collar workers is not much different from the amount of funds received by recipients of food stamps, welfare benefits, or social services.

Whether this situation in part is myth generated by the political establishment, or myth generated by professors, I will leave unanswered. However, there is nothing psychological about the rebellion against public policy toward social welfare. There is enough reality in the charges against welfare and tax dodge systems to make working-class resentment against both the top and bottom a potent factor of politics in the 1970s. The formation of public policy has too often been addressed to people in the underclass by those in the ruling class without adequate regard to people in the working classes.

It is important to bear in mind that there is a double edge involved in this policy blindness to working-class demands. There is a concern for those people below, and definitely a concern for the maintenance of the privilege and prestige of those at the top, but not enough concern for people involved in the process of production. The union leadershp has emphasized this theme throughout the 1970s, and it has struck an extremely responsive chord. The data may or may not support every aspect of this analysis; but the fact is that federal policymakers have historically not addressed themselves to this class theme, certainly not since the New Deal period.

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There is in fact a new triclass structure in American life. Yet we do not have either a policy formation or a theoretical framework that takes account of this underclass/workingclass/ruling-class dilemma. The working class has uniquely introduced demands for law and order because it sees corruption and deception as the essential ingredients of both a squeamish ruling class and a ravaged underclass.

When working-class demands are not met by their rulers we have revolutionary conditions present. When vast portions of society are unprepared or unwilling to work we have decadent conditions. That this pattern is a matter of professorial conspiracy is a dangerous way of viewing the entire decade of the 1970s, at least as dangerous as viewing the 1960s as a modest success.

LEVITAN: Without going into metaphysics, I do not know of any past or present working class which has had as high a standard of living as the American worker. Despite this favorable position, American workers have become alarmed at the changes in society and their nerves have been frayed by political rhetoric. We are now undergoing the "ordeal of change," to use Eric Hoffer's phrase. Undergoing this change is a traumatic experience, but the question is "do we want to make these changes in our society?"

There will always be a bottom fifth. Do we want to define this bottom fifth as the blacks and Chicanos? Do we want to define society in terms dictating that women will always have to accept their "rightful" place and earn 60 or 70 percent as much as men for the same work?

The Great Society tried to correct some of these wrongs, but they involve difficult adjustments; and we are now experiencing the changes wrought by the new conditions. You are telling me that once people have satisfied the caloric intake, or a little more than basic needs, it is time to "let well enough alone." I disagree.

We have the responsibility and the capability to continue to improve our society in terms of fairness, justice, and economic growth. We are being cowardly if we do not pursue these goals despite temporary strains.

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PLANNING FULL EMPLOYMENT

An Interview with Eli Ginzberg
Barton-Hepburn Professor of Economics
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University of New York

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PLANNING FULL EMPLOYMENT - Eli Ginzberg

HOROWITZ: Do you feel that your work more nearly reflects the 1960s than the 1970s, given its emphasis on problems of manpower allocation, educational opportunity, income equality, black equality, labor participation, and women's equality in the labor force? There is a disproportionate emphasis in your work, at least in terms of the current pessimistic rhetoric, on inherited issues of allocating a nearly infinite amount of resources, rather than on the current concerns about financing these resources.

Is your work a justification for a "war on poverty" that no longer is, or do you feel that the cynicism of the moment is unwarranted, unnatural, and unfounded?

GINZBERG: I have never thought of myself as a planner, and never accepted one period of time as delimiting my policy concerns. I am a kibbitzer, almost a perpetual kibbitzer, since I have had thirty-five years of uninterrupted consultation with the federal government. But only during World War II did I have operational responsibilities--and then in the health field. I was a senior logistical advisor to the surgeon general of the army.

The advantage of being as grey-haired as I am is that I have been through many different episodes in the United States, and I have learned one thing about the labor market and the economy: that any time you overrespond to the current situation, you are going to be wrong. I have no reason to believe that the so-called "scientific" projections of the Congressional Budget Office at the present moment, reinforced by the projections of the Office of Management and Budget and the Joint Economic Committee, are more likely to be right than wrong.

Economics is an imperfect forecasting discipline. As I testified before the Joint Economic Committee a few months ago, what more proof do you need of the primitive stage of economic planning in the United States than to realize that on the day the president of the United States had the best assembly of nonpartisan brains he could fine--Ford had everybody who was anybody in the White House in September 1974--the result was a failure. Not a single person in that august group was even close to suggesting to the president what was happening at that moment.

I did a study on the long-term unemployed in New York City in 1939, 1940, and 1941. I worked with psychiatrists and some smart social workers who interviewed unemployed people. We then assessed their future employability.

The other three members of the staff agreed that 90 percent of these unemployed persons would never go back to work. They had been out of work for four years, five years, seven years; they were fifty-five years of age; they had hernias; they had asthma. They were clearly nonemployable. I said at the time, because my usual posture is to go against the grain, "you are wrong; they are all going to be employed." And the other staff said I was out of my mind.

My reasoning was as follows: "there is going to be a war; the war is going to change the demand for labor; they are all going to go back." By accident we were able to do a followup study one year later. At that time I was working for the War Department. But the follow-up study showed that I had guessed correctly. Except for a few alcoholics, each one of those unemployed people was back to work.

All the stuff you read must be taken not with a grain of salt, but with a ton of salt. I know of no way of looking at the American economy, its labor force, the so-called oversupply of educated people and shortage of doctors, and guessing what tomorrow will bring. The only thing I know is that ours is not a simple, ordered system. You cannot find the perfect balance of supply and demand. The best thing to do is to be modest about the incapacity of intellectuals to understand our complicated system. It is not easy to figure it out.

The Manpower Connection obviously reflects the late sixties and early seventies. The essays were put together then; and the next book I write will reflect some things differently. But I can live with that book.

HOROWITZ: There is a serious contradiction between two aspects of your work. On the one hand, you assert a direct relationship between manpower and education. But you also indicate that the solution to the unemployment problem took place through a permanent war economy, not through maximizing educational opportunity. How does this contradiction square with the concept of education as a basic source of economic participation?

GINZBERG: I am actually arguing at a different level. From the mid-1950s to today the word has come from Washington, and from the universities, that if you get a good education and pick up degrees you will have a good life. This belief was doctrine until the most recent recession, and successive presidents have advocated it.

When John Gardener was secretary of health, education, and welfare he ran a White House conference on education, in which I had a negative voice. Everybody was arguing that more education would solve all our problems. I disagreed with that notion.

While I have no objection to education, and while I have spent my whole life in teaching and research, the notion that there is a one-to-one relationship between education and the labor market is silly. Look at the statistics on education, income, age, and skill: the overlaps are tremendous. It is a terribly subtle affair. People with Ph.D.'s are better off in the labor market than people who drop out of school without a high school diploma. But the overlaps are the interesting matter. Education, while exaggerated by its friends, does help move a person in the right direction.

Education is a set of social institutions and structures that open opportunities for some people and closes them for others. Years ago John Fischer, the long-time president of Teachers College, said that the American public school system has never known how to educate low-income people, white or black, and does a bad job with them. This failure does not mean that individual whites or blacks cannot make it, or that low-income people cannot make it in the system. But the educational system has failed them. Therefore, one must be cautious.

I have been impressed with the young economist Lester Thurow, of MIT, who has argued that even if you accept the revisionist theory of education with respect to the labor market, you still might want more education for defensive reasons. If everybody is getting an education, and employers are using education as a screen, you will have competition based on education. The educational interface with the labor market represents a forward-looking development because it opens some opportunities for some people.

In 1965, when I was working for the Johnson administration, I went to Watts early in an effort to learn something before too many misconceptions got abroad. I discovered that the brightest kids dropped out of high school and that the passive ones--mostly girls who were well disciplined and passive--were able to accept that lousy system and stay in class and get their high school diplomas. But the active, intellectually alive youngsters recognized that they were being put on and they left and went onto the stretts. The bright people broke out of the educational system early.

HOROWITZ: What impresses me is that while you have a belief that the data clearly reveals that the Great Society had a fragmented outcome on the economic level, on balance you say that it was favorable. Yet we are confronted with the disquieting fact (indicated by the Council of Economic Advisors) that income distribution among classes has hardly changed since World War II. From 1945 through 1975 the bottom 20 percent absorbed only 4 percent, while the top 10 percent absorbed 41 percent. And these figures have hardly changed at the aggregate levels.

Ironically, the bottom 20 percent is now worse off--despite its higher education--than its predecessors. The actual definition of the poverty line has been stretched during the past thirty years. And if this situation is true for aggregate data, it is more so for segmented data, i.e., the particular situation of minority groups. Consequently, how can one sustain the idea that the Great Society worked?

GINZBERG: Let me break up your points. First, you can always divide any income distribution into quintiles, but that division tells you little. You will always have a lowest quintile. You cannot conclude what is happening over time simply in terms of quintiles. Unless you do the analysis after taxes and transfer payments you do not have worthwhile findings. And most analyses are done before, not after, these adjustments.

Robert Lampman is the outstanding student in the United States in this arena. In his newest essay Lampman concludes that if we talk only about income poverty, President Johnson's goal of abolishing it has been achieved. It is an important finding that only a small gap remains. This finding does not mean that every last person is above the income poverty level; but in the aggregate it does.

We can also consider Jim Morgan's panel study of families in his survey data collection at the University of Michigan. We do not want to know who is at the bottom; we want to know if there is a flow-through, or whether it is the same people who remain at the bottom.

And if we read Morgan's work on his five-year analysis, we find that only one-third of the people who were at the bottom in 1967 remained at that level throughout the five years. Twenty-five percent were there for only the year they were initially surveyed, and were not there again in the succeeding four years. The remaining 75 percent had erratic movements: sometimes they were there, sometimes not. While I am not claiming that we have made great progress in income equality, let me point out something else.

Simon Kuznets is our most sophisticated student of national income in the real sense of the term. I asked him recently if he had ever seen any analyses of income distribution that account for not only family income figures, but also public services. I asked him this question because the quality of life people are able to enjoy is a function of both these streams. If you have four thousand dollars personal income in the state of South Carolina, with its modest educational and other kinds of governmental services, you have one kind of opportunity. With equivalent dollars in California or New York comes increased access to free educational and other services. Kuznets said unequivocally that he knew of no such studies.

On balance the Great Society programs were not failures. What were the major programs? In Lampman's view a solution was found for income poverty. We obviously did not make structural changes that fundamentally altered the lives of all poor people. But we took care of much of their problem of deficient income via food stamps and other subsidy and cash programs.

During the Great Depression many poor people lived out of garbage cans. That situation happened repeatedly in our large cities. Fortunately, we are not at that level anymore. The Great Society was cautious on health reform. Regardless of our attitudes toward it, the

Medicare program represented a considerable shift of financial responsibility off the backs of middle-class people (who could no longer absorb the costs of an extended illness) onto the federal government. This shift was a social plus. Even Medicaid, no matter how critically we feel about it, surely did not worsen the access of poor people to health care.

If we look at a 1970 report of the Hospital Administration Division of the University of Chicago and HEW on the utilization of health services, we find a substantial increase in the recent access of the poor. In fact, they may have too much access; some of them are being operated on more often than the rich, not a good sign.

If you were taken in by the rhetoric of the Great Society, and believed all the promises that were made, the effort failed. But if you ask whether there were significant impacts from these programs, the answer must be quite a lot: not enough, but quite a lot. If you live in New York City, you would answer "too much."

HOROWITZ: Even if you can demonstrate the accuracy of your claims about continued levels of upward social mobility, I do not see how your work addresses basic political concerns. There is no spillover between education, participation at high levels of student government activities, and the actual running of the political system. Your work is weaker in this area than in any other. Have you had any thoughts recently on how manpower allocation and implementing economic networks (which you are urging) have any impact on political mobility?

GINZBERG: That challenge is fair; it is not misconstruing the emphasis in my work. But let me establish a few points. In early February I was at the swearing-in ceremony of the new secretary of labor, who said that he had been an hourly wage earner. Now, it is true that this man is only one member of the cabinet. The other members of the cabinet were not working for a living at an hourly job two decades ago, but we know of this one instance.

What has been occurring over time--the question of social mobility--has long been a matter of great interest to me. I put this proposition before you: the improvement in the economic position of blacks in the

United States since 1940 has been greater than that of any other minority group in the history of the United States. This formulation does not mean that there are not a lot of black people living below the poverty line, or that the United States has solved racial differentials in pay. But since 1940 the improvement in the economic position of blacks has been faster than that achieved by any other minority group.

Gunnar Mydal wrote The American Dilemma and published it in the early forties. He pointed out that in the late thirties, his data base, the overwhelming majority of American blacks were peasants in the South facing a bleak future in a declining industry. With the exception of a thin group of teachers, ministers, and a few postmen, the best a black man could do in the United States in the late 1930s was to be on public relief. This situation led some blacks to try their luck in the North, where joining WPA was easy. The blacks simply were not part of the effective economy of the country. Myrdal was not an unsympathetic student, yet he saw no prospects for them.

Insofar as possible my work is sensitized to the question of political power, how it operates, and the linkages between politics and economics. In the book where I am most sensitive to this issue -- The Troublesome Presence: American Democracy and the Negro, the first broad study of this country's inherent racism -- I asked the question, "why was the United States able to absorb all groups other than blacks into its social system?" Admittedly, it did not do so easily; the Germans, Italians, and Jews all encountered difficulties, but eventually the country absorbed them all. But it choked on the blacks. I asked that question, and I traced the answer through the transformation of our political process.

The answer runs deep. Even now I am not certain that I have the full answer. In the 1880s a leading segregationist senator from South Carolina pointed out that the black situation in this country will never receive the national attention it requires until the blacks are distributed throughout the country. The North and West will not face the black problem until they are forced to deal with blacks on a day-to-day basis. This situation has occurred only recently; the answers, if they come, will require additional time.

When the blacks were in the South, on the farms, they were counted as employed. Today, when they are in the northern ghetto, they are often counted as unemployed. This fact does not mean their situation has worsened; it means that we do not know how to measure employment and unemployment. But relocation was fundamentally good for the blacks and the country. They could not be locked in the South forever. I have been interested in the blacks and political power; I have been deeply concerned about that point.

In the manpower field we are at an early stage of a major shift in American political life focused on the role of employment policy. The trade union movement is beginning to think seriously about public employment. Peripheral workers are unprotected. A large part of the 1976 presidential campaign will focus on jobs, more jobs, the quality of jobs, and which people are hired. This issue is moving to the top of the nation's agenda. I am deeply interested in the political forces leading to a national employment policy.

I wrote a book called The Pluralistic Economy, which nobody in this country paid attention to because it ran against the ideology. In this book I argued that we are not a private sector economy, and that about 40 percent of all jobs depend on governmental expenditures. The year was 1965.

President Ford, as others before him, continues to repeat that five out of six jobs are in the private sector. The arithmetic and the analysis are both wrong. When Lockheed builds missiles and the final purchaser of those missiles is the U.S. government, the jobs are not private. They are covered with public money. I have been concerned with the question of a pluralistic economy and its power relations. In my medical work I think about government and monopolistic producer groups of doctors, nurses, and hospitals.

HOROWITZ: Are there any inherent or intrinsic limits to the drive toward equity? In the mid-seventies we have an entirely new intellectual thrust: a counterattack on the idea of equality, not only in the form of the limits of growth conception, but also from those people who argue that the costs of equity are so high as to disrupt the structure of the American economy.

According to this counterargument, putting more people into the public sector than the 40 percent you claim, or the 20 percent that others claim, will totally destroy the relationship between productivity, productive forms of labor, and bureaucratic forms of organization. The Great Society had no room for real growth; it was too busy satisfying the drive toward equity, and it could not satisfy the thirst to grow as an economic system. How do you answer this charge and critique?

GINZBERG: My major book, The Human Economy, is being published. One simple idea relates to the broadening of options, a useful touchstone in determining whether a society is moving in the right direction. Broadening options is not the only, although it is for me a basic, touchstone for measuring the quality of a social system. I have travelled sufficiently in Eastern Europe to know that a full employment policy with no consideration of options for workers has limited meaning.

Some years ago George Wiley, the head of the Welfare Mothers League, and I appeared before the Executive Committee of the National Council of Churches. Addressing this type of audience is not typical for me; but the committee asked us to appear as experts, which we did.

I said to George, "Look, I know you are going to say that you want $5,600 per welfare family. This figure is not exorbitant. No one is going to live well in New York City on $5,600." But I warned George that I was going to oppose him on the grounds that one could set $5,600 as the welfare grant only by levying additional taxes on the middle classes, that is, teachers making $14,000 and the blue-collar workers making $12,000. You would have to take another $1,000 in taxes from them. There would be no other way of raising the welfare grant level to $5,600.

Politically this measure is totally impossible and, in fact, undesirable. I tried to explain to the council why it should not be trapped into recommending this approach to income equity. A society is a fragile organism. The only way to help one group is to win the toleration, if not the active support, of others. If a proposal intensifies intergroup conflict to a point where everybody is mad at everybody else, there is no progress.

HOROWITZ: In your work there is a peculiar top-down vision, even though your judgment is essentially liberal and your concern authentic. There are many allusions to social movement. In other words, there is little feeling of bottstrap mechanisms.

You are not concerned with what women do for themselves or what blacks have done for themselves. You recognize these forces; but somehow they are filtered through a world not only of institutions, but of what you can call governatorial institutions--federal institutions have a beneficence in your work that they do not have in reality. They are far more benign and benovolent in your work than one can conclude from the history of the last thirty-five years, or from Gunnar Myrdal's lifework.

What do you see as the role of mass movement, social movement, or interest group movement with no appeal to authority of public welfare as its aim or goal, but rather with a large transcendental appeal? Or transcendental values that do not resolve themselves into nuts-and-bolts terms involving a further payoff matrix that the government either can or cannot meet? Is there any place in your worldview where there is a valuable movement of this type from below?

GINZBERG: Advanced economies--in terms of the level of disposable income--are characterized by large institutions of which government is but one. The corporation is a dominant institution, trade unions are large institutions, universities are large bureaucracies, hospitals, and so on. Both capitalist and communist countries with advanced technologies depend on large organizations.

In The Human Economy a major element in my analytical apparatus involves the value system. Although there may be no escape in many realms of life--particularly the economic sphere--from large organizations, broadened options enable a percentage of the society to avoid being totally swallowed by large structures.

In most organizational settings one person works while five other people go along for the ride. Most societies continue to operate because only a few people are determined to accumulate power. If a great

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number of people entered the fray, the struggle would be intensified to a point where the basic organizations could not function. Fortunately, the search for power is so strenuous that most people eschew the struggle.

Let me provide another illustration. Occupational structure enables people to pursue different values. I am not talking about a vulgar Freudianism that sees the occupation of prison guard as allowing a person to work out his aggressive tendencies. A salesman who is away from home three nights a week surely has more opportunity than most married persons to indulge his proclivities for sexual experimentation.

Another insight into how the work/value problem is resolved is suggested by the following interchange. Many years ago I asked Jim Mitchell, the outstanding secretary of labor under Eisenhower who had once been general manager of Bloomingdale's, about his views concerning frustrated workers.

He said, "What are you talking about? In good periods when the labor market it tight and you have a job you cannot stand, you find yourself another job. When the labor market is weak and there is much unemployment you feel lucky if you have a job, even one that leaves something to be desired. I do not know any frustrated workers."

There is much wisdom in this formulation. There are many ways in which people settle with themselves, and what they find tolerable changes over their lifetimes. Most young people who start to work in large corporations at the executive level are "gung ho" for a few years. Then they realize, with a few exceptions, that they will never become either a chief executive or even one of the top managers, and they start to play the game differently. They become less concerned with their job and more with their life off the job. The great advantage of a rich society is its openness. It permits combinations and permutations.

HOROWITZ: When you refer to intermediary institutions such as trade union movements, the total number of trade unionists with respect to the total work force (approximately 25 percent) is down considerably from what it was after the great organizing drive of John L. Lewis, the amalgamation of the CIO and the AFL, and the formulation of the United Automobile Workers.

How do these intermediary institutions, which themselves develop strong oligarchical Machiavellian tendencies, service the constituencies you are referring to? Do they not ultimately have to make the same appeal to large governments for some kind of bailout against the intermediary institutions which liberal thought has historically believed pluralizes opportunities and possibilities?

GINZBERG: Every institution wants to accomplish something. Over time it undergoes transformations and becomes increasingly concerned about its survival. With unions the analysis must allow for indirect as well as direct effects.

Columbia University has recognized during the past several years that unions are interested in organizing its non-professional personnel. Faced with this reality the university has made efforts to change its style and behavior and, even in a period of financial stringency, has found extra money to improve the wages and benefits of these workers.

My principal corporate exposure over many years was Dupont. It was a largely nonunionized firm. But it is a gross error to assume that Dupont was not affected by the trade union movement. Its personnel policies were directly affected by the unions' existence.

We are at a turning point. We must be careful to take account of the age distribution of the leaders. The AFL's top bureaucracy is very old. But new presidents are appearing; many are in their forties or early fifties. Unionization has been growing most rapidly in the public employment arena. There are millions of recently organized public employees.

A critical question is whether there is a reasonable chance for the young people starting low on the hierarchy to advance. Within the same generation only few people are likely to advance far. The question is whether over two generations many can move up.

Recently I had lunch at one of the la-gest banks in New York that twenty years ago had no Catholics and ten years ago no Jews in its organization. Today there are hundreds of blacks and Puerto Ricans working there. Most of them are in the lowest jobs, but they are there in large numbers.

If New York is going to survive, employers have no option but to let these new people in because they have no other labor force on which to draw. Sixty percent of the new labor force will come from the city's minority groups.

People born at the end of the queue are always in trouble. If an individual is not only poor but black, he is in worse trouble. If in addition to being poor and black a child is reared by only one parent, the situation is still worse. The amazing thing is not that many people are badly off; the amazing thing is that not all their offspring are crippled for life.

Let us turn this situation around. We should be surprised not by the prevalence of crime, alienation, psychological collapse, and suicide, but rather by the stability of the social system. Given the existing pathology and inequality, our society is sounder than we have reason to expect.

If we knew how to make all people equal, and decided to do so, we would inevitably prepare the ground for new discontent. All social change brings with it unexpected as well as anticipated consequences, and we must allow for this feedback.

I question whether Ronald Reagan or George Wallace have a chance of being nominated by their respective parties, let along elected. Regardless of whether the public is discontented, I doubt that it would respond in this fashion. Having served the past seven presidents, I am impressed with one point: the continuity of national policy. It changes slowly and only at the margins. The president of the United States does not have the power to do much, except in times of war or a Cuban crisis.

HOROWITZ: How does the black population fit your model of slow and steady progress, especially during a period when affirmative action directly confronts an equally potent legal rival, seniority rules?

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GINZBERG: Some blacks stayed in the South; some even stayed on the farm. Many blacks who wanted to stay were pushed off the farm by the enclosure movement resulting from national agricultural policies that cheapened the cost of capital. But people generally move freely in the United States; they move because they think they can improve themselves. And the blacks have kept moving during the past three and one-half decades at a rate that has reduced their concentration in the South from 80 percent to below 50 percent.

Some northern blacks are returning now because the South has changed over the years. But as late as 1960 there was not, with the exception of such unpleasant jobs as working in a steel foundry, a single manufacturing job open to a black man or woman in the whole of the South, In the 1960s blacks broke into textiles, and more recently into other industries. But many remain on the outside.

Hence there are a great many poor blacks. All blacks suffer disabilities. The United States is indeed a racist society. But you cannot jump from this statement to say that nothing has happened to improve the circumstances of blacks, or that nothing is better than what we have now.

There are many blacks who are better off today. Let me be as concrete as I can. A black high school dropout who drives a bus in New York and whose wife works for Macy's as a saleswoman have a joint income of approximately $19,000. You cannot tell me that they are not better off than their parents on a southern farm. Harlem is experiencing a decrease in population; people are leaving. They are leaving because they have better places to go to.

There is no question that blacks in the United States deserve a better deal than they now have. I wrote The Negro Potential before most people recognized the enormity of this problem. But I do not understand why one must argue that there is not a substantial, growing black middle class. What is the middle class? People with more income and more opportunities than those lower on the income scale.

I have been teaching at Columbia for forty years. I used to have one black student per year in each class. Do not ask me what the figure is now, but it is larger. Anyone who graduates from the Graduate School of Business can command a starting salary of around $15,000 per year. Clearly many blacks have no prospect of being admitted, but many others are making it.

HOROWITZ: Even if the goal of full employment is feasible, is the goal of satisfactory and worthy utilization of talent possible?

GINZBERG: The United States has little prospect, even with a favorable conjunction of political and other forces, to absorb all of its underutilized human resources and put them into productive work in the near future. There are as many as twenty or even twenty-five million people seeking a job or a new job. Some are so discouraged that they have ceased to look for work; others are unemployed; still others work only part-time out of necessity; many are caught in jobs that pay little and have no prospects. Even if everything goes well--good leadership and an early consensus--a national solution will not be quickly forthcoming.

On the other hand, we are beginning to make a serious effort to guarantee everybody who wants to work a chance to work. If this concern becomes national, it will represent a substantial advance, one that I have been awaiting.

HOROWITZ: What measures are currently underway to reduce the current high figure of unemployment? Or do the economic and political elites believe that an army of unemployed is both necessary and good to stimulate productivity?

GINZBERG: The National Commission for Manpower Policy includes by statute five members of the cabinet. What Congress wants from the commission is guidance on updating the Employment Act of 1946.

The chairman of the board of the Federal Reserve Bank, no flaming radical, made a speech in Athens a few months ago in which he established a zero unemployment rate as a national goal. Furthermore, he stated that the government must become the employer of last resort. Arthur Burns recommended that public jobs pay 10 percent below minimum wage; he speculated that a constitutional amendment is desirable to assure that the level be kept down.

Nevertheless, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board said that the nation should have a zero unemployment rate and that the federal government should be the employer of last resort. These statements are strong.

Senator Humphrey, chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, will be holding a major assembly in Washington within a month built around the Joint Economic Committee's concern with employment policy. The president, despite his conservative stance, keeps repeating that our unemployment rate, even though it is dropping, is much too high,

No one in public office favors a policy of inaction; the differences--and they are great--concern what kinds of action to take. The Democrats are revising the Hawkins and Humphrey Bill as a first effort. The president recently vetoed the Public Works Bill. It is always difficult to call close issues, especially in an election year. But within five years the United States will be a fair distance down the road toward evolving a national employment policy that will make it easier for people who want to work to find a job.

You ask about the wage structure. I ran a meeting with the presidents of several large unions under the auspices of the commission. Humphrey spoke at lunch. He pressed his friends to recognize that if they wanted congressional action on public service employment, they would have to be flexible on the wage problem. One cannot have trade union wage rates and a large-scale public service program. Humphrey suggested that the unions' major concern should be with displacement. As long as public employment does not displace union workers from their jobs, union leaders have little to worry about.

But the wage problem is sticky. The last secretary of labor was wary of a large public service program because of the difficulties on the wage front.

HOROWITZ: You have served seven presidents and one cannot help but wonder which presidents listened well and which did not, and in what areas they did their listening. Surely each man did not react in the same way.

GINZBERG: I do not claim to have influenced any of them. I was a kibbitzer. They were entitled to my advice, and from time to time I offered it.

My closest relationship was with Eisenhower. I knew Eisenhower intimately. I had an arrangement with Eisenhower predating his moving into the White House. He read what I wrote. I gave him advice on a wide range of subjects for eight years. I started before the 1952 election by suggesting that he stay out of Wisconsin, since he was likely to be embarrassed by Seantor McCarthy. "You don't have to go in. You're going to win. Don't bother."

My second piece of advice was to commute the sentences of the Rosenbergs. I said, "I do not know whether they are guilty or not guilty. If they are guilty, you will not learn anything if they are electrocuted. Why not commute their sentences?" My batting average did not improve much, but I have many personal and confidential letters from the president explaining why he did not follow my advice.

In Washington you never know when you have influence. Senator Clark held hearings on the Civil Rights Act in 1963. He asked me to testify. Kennedy had sent over a bill which did not include the equal employment clause. Several of us were upset, believing that access to jobs was more important than access to public accommodations. Without a job or income a black man can make little use of his freedoms.

I have directed my energies to fashioning a system of ideas about human resources and manpower and have sought opportunities to gain a hearing for these ideas in many different ways, primarily through writing. Hence the question of influence and impact must be primarily indirect and cumulative. I have never been deeply involved in either legislative drafting or administering programs.

I mentioned my book The Negro Potential, published in 1956. I responded to a request of the National Urban League in 1952. Its Executive Board was engaged in a reappraisal. I studied the problem and suggested to the board that more jobs were opening up than there were trained people to fill them. The NUL leadership found this formulation helpful and began to adjust its programming accordingly. For two or three years I did extensive lecturing on this theme to black audiences concerned with advancing their economic wellbeing.

Similarly with The Life Styles of Educated Women, which the Conservation of Human Resources published in the mid-1960s. Here too we broke new ground; we focused on an emerging problem. By being ground breakers we had considerable influence in framing the issues and suggesting some of the answers.

HOROWITZ: Was there any critical mass at Columbia University that helped you in this period of time? Was there any factor of work within your academic environment that inputed into your own activity in the policy area?

GINZBERG: If you are located in New York; if you have a dean who is especially fond of you and makes connections for you early in life with the Rockefeller Foundation; if you have a cousin who is a brilliant psychiatrist willing to donate a lot of time free of charge; if as a result of the turmoil of war you become the advisor to the surgeon general of the War Department; if you then become close friends with the personal physician and close friend of General Eisenhower; if General Eisenhower later becomes president of Columbia; if he then is interested in Columbia taking the lead to study the manpower experience of World War II, and if he then appoints the dean to obtain financing for the project--if all of these serendipitous events occur, a foundation can be established for policy research at a university.

But the difficulties remain severe. Universities are organized in terms of disciplines; excellence in a specialty is what pays off. But policy studies require investigators who are problem, not discipline

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oriented. For thirty-seven years I have worked with interdisciplinary teams in fields that have included economists, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, historians, psychiatrists. I even had a dentist on the staff last year; he did a good study of dental services under national health insurance as part of our ongoing work in health policy research.

Because of another group of serendipitous events my internal relationships within the university are conducive to work, not to administrative power plays. My group has concentrated solely on research and has not been involved in teaching. This concentration has kept us out of trouble. But it has not been a costless resolution.

In short, policy research at a university is feasible if the following conditions prevail: the support of a president, major national corporations, the principal foundations, and assembling a congenial group of academicians who share an interest in policy.

POLICY AND EQUITY

An Interview with Seymour Martin Lipset
Professor of Sociology
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution,
and Peace, at Stanford University

POLICY AND EQUITY - Seymour Martin Lipset

HOROWITZ: The problem of equality, the state of being equal, is linked to the problem of equity, the quality of being fair and just. For while the two are organically related, indeed, often spoken of as isomorphic, being fair and making sure that everyone in a society has the same life chances is no easy matter.

Add to that a built in ambiguity between equality in starting positions, i.e., everyone should have the same opportunity, and equality of outcomes, everyone should be guaranteed a decent standard of living and security, and one can begin to see that what first appears as a self-evident proposition is a complex, often cross-purposed abstraction. For the purposes of our dialogue it might be wisest and simplest to avoid nitpicking at the conceptual level, and get on with the task of studying equality in America, taking for granted the global sense of the situation.

As a concept, equality has an infinite shade of meanings. For example, even were we to accomplish full job satisfaction and participation by our black citizens, or the full equality in economic terms of women in the labor force, we would still be faced with problems of other minorities: problems of the aged, the young, and a host of varieties of sub-ggroups. Even were we to resolve the employment problem of all these groups, we might have another category of problems: for example, the problems of the rights of fat people or skinny people, short people vs. tall people, or the rights of animals, the rights of subjects of research. With respect to equity, one can argue the case for whatever cause one happens to believe in. In this way, civil rights issues impede civil liberties--a dangerous treadmill.

If equity were ever fully realized, it would mean that, in effect, we would all start in the race of life at the same place and the fastest would win. The problem is the imagery of a footrace leaves unclear whether the better and swifter should win the game, or whether the hurdles should be set so that we all end in the same place. There is a starting point concept of equity and a terminal point concept of equity.

But if we get beyond the epistimological hurdle we still have the problem of the rise of contrary demands. At this point, environmental groups, ecological groups, population control groups, and abortion groups-- are all concerned with zero growth or limited growth. For these groups, high, rapid-paced growth is, in the words of Dennis Meadows, highly stressful. To ease the sense of stress means to limit the amount, the pace, and even the quality of growth.

Often the same people who champion the rights of women or blacks, also defend environmental protection agency controls and population control mechanisms; in other words, they advocate limited growth. But those who want to limit growth do not necessarily want to redistribute the present pie. With an infinite, or rapidly expanding pie, the problem of taking from one person and giving to another does not arise. When, however, that pie is finite, inflexible and rigid, then the problem becomes one of distribution. Then one finds a sharp antagonism between those who maintain that the quality of life has deteriorated because of continuing growth, and those who maintain that there remain unsatisfied demands that are constitutionally guaranteed.

At present we are confronted with a policy problem of enormous magnitude, enhanced by the fact that the kinds of theorizing that we have dealt with are primarily neo-Marxian and neo-Keynsian paradigms, both of which assume affluence, if not opulence, and both of which assume a continued expansion of technological growth, energy resources and energy availabilities. Both categorically deny the neo-Malthusian framework of pestilence, war, and shortages of minerals.

In the world of social science, very little attention is given to questions of scarcity. There are assumptions of abundance, and the consequences are that when you have an oil boycott, or a shortage of basic minerals, the shock is enormous and the fallout is, in policy terms and in social research terms, to put it mildly, considerable. This leads us to the question of whether we can even make accurate predictions about the year 1976, never mind the year 2000. When we entered this decade the literature hardly mentioned the possibility of limited resources, or the idea of limits, period. Only now is the concept of affluence being challenged as a geographical or an ecological reality.

If we pose the problem accurately we can at least work our way out of the woods. Accurate posing of the problem is that we have two powerful contrasting paradigms. One is an infinite demand for equity, and the other, is an equally powerful demand for finite, if not zero, growth.

LIPSET: If you look at the problem of equality in the American context, for that matter in the world context, the term has had a number of meanings. The two most essential are equality of opportunity, that is the equal right of individuals to get ahead, to determine whatever position they can attain in career terms. The other is equality of condition, or what has become to be known in recent years as equality of result. This latter concept of equality is a modern version of the old communist notion, from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs. That is, people get what they need. Society does not differentiate in reward.

In American society, and in the socialist and communist movement as well, the emphasis in practice, though not in ideals, has been equality of opportunity. That has been what Americans have meant when they talked about this being an egalitarian society. Some suggest a third meaning--equality of respect, independent of the other two. This is what Tocqueville and other foreign travelers meant when they said that Americans, regardless of the tremendous actual difference in status or income, treated each other as individuals who deserved respect. They were amazed that servants and members of the lower strata did not have to bow down or show deference.

One of the strongest indications of how powerful the emphasis on the equality of opportunity has been was the ideology of the first Workingmen's party, so named, in the world. It was formed in New York and Philadelphia, and a number of other eastern cities, in the late 1820s. The New York party, which was the strongest, actually proposed the setting up of a state-supported boarding school, in what even by our contemporary standards would be a very sophisticated document, because they argued in their literature that the opportunity for all children, rich and poor, to go to the same school, the same common school, what we now term an integrated school, was not enough to guarantee equality of opportunity. Children coming from rich, well-to-do, better educated families had a stimulating environment--were culturally superior to use modern phraseology, while others were deprived.

They then actually proposed as part of the program of a political party that to guarantee equality of opportunity, all children must have the same environment for 24 hours a day, which meant taking them away from their parents and sending them to state supported boarding schools. They proposed that children from the age of 6 attend such a school. I submit this proposal is the most radical ever made by a political party, one which makes the programs of contemporary socialist-communist parties seem moderate.

What they were proposing was not to nationalize property, but to nationalize the children. And they actually received something like fifteen percent of the vote in New York. They elected some members of the Legislature and the City Council. While this was a clearly utopian proposal and has been forgotten, it indicates the strength at that early period in the nation's history of the belief in the necessity to equalize opportunity for people to move ahead. This was, of course, the same time that America was still a slave society. But the effort to make the emphasis on equality of opportunity a reality was powerful and it has remained strong through American history.

What has enabled people to move up, is not a value system, but the fact of an expanding population, an expanding economic structure, and, in particular, mass immigration. Studies which have been made of the occupational position of immigrants, as shown from Census data indicate, that the immigrants generally came to America from Europe, some from Asia, with little education and little skill so that they appeared here first at the bottom of the social structure. They brought muscle power and they took unskilled labor jobs.

By taking these jobs at the bottom they made it possible for native born Americans, for the children of the previous generation of immigrants to move up. Many of the lowly immigrants felt reasonably happy because in a sense they moved up also--not socially--but they generally had a higher standard of living than they had in Europe, or Japan, their children did much better, and their grandchildren, the third generation, tended to do as well or better than old stock Americans.

Mass immigration lasted into the 1920s. It stopped completely in the Depression which caused all kinds of problems; but since World War II there has been a migration pattern within North America which encourages mobility. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and to some extent, southern whites, the North American peasantry, have moved into the cities. Millions of Mexicans and other Latin Americans also enter the U.S. Finally and continually it should be noted that women as a group have played a role similar to that of immigrants or blacks in the system. They have taken the less privileged jobs; they constitute the white collar proletariat. Telephone operators, secretaries, key-punch operators, nurses, teachers in the elementary schools, these are lower level jobs held by women. By doing so they have permitted men, often their fathers, their husbands, their sons, to have better positions.

The upshot of these processes in statistical terms, as reported in very good studies of social mobility in recent decades, by Dudley Duncan, Robert Hauser and Christopher Jencks, is the initially surprising finding that the United States comes very close to equality of opportunity for white males. Family background makes some difference for this group, but not very much. Christopher Jencks and a group of his colleagues who analyzed income data, found that the difference between brothers, and totally unrelated randomly selected men, was of the order of only $500 a year. That is, the income difference between that received by any two unrelated men and that reported for the average pair of brothers was $500. This points up how little difference family background seems to make for white males, but it must be stressed the picture is quite different for blacks, Chicanos, and for women. The latter groups contribute heavily to the lower rungs of the structure.

Those now entering at the bottom are, however, faced with the possibility that there ma- not be any new recruits after them. The blacks and the white peasants may have no replacements on the bottom. The demand for equal rights by women and blacks, if successful, means that white males will hold fewer high level jobs in a stable population, with limited migration from foreign and non-urban areas. It is possible, of course, that the technological or occupational structure will continue to be upgraded, that the proportion of lowly occupations will continue to decline, while the proportion of jobs requiring high levels of education and technological training will increase. These processes imply a class structure which looks like a diamond rather than a pyramid. With technological development, society shifts from a pyramid, i.e., most positions are at the bottom, to a diamond, i.e., most positions are in the middle. Such changes like mass immigration mean more upward movement than downward from one generation to another.

These kinds of structural changes which have gone on for many generations, however, seem to have slowed down considerably. As I noted earlier, this means that any further progress toward equality will require an increase in downward mobility. If some move up, others have to move down. If women move up, men have to move down proportionately. If you have a situation where the women's role in the occupational structure has been on the average much lower than men's--if the women move up toward the same proportion of occupations that they are in the population or in the labor force, then a certain proportion of men have to have lower jobs than they had in the previous generation. If blacks and Chicanoes move up in a non-expanding society without new immigrants and new migrants coming in, then a certain number of whites have to come down.

These developments are beginning to occur and are beginning to hurt. There are complaints and concerns about them. particularly in relation to government affirmative action programs designed to implement equality of result with respect to sex and race. Equality, in other words, is beginning to cost. It is not just a free good, as in a certain sense it was, a kind of psychic as well as technical free good in the expanding population of the past. As a result, we may be-

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gin to have in the next generation, or even in the present one, a considerable degree of tension. This is obviously a very real problem to those who are students, who are graduating soon, and who have to go out into the labor market. They are undoubtedly aware of the changed situation from ten or fifteen years ago. One reason for the change is the fact that there are more women in the labor force. One has to recognize this.

The number of employed people in the United States today is at an all-time high. The labor force is larger than ever before because of the tremendous increase in the 1960s of young people; but even more, because of the great increase in the number of women who are ready to take jobs, who are trained for jobs. Insofar as there has been an increase in the number of such women, considerably above the normal growth of the labor force, full employment would require a much larger increase in the number of jobs.

It is unfortunately true that one of the major causes of the recession, particularly for the better educated, is the incursion of women who are working, or who want to work. We are now in a situation in which some people (women) get more, while others (men) have to take less. In the context of a limited growth economy, women's liberation is painful for a lot of men, particularly white males. In fact, black females are doing better than black males, and the better educated among them, those just out of college, are doing better than white males. We welcome progress, but we sometimes forget the strains that accompany it. The improvement in the black situation adversely affects some whites.

Take the fact that as of this year the proportion of blacks entering college as freshmen is actually higher than the proportion of blacks in the population. The Census reports that 12.6 percent of the entering freshmen in 1975 were blacks, an incredible statistic given the past history of educational deprivation for the black population. It is true that one has to add very quickly that a large proportion of those black freshmen are not going to the same kinds of schools as the average white. They are disproportionately concentrated in black colleges in the South, and in community and junior colleges--schools which are not as good academically as those which most whites attend.

But still, it is a tremendous advance to be able to discuss a situation where the same proportion of blacks have entered college as whites. The percentage of blacks graduating is still considerably below that of whites. The gain means that blacks are competing for jobs which used to be a monopoly of whites. And in a non-expanding labor market, if blacks increase their share of the good jobs, then some whites will get less. They are going to resent it, are going to feel frustrated and embittered. As we move toward equality of opportunity in the real sense for everyone--black and whites, men and women--we must learn that equality of success also means equality of failure. In an open society one has to remember that the number of good jobs--the number of prestigious, highly rewarded positions, is a minority of the total positions. If every college graduate wants to have a pretty good job, and there just are not that many high-level jobs around, if women college graduates refuse to become housewives, and compete for jobs which were formally male preserves, we will witness increased frustration among their brothers.

HOROWITZ: You have described a revolution of falling expectations. Many of us have grown up in a world of Stevensonian rhetoric which embodied a revolution of rising expectations, and which depended on the infinite expansion of the GNP. Meeting these expectations depends on infinite energy resources.

Can a society and can a population participate in a revolution of falling expectations? What does it imply? Does it mean having a car longer, rather than trading it in every year, or owning your home at forty rather than when one is first married? Perhaps the house itself will be smaller, with fewer amenities. Can U.S. society as a whole, move in the direction of diminished expectations, or is this a selective process in which some people participate and others do not? That is to say, one unanswered question is, how many people are actually willing to participate in a revolution of declining expectations?

At the top, are people who have the money to pay for what have become luxuries. There are, after all, those for whom 55¢ for a gallon of gas is marginal to their household economy, or to their sense of security. There are others for whom a dollar a gallon of gas would mean a great sacrifice. There are some who can still afford large luxury cars, and there is still clearly such a market. In every area there are those who can, in fact, afford the luxuries of life. Despite the contradiction between demands for equity and for zero growth, a strata of the population has become even more visibly affluent.

One of the marvels of American life historically has been the kind of invisible affluence wealthy Americans have been able to generate. Yet, in an odd way, wealthy Americans have really violated the Veblen thesis, by despising their wealth. If you scrutinize young people in any college or university, you will have a hard time indeed determining who has personal family wealth and who does not, which any European could immediately determine on the basis of clothing and mannerisms. Now, all of a sudden, decreased economic growth creates a visible economic elite, that has the potential to become an object of aggression and class rivalry and class warfare in a much more earnest and bitter way.

LIPSET: There is an interesting side to the affluent advocating no growth. Much of the advocacy of no growth--a more clean environment, ecological decency, etc.--comes from well educated, affluent people who are concerned about protecting certain environments from overcrowding, dirt, and the like. But in many cases the environments they are protecting are ones to which they have access, and limiting further development deprives the less privileged.

For example, Cape Cod was declared a National Seashore under a Kennedy bill, which meant that the existing density of housing could not increase. This law also means that existing houses on Cape Cod have gone up three or four times in value because these are now a much more scarce commodity. Cape Cod is a wonderful place; but should access to it be limited to a relatively small number of affluent individuals? Those who summer on Martha's Vineyard are now involved in a comparable effort. If you go to Martha's Vineyard you find that people there are outraged that the Martha's Vineyard boat company advertises for day trip visitors. Those who own summer homes do not want more people. But only a few thousand people own homes on Martha's Vineyard, and if the legislation that has been introduced by Senator Kennedy as an extension of the Cape Cod bill passes, they will have a monopoly on this nice environment.

There are many two, three, or four-acre summer plots. If these are subdivided into half-acre plots, quarter-acre or smaller ones, the result will be increased density of population, destruction of nature, more pollution--but a lot more people will have access to a better life in the summer. The issue is whether to keep this and other comparable areas clean and nice for a relatively few rich people, or whether to increase the density and dirt, and give many more people the opportunity to live a more decent life. It is ironic that many people who consider themselves liberal or left politically are defending their right to special privileges, to hold the masses down as part of what they present as a liberal program.

The labor movement has tended in recent years to be very much opposed to a lot of the ecological demands of the conservationists because the trade unions put jobs ahead of cleanliness. They are ready to take a considerable amount of pollution, if cutting down on pollution means reducing the number of jobs. Well-to-do people who do not have to worry about jobs quite properly worry about pollution; but to those for whom a job is a necessary condition for supporting their family, pollution may be worth it. Affluent people, many of them think of themselves on the left, simply do not understand that for many the alternative to pollution is bad, if it involves cutting down on the number of factories, or access routes to get to work and the like.

These questions are real political issues, not hypotheticals. In California, in June 1976, the voters overwhelmingly defeated an initiative proposal to severely hamstring the operation of nuclear energy plants which had been put on the ballot by liberal conservationist forces. The organized labor movement was the chief force opposing the proposal. They want nuclear energy, not because they like nuclear energy per se, or have, for some reason, a different view of the dangers involved, but because they see that nuclear energy means cheaper abundant power, cheaper power means more factories, more factories mean more jobs. Evaluating the risks and other trade-offs, they choose more jobs rather than various kinds of cleanliness. The conflict is a real class issue, even though many of the more well-to-do people pressing for conservation, ecology, no growth, cleaner environment, etc., see themselves fighting for a better, cleaner American society--not recognizing that for the less privileged cleanliness is not the supreme virtue.

HOROWITZ: Ecology is also in part a racial issue. In East St. Louis there is (or was) a large chemical plant which was burning soft coal, which is relatively inexpensive, and the plant was asked by the local EPA to use anthracite (hard coal) to turn out its products. The cost of the changeover, and by the way, apparently anthracite burns more rapidly (bituminus burns dirtier for the most part) and the wind currents brought the chemical reagent, or the chemical agents from East St. Louis to St. Louis. The people who worked in the plant were primarily from East St. Louis, and about ninety-five percent of them were black.

The consequence was that the corporation delivered an ultimatum that they would have to leave if they were forced to burn anthracite rather than bituminus. In point of fact, they did leave; one of the plants shut down. East St. Louis is a small urban community with extraordinarily high unemployment, and this put another 500 or 600 black proletarians on the labor market. So the clash between the Environmental Protection Agency and the trade union movement in practice issues into a heavy racial as well as class antagonism, which certainly cannot be dismissed. Again, it is not a question of right and wrong, but of competing demands.

I would add that there are new concepts of what equality and equity are about, removing these concepts from the sphere of social mobility, and moving them into what you might call socialist scripture. Now the question of equity demands very often is linked to demands of ethnic minority groups, of women as a sexual group, of all kinds of phenomena having to do with birthright claims, religiousity, race, and sex. The breakdown, the limits of continued upward mobility have led to a resurrection of overvalues, which, in their own way, inhibit social reform.

First, because overvalues make a claim on society, not in the name of the normal channels of going ahead or moving toward equity, but in the name of equity within a racial group or within an ethnic minority group. And that produces yet a more complex, even more anguishing problem. What is to be the central thrust of American demands for equity? If our society is to become pluralized, then it is pluralism and fragmentation along racial or sexual lines. Then, what is the inner core of equity values within American life? Do they exist? And can they be retained? We are dealing with an entire panoply of problems as we enter the third century, having to do with a definite set of contradictory demands which have led, in my opinion, to a breakup of the paradigms that we have come to live with. And that, it seems to me, is where a considerable amount of energy is going to have to be focused.

We must define much more precisely what we mean by equity; we must envision an achievement orientation--the son outdoing the father, the daughter outdoing the mother--in terms of mobility in the economic ladder, in contrast to a notion of ethnic homogeneity, or religious homogeneity that espouses the larger national culture. It becomes incumbent upon us to take much more seriously the possibility of breakup of our national culture through disintegration rather than breakup through revolution.

The problem at the top is the increasing visibility of those who are affluent; the problem at the bottom is the growing difficulty in isolating and examining who is the underclass. Beyond that point we have new forms of struggle at the bottom that were much more muted in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth century. We used to talk in terms of a lumpenproletariat, in terms of residual capacity or residual phenomena within the society. Now we change all of that for a respectable designation: marginals, or marginal groupings. We do not have a struggle between what you might call an underclass and a working class--between those whose revenues are largely derived from marginal occupational activities which have mushroomed in an urban context and from all kinds of state benefits and programs, and those who continue in the labor force as proletarians. Now we really do not have at this point a rhetoric to explain the breakdown of equity at this level and the breakdown of equity demands.

How does one address a member of the working class who comes home with $150.00 and how does one assure that person that the individual who receives welfare benefits or food stamp advantages, which net out to $115.00, should not, in some sense, be considered an enemy--to be blunt about it? How does one create forms of cohesion between those competing groups at the bottom of the ladder? We have a series of complicated but at the same time fundamental issues that could very easily tear our society apart. The questions that we are posing about equality are not reducible to the bigger the better, or the more the merrier, or to making do with less, or small is beautiful. They point to the incompatibilities of many demands, or at any rate, the failure on the part of social science to resolve what appears to be incompatibilities.

LIPSET: If I may pick up a related topic on these problems of the future--for me, one of the saddest statements known to man--one that nobody I know of knows how to challenge or change, no matter what alternative social system or reform or revolution they would like to see, is that fifty percent of any population is below the median. Now that trite observation is in the context of thinking of an open egalitarian society a very unhappy statement, because it means that fifty perecent are going to be in the lower half, must be in the lower half as long as society is stratified in any way in terms of reward, status, good positions, more interesting jobs, kinds of education received.

For most of human history populations have been stratified in boxes, i.e., in ancient slave societies, in the feudal system, the Indian caste system, and others. In such societies, even those where there was some mobility, most people were brought up to believe that they were in an appropriate position by virtue of their birth--that their birthright status was all they could have, and they should try to do well in whatever box, station, they were in. But modern industrial society rejected ascription, fostered a belief in achievement.

We now have social systems, those of North America, western Europe, the Communist world, in which many more than half the population want to be in the upper half. Many more than a quarter of the population want to be in the upper quarter. As children socialized in these societies, they are taught that they can succeed, reach high level positions, if they study and work hard.

How do societies deal with the gap between desired and attainable statuses? In some countries, the Soviet Union for example, this has become a real problem calling for government policy. The Soviets have allowed high school education to expand with demand. As many Soviet youth as want to go to high school and graduate from high school. But the number of openings in university, in higher education, has not expanded with demand. At the present time, something like five or six times as many Soviet youth who are high school graduates seek to go to college or university as there are places. This means five out of six just do not go. They take the entrance exams, but only one of six can qualify for higher education. The Soviets have a stratified educational system, much like ours--better and worse colleges, specialized schools, prestigious ones which are very selective in admissions, and the like. But no matter how well most Soviet youth do in high school, most of them cannot go on to colleges because the State limits entrance places to the number of college or university graduates needed by the economy. This problem does not only occur in planned communist societies. In Western Germany today a similar situation exists. Many more Germans graduate from high school than may be admitted into universities.

What happens to those who want to go to universities but cannot? There is little doubt that they are terribly unhappy people. Soviet writers, sociologists and others have written about this. Many of the ambitious rejectees will not go to work. The Soviets face a real problem with high school graduates who refuse to take regular jobs. They know that almost all of the good jobs in society go to college graduates. As a result, unless and until they can get into college, many wander around refusing to be absorbed into the regular labor force.

The Japanese have a similar phenomenon among their youth. They call them Ronin, the masterless people, after the masterless Samurai of medieval Japan. The United States, and a number of Western countries postpone this problem since they treat college and university the way the Soviets do high school, that is, allow higher education to expand up to the limit of demand. People may not be admitted by the colleges they desire, but almost everybody who wants to may get into some institution. The problem faced by these societies is an increasing number of people with college degrees who constitute a greater number of applicants for the kinds of jobs associated with college degrees than exist. The problem has been exacerbated by the increase in the number of women college graduates who want to go to work.

In future years, a larger and larger proportion of the college graduate population will have to accept jobs at a much lower skill, income and status level than used to be associated with higher education. This means, of course, that there will be increasing numbers of people frustrated individually. I use the word individually rather than collectively because I think they will see themselves as failures rather than feeling that there is something wrong with the society because it has not provided a niche for them. In a sense, the more egalitarian a stratified society is in terms of equality of opportunity, the more frustrated people it will contain. The only egalitarian society which would not sustain such frustrations is the sort of social system that ideal communism supposedly would be--one where there are no stratified rewards.

But clearly, regardless of what one may think is possible in some ultimate future, communism in this sense is not going to exist in any human society in the lifetime of any of us here and probably well beyond that, for the Marxian condition for communism, abundance, and the elimination of manual work by machines is a long way off. The spread of egalitarian goals will increase frustration. More equality means more failure, more failure, more frustration.

This syllogism brings up the problems faced by categories of people who previously were ascriptively allocated the lower jobs of the society but who now respond to the promise of equal opportunity. When very few blacks could look forward to the opportunity to go to college or get decent jobs, those blacks who had steady jobs as laborers, postmen, or Pullman porters, were doing well within the context of their own group. A black did not have to feel himself a failure for being a Pullman porter, or a postman, since he knew, and those around him knew, that the occupational horizons of blacks were largely limited to such positions. When few girls were able to get into medical school, those who became nurses were doing pretty well, they were part of the high-status medical complex. Now that larger numbers of women are going to medical school it is easy to anticipate that this is going to make nurses feel frustrated, and less happy with their jobs as the proportion of physicians who are women increases. The only development that could avoid this is to find ways to increase the numbers of men in the nursing profession, so that the identification of nursing as a lower status women's profession changes.

These kinds of problems in societies moving toward increased equality of opportunity are rarely anticipated. Some psychiatrists, for example, suggest that recent increases in the black population of certain kinds of mental illness are a consequence of increased lack of opportunity--that blacks in lower status jobs are now more likely to feel that they failed personally. The same tendency has been commented on among women. Many have written about the problems posed by the demotion of the roles of housewife and mother as a consequence of the movement toward sexual equality. There are many women who are "only housewives and mothers," and they tend increasingly to be looked down upon by working women, particularly by professional women with careers. They have become failures.

Similarly, as more women attain prestigious occupational roles once held solely by men, many women in traditionally women's occupations, like secretaries and nurses, will feel inferior, unhappy, about their role in life in ways that were not true twenty and thirty years ago. It is going to take a long time for these kinds of relationships affecting status satisfaction to sort themselves out. It is unfortunately necessary to recognize the notion that more equality of opportunity makes for a more happy society may be true in the long run, but clearly it is not necessarily true in the short.

HOROWITZ: When you start to think about how you address this kind of problem, it becomes a very serious matter. I do not think we have many mechanisms to do so, but we do have some. First, we can change our labeling. Persons used to be called garbagemen; now they are called sanitation engineers. A person used to be a truck driver; now he or she can be called a truck chauffeur. This is not just verbal sleight of hand, for as you change labels, you change economic rewards. When sanitation engineers make almost as much, if not as much, as professors, then the status **incongruity** between the sanitation engineer and the professor diminishes.

One can easily see how someone with an advanced degree could go into sanitation engineering. Some occupations, like hotel management, until a few years ago were really residual activities that people went into by virtue of the fact that there was not much else available. Now we have entire schools of hotel management. We even have advanced degrees in jazz. In some sense, the solution to the problem is to change labels regarding what is and what is not a desirable occupation. Label change has to be made to stick by virtue of economic advancement for those people who up to now have been disadvantaged. If one continues to hold constant the wages and salaries of college instructors and assistant professors, and if one begins to lop off the top portion of the professoriate, and at the same time, spends for trade unionization, of let us say the Teamsters, there is no doubt that within a relative few years you are going to have equal salary possibilities for truck drivers: teamsters will make as much as professors. There will still be marginal benefits to being a professor: long summers, for example. On the other hand, that may be counterbalanced by the security in trade union work, vis-a-vis the insecurity of an untenured position.

We have to begin to address these kinds of issues much more frankly, and not simply throw up our hands and recite a lexicon of contradictions within American society. As Professor Lipset said earlier, equity hurts those who have, and hurting those who have becomes the name of the game. This is going to be an interesting period because the ones who will be hurt are often those who are nominally identified with liberal and radical causes. And the ones that will be assisted are often those who have not been so identified. So it will be an intriguing thing indeed to see how ideology or ideological prerequisites are squared with a growing impulse toward equity on a much broader scale than we have hitherto experienced.

LIPSET: There is an interesting development (I have no sense of how widespread it is in statistical terms, though it is quite visible in university communities such as the Boston-Cambridge area, Berkeley, Madison, Ann Arbor and the like) involving persons marginal to the university or intellectual worlds, who try to maintain an identity as graduate students, who week to remain associated with the intellectual community. In order to maintain this fringe role, they work at various jobs which are non-intellectual.

I am told, for example, that the auto industry in Detroit, which has a lot of trouble getting people to work on Mondays, Fridays and weekends, employs a large number of part-time "students" who are ready to work a couple of days a week. For many of these people, the real part of their life is their identity as a student, their involvement in books, intellectual discussions, and living in communes. Since they have to earn some money they take jobs, but the jobs for them are secondary, not their real identity. It does not matter, therefore, what they are doing to earn money--whether they are waiters, on the assembly line, janitors or anything else--that is all secondary. There are probably less than one hundred thousand in this kind of situation, which would be a small fraction of total numbers in the labor force.

Nevertheless, such behavior reflects an example of withdrawal from the competitive structure of an economy in which many try and cannot succeed. It is a rejection of the competitive ethos, an escape into the fringe economy. On the other hand, some ideological veterans of the anti-competitive movement of the sixties are now to be found in small businesses. These are run, ironically, by people who think of themselves as being anti-capitalist. They start restaurants, farms or artisan shops. Many of them see themselves rejecting capitalism, escaping from the materialist economy because by running a business they are not working for someone else. If they have to take a job, they prefer ones like cab driver or postman, where they are not closely supervised.

It would be interesting and important to get some reliable estimate of how much of this behavior occurs. My sense is it is a growing phenomenon that reflects the desire to opt out from full participation--full ego participation--in the competitive society. The rejectees say: "I am going to do my own thing," "I am going to express myself" in all sorts of ways that are not job related. Hence, my job will be only something I do to earn as much money as I need to maintain myself and no more. I do not want a steady job; I do not want a regular job. Obviously, this kind of behavior can only be found among young people. Presumably, as one gets older, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain this fringe role. One wonders what has ha-pened to those people who have been doing these things for the last ten years.

A different kind of change, also resultant in part from the increased emphasis on equal opportunity for all, is the two-job family, a consequence of increased participation by women in the labor force. Among the college educated young professionals, large numbers are married to others in roughly the same occupational category, which means that they are often earning, as a family unit, as much or more than an older professional whose wife is not working. This development affects the income distribution of the country, which is analyzed in terms of family income.

Ironically, the increased participation by women in the labor force serves to make the income distribution, as it is measured by the Census, less equal than it would be otherwise. When there are two or more bread-winners in a family, that family tends to be classified as relatively high in the income structure. This press toward greater income inequality has been intensified since the increase in the number of women working has occurred much more in middle and upper classes, in the college graduate part of the population, than it has in the working class. Working class women are not so attracted to the kinds of jobs they have that they want to keep working after they are married. Many women who are waitresses, key punch operators, or work on the assembly line look forward to escaping boring work by staying home with the children. Being a typist is no great deal. Women in low status employment lack a sense of a career, do not see holding down a monotonous job as a contribution to women's equality.

Those who are editors, executives, professors, teachers, or doctors form the basis of another story. Female professors, lawyers, doctors, and professional women generally want to work after marriage. Hence, the amount of money that is in the hands of upper middle-class families has increased because more wives are working. And to repeat this ironic fact, increased middle class women's participation in the labor force has made for greater inequality of income distribution in the United States than would be reported if the proportion of women working were at the level they were in the 1950s.

HOROWITZ: When we talk about marginal groups, we must not only talk about people who drive taxi cabs or work part-time in factories. We are overlooking, in some measure, the possibility of marginality in areas like prostitution, pimping, gambling, drug sales, drug pushing. These have become big business phenomena in this culture and in this country, and they take up an enormous amount of marginal slack. When one talks about the culture of university life, or possible spin-offs, we are also talking about a phenomena that we have known in the Third World but that we have not known here, which is the rise of urban marginality, or modernization without industrialization. Or, let us say modernizing outpaces industrializing and creates all kinds of marginal pigeonholes for all kinds of different people.

Now what does that do to a concept of equity or to the concept of work as the source of equity? I am reminded of what the economist Albert L. Hirschman always says: there are two ways of looking at a product: one, what goes into it, and the other, the final result of it. It is easy to look at the final outcome--at a television or an automobile and say, I want it, I deserve it, I ought to have it. It is quite another to say, I have to work 454 man hours to have the product. Now, if the choice is work--454 man hours-- or pimping for 5 hours--to get the same product, then there is going to be heavy pressure, it seems to me, on the marginal sector of the intelligentsia, to move into that area. We are so heavily focused in our society on the problem of equity that perhaps we have lost sight of the problem of work. And the problem of the guarantee of equity through labor input and labor power may in fact be a source of the tension that I was mentioning earlier between the marginals and the working classes. I cannot help but think that we have witnessed class antagonism at much sharper levels than we were led to expect by either the Marxian or Keynesian literature.

LIPSET: A lot of this is true. This relates to another problem that we have not talked about--crime. Higher crime rates are characteristic of societies which stress opportunity--which means, as I have emphasized, many failures as well as successes. The United States has had the highest crime rate of any country in the developed world. It is necessary to limit comparisons within this category since, obviously, problems of crime, wealth, and position in countries like India or Saudi Arabia are of a different magnitude. The rates of crime, of course, have steadily increased in the developed world, the United States as well as other countries. Britain, for example, which used to be a relatively crime-less country, has had considerable increases in crime rates since World War II, although they are still behind us.

Social scientists, such as Robert Merton, who have attempted to explain increased crime in modern, more affluent societies, have suggested that to some degree, crime is a way of achieving economic goods without following the legitimate methods of study and work, which for many would not lead to a decent social position or income. Crime, in a way, is a mechanism of social mobility. Increased crime, therefore, may reflect a greater emphasis on equality. The more equality of opportunity, this analysis suggests, the higher the crime rate. Perhaps, therefore, the proverbial high crime rate in the United States is a tribute to the fact that we have had an emphasis on equality of opportunity earlier than other countries. As a result, more Americans have felt frustrated as failures and have taken this illegitimate way to success.

The same processes appear to be at work in the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets do not issue crime statistics, it would appear that they, too, have been experiencing a steady massive increase in the crime rates. In terms of Marxist theory, this should not occur and the Soviets clearly do not understand why it is happening. But the assumption that greater stress of equality of opportunity increases frustration among the "failures" begins to supply reasons for increased crime in the USSR.

In most societies which claim to be open to talent, the kinds of jobs offered to young people, particularly those who do not have a decent education, are generally uninteresting and unrewarding positions, and young people do not want them. Some years ago, a sociologist, Ted Harwood, sought to analyze the sources of the large scale black teenage unemployment in Houston. Harwood concluded that if you look at American youth people (teenagers), regardless of race, they do not like to work, and they do not want to work. In any case, the kinds of jobs available to them do not interest them much.

He argued that the way white young people, particularly middle class ones, escape working is to go to school. That is the appropriate cultural response for them. At that time, he suggested, many black young people who came out of cultural backgrounds which did not find school as a positive experience, (it has often been a punitive experience for many of them) drop out, but like whites they do not go to work. He suggests that generally, those who are not socialized to the culture of the school in America drop out of school, but refuse to go to work. Statistically, they are counted as teenage unemployed. But many of them could have jobs, low level ones to be sure, but regular employment. They refuse to take them or quit, not because the jobs are not available, but because at their age level, steady work is not an appropriate response. By the time they reach adulthood, their twenties, and begin to take on family responsibilities, at that point regular jobs became a dominant pattern for both whites and blacks, although blacks still have a higher rate of unemployment, but one much lower than for teenagers.

PARAPROFESSIONALS, POVERTY, AND POLITICS

An Interview with Frank Riessman
Professor of Education at Queens College
Co-Director New Human Services Institute
Editor of Social Policy magazine.

PARAPROFESSIONALS, POVERTY, AND POLITICS - Frank Riessman

HOROWITZ: Is there any real spin-off from social science to the work in paraprofessionalism that you do at present, or is it simply a legitimation device? Does your social science training in the area of social psychology have any real bearing on the direction of your work on the development of the projects that you have been associated with? Or are such background variables largely irrelevant to the practical efforts you are involved in?

RIESSMAN: I am not sure of the answer, because as you talk about the role of social science and the development of social policy I have two reactions. On the one hand, I am trained in the social sciences, sociology and psychology. On the other hand, in the actual work I have been involved in for the last ten years I rarely use this training in a direct, conscious, explicit way. I wonder whether I could not just have been a well-informed activist and done similar things. Perhaps "well-informed activist" is the wrong phrase -- but somebody who is trained in dialectical thinking, the most important part of my way of dealing with problems.

I wonder about the direct relevance of social science. Much of its value is exaggerated and serves the interests of social scientists who want to make a big thing out of what they are doing. However, sometimes--in a nonspecific way--I use lots of things I have learned in social science. I would have to think about what they are, because this use is not specific and not conscious.

In recent years I have been most interested in two things: in effective human service practice, and in developing policy that actually influences national policy in relation to services and jobs. To try to answer your question though, I am not sure exactly what kind of social science I use. I have to spend a lot of time avoiding the foolishness of social science: the supermethodology, the superprofessionalism, and the plain garbage.

HOROWITZ: I do not wish to push this point too hard, because many people--conservative, liberal, and radical--say what you have said. But the more directly people are plugged into the policy apparatus, the less they seem to have high expectations or opinions about their particular social science training. Nonetheless, if one examines either the editorial board or the composition of Social Policy--the magazine you edit--they are, in fact, composed largely of sociologists, economists, and political scientists: Lester Thurow, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Lynn Turgeon, Herbert Gans, and, of course, yourself.

Why is it, how is it, that there seems to be a dual relationship to being involved in policy issues and being trained in the social sciences? At one level there seems to be such heavy reliance on personnel derived from these areas, while at another there seems to be disdain for this background variable. After all, social scientists are still a small part of the American population. There seems to be an extraordinary degree of hostility manifested by the practitioners themselves for this kind of phenomenon. What is it, then, that leads to this dialectic, to this negative and positive charge toward being trained in the social sciences?

RIESSMAN: Most of the writers that we deal with are social science critics. They were Young Turks at one time, but that are not Young Turks anymore. They are people who make their living in the social sciences and think there is something valuable about social science. I wonder, however, if many of them could tell you exactly what it is. We are deeply critical, and most of our articles are written from that kind of critical perspective.

All these people have that quality in common: they are all critics of social science. Many of them have had Marxist training, but they are all critical of Marxism too. These people are not simplistic or mechanical Marxists by any means. What we share is that critical perspective about the social sciences and society. At the same time, all the people who write for us try to be constructive; none of us wants to throw out the whole society and burn it down, nor do we want to burn down social science of Marxism. In that sense we are all implicitly dialectical. You do not throw out the baby with the bathwater, whether it be knowledge, partial knowledge, or society. We deal with problems as people experience them. We go into the ball park of political and social life in America.

In the forties Alvin Gouldner and I started a magazine called Ideas for Action. It was a little magazine without elegance or funding; we raised money by running parties. Harry Belafonte did his first singing at one of our parties, as did Leon Bibb. The parties raised money to put out a magazine of sixteen pages that was concerned with applying whatever was useful in the social sciences to social problems. We did movie reviews like Herbert Gans does in Social Policy today. We worked in the Henry Wallace campaign in 1948.

One of the ideas we introduced was that social services in America should be decentralized, and we proposed a concept called "neighborhood service centers." In the sixties that idea became a reality, twenty years after being a good idea in Ideas for Action. That magazine still lives for me as the epitome of an attempt on the part of social scientists to make ideas live, to make social science valuable, and to rid it of paraphernalia and pretense.

HOROWITZ: A number of people have argued that some concepts related to paraprofessionalism--a movement you are deeply involved with--provide in abstract form an interesting bridge between mass work for mass activities and elite work for professional activities. Is it not the case that the concept of professionalization as a bridge between mass and elite is a good idea only if there were a different set of social circumstances?

Let me put this argument in concrete terms. If you were to evaluate this concept in terms of a socialist system, where trained personnel were in short supply, I could see the advocacy of paraprofessionalism. In fact, it did become operational in China and in Cuba. The problem is to conceptually enforce an intermediary stage of solution within an American social structure that cannot accommodate that intermediary range of activity.

Do you not have within the concept of paraprofessionalism not so much a dialectic of mass and elite as an ambiguity, a problem of what constitutes the boundary line of competence and/or excellence? How does one know at any given point what a paraprofessional is? How can you resolve such an issue within the confines of a commercial society, in which the dynamics of that society operate in terms of professional norms? Have you not in your work taken an idea which on the surface is exceedingly attractive and worked it into a social order that cannot accommodate the concept in practice?

RIESSMAN: There is no question that fully productive human service practices cannot develop completely in capitalist society. Your point is certainly well taken. But let us start at the roots of the paraprofessional movement to put it into some kind of context, and see what it did accomplish within these limits.

I was not an inventor of the paraprofessional or paraprofessional movement. The autobiographical data are that for several years in the 1960s I worked for Mobilization for Youth (MFY), an antipoverty, antidelinquency program funded by the federal government. It was concerned with finding ways of reaching low-income populations, providing better services, and also activating the people in the community. It was a mixture of the things that developed in the sixties: the improvement of services, participation of the poor, etc. I was there because I was interested in those problems. I had written about them and I was permitted to roam around and see what looked most meaningful of all the things being tried. What would work? What would be significant on a larger scale? I found two things of interest--only two out of about sixty.

One of them was (it had nothing to do with paraprofessionals but is important to tell you about) that the kids who were tutoring the other children were those who were learning. There was a lot of tutoring going on, and it was thought that the persons who received the tutoring would benefit. It turned out that that thought was not true. Rather, it was the kid doing the tutoring who benefited.

That finding led me to conceptualize what I called at that time the Helper Therapy Principle. It was the person who gave the help who benefited, and in all the self-help organizations the main force which was producing positive results was that people were playing the helping or teaching role. That principle ultimately became programmed into college kids helping high school kids, who helped sixth-grade kids, who helped fourth-grade kids, and so on. Each of the helping kids was an underachiever. The underachievers benefited enormously as measured by a great variety of indicators. That is what I observed impressionistically at MFY. Since then it has been analyzed very carefully.

The other worthwhile thing that was happening was that people, called at that time parent-school coordinators, "non-professionals," seemed to be doing a lot of good things. They seemed to be able to reach the community, reach the children, understand them better, style the service better, relate to the teachers effectively; and in general they were an important force in bringing the community into the system: changing the professional system somewhat, making it less superprofessional, less removed, less abstract, more real, more concrete, earthy, more community sensitive. I saw that development as a positive thing for human service practice and for people-necessary services.

There is probably more data on the effectiveness of paraprofessionals than there is on the effectiveness of professionals. What occurred was that people used to say, "You are using paraprofessionals; you are using these community people who never worked and are on welfare. How can they be helping other people?" We went through a lot of trouble to gather information demonstrating that paraprofessionals could be effective in their interventions.

Paraprofessionals can improve practices in any society. But in a socialist society they improve it more dramatically and unequivocally--as you suggest--for a number of reasons. First, the professional establishment is not as strong or as resistant as it is in capitalist societies. Second, the need for services is recognized by the entire society. In Cuba, for example, you have to have people innoculated; you have to make everyone literate. You cannot argue as easily that only teachers and doctors can do the job; you have to think in terms of how we can do it quickly with what we have. Thus the use of paraprofessionals in Cuba and China is enormous.

Even in our society there is considerable evidence that human service practice has been greatly improved, that people who get health service from paraprofessionals benefit immeasurably from those services. Kids learning in classes where there are paraprofessionals learn better. The paraprofessionals in correctional institutions rehabilitate offenders better. The use of paraprofessionals has also made the professional system, the agency system, much more community centered. The demand for community control and paraprofessionals together have affected agencies so that they are much more sensitive to community feelings.

Finally, there is an employment crisis. The capitalist system cannot absorb enough workers in the private sector. There are large numbers of people--increasing all the time--who want to work, who want jobs. These jobs are going to have to be created in the public sector, and they are going to have to be created for people who often have not been employed before, large numbers of whom are poorer minorities and women. Basically this expansion is going to be in the human services.

In the sixties I wanted to demonstrate that paraprofessionals were not just good for encouraging participation of the poor--which was the way it was presented--or improving the agencies, but that they could be an important future area for employment. There is a vast need for health services, education, rehabilitation, recreation, art, and so on, and for a large number of people who want to work and who have been completely removed from the labor force. We made a powerful effort to demonstrate that these people could be effectively employed doing useful, needed work.

With all the demonstrations, however, the concept still has not been absorbed by the American public. There is still the widespread misconception that people need lots of training and education before they can do a meaningful job. It is important for people to see that human service work does not require long periods of preprofessional training. Because of the character of human service work, a large part of it can depend on human feelings and human sensitivity.

We can draw on those indigenous qualities immediately and make them valuable in human service jobs. I was interested in demonstrating that those people who were thought to be unemployable were clearly employable; this arena was going to be a major area of employment in the society. That goal has continuity with the present because we moved from new careers, from paraprofessionalism, to the idea of public service employment (and the whole development of legislation around that idea) to the concept of a guaranteed job and full employment--which was a powerful demand of all Democratic candidates for the presidency except Wallace and brings a major new dimension of consciousness to American life,

Fred Hechinger, in describing the sixties, said that one of the few things coming out of that period that worked and stayed was the paraprofessionals. They never had the fanfare that some of the other programs had. They came in more quietly, but they did not go out. They became institutionalized as a basic part of life and relate to the current full-employment agenda.

HOROWITZ: The entire area of your work, and the area of human services as a whole, involves a heavy concentration on public sector spending and support. You seem to be engaged in an effort which presumes an ever increasing role of that public sector in society at a time when political and economic pressures are moving in a reverse direction. When one examines the current thrust, whether political or economic, there is a seeming rebellion against the bureaucratic excesses of that public sector.

Therefore, my question becomes elemental: is not the position that you are involved in contingent upon an ever continued growth in that public sector? When one speaks of new careers, human services, and paraprofessionalism, is there not an implicit--if not an entirely explicit--assumption that we are continuing to move rapidly toward public sector definitions of an economy? That movement raises all kinds of parallel questions.

Without raising the specter of conservatism, the question of who pays for what services, and how the quality of this type of labor is to be evaluated, arises repeatedly. The question of the avoidance of imbalance to the point where the society cannot really absorb such a series of public sector demands; a confusion at some level between the recipients of and donors to the public sector; the tendency toward an enlargement of public sector donation as a result of an increase in public sector recipients--all lead to perpetual economic crisis in the eyes of many conservative critics of this line of work.

How do you now, in this era of fiscal concerns, cope with such a line of reasoning or inquiry? Are you making efforts to accommodate private sector requirements? Or are you suggesting that there is an inexorableness about public sector growth, and that the needs of the poor, disabled, unemployed, untrained, etc., have to be supplied in one fashion or another?

RIESSMAN: There is no question that there is a battle for the public sector. There is resistance to the expansion of the public sector. I wrote a paper recently in which I make the obvious point, but somehow it has not yet registered, that everyone says we are in a recovery phase, that the economy is doing marvelously--profits are up; sales are up; inventories are up; housing starts are up; GNP is up. That movement is the recovery of the private sector.

The public sector has not recovered at all. Quite the contrary: the public sector, on the city, state, and federal levels, is doing poorly. Wages are not rising; cost-of-living increases are not being given; cities have enormous deficits and some are facing bankruptcy. There is a deep depression in the public sector. This development is anomalous in American history. In periods of economic upturn, particularly in the Great Depression, the public sector was the propelling force in producing the upturn. Aggregate demand was increased enormously by public expenditures, public works, etc.

But then a new game plan was developed by the Ford administration. President Ford did a truly clever job in which the public sector was ruthlessly smashed, while the private sector did beautifully. Large numbers of minorities and women and older and younger people are dependent on jobs in the public sector. These significant groups--what some people call "the new majority"--are being hurt in the present crisis.

HOROWITZ: Your response raises another larger issue about what might be called the changing class structure of American society. During the sixties people like yourself, S.M. Miller, Martin Rein, Lee Rainwater, and others began to develop a notion that something was going on in the demimonde of the class system in America--what Myrdal referred to as an underclass, what others have referred to as marginal classes, and what still others have referred to as downright deviants. The basic thesis is that this underclass of marginals had in fact split off from the organized proletariat. Thus the scenario one grows up with in the classical Marxist variety breaks apart. It breaks apart at the top in a Burnham-like fashion, through a separation of owners and managers, and at the bottom through a parallel differentiation of middle-class workers and lower-class poor.

I am not necessarily outlining your thinking but a general line which has developed: a division between managerialism and ownership and, on the bottom, a corresponding division that splits the marginal underclasses and trade union working classes. We have a country of approximately eighty million members of the working class who draw salaries regardless of what occupational ranking they hold in society. They are salariats if not proletariats. Only fifteen million of those people are within the framework of the trade union movement. That latter figure has been stagnant since the AFL-CIO's last organizing drive, the Southern organizing drive of 1946-1948. There has not been any precipitous or noticeable drive since then. Perhaps current efforts to organize white-collar and professional employees will change the situation. But currently we have a working class divided within its own house.

Is there any way in which your approach addresses that situation? Or does it in fact exacerbate the contradiction between the factory proletariat (an occupational group formed in relation to management, and involved in the creation of goods) in contrast to a human service sector that develops a secondary concept of services more in keeping with a "postindustrial" society approach than your own? We generally run the words together: "goodsandservices." In fact, goods are different from services; the constituencies involved are different.

How does your work assist in creating any concept of membership in the working class? Or does your viewpoint contribute to the continuing fragmentation of the American system, and hence the continued pluralization of the supply and demand network within the system? In other words, are you involved in a highly articulate special interest appeal, not much different from other special interest situations that must be satisfied within the framework of a pluralistic society if quiet and calm are to be maintained?

RIESSMAN: In a service society we talk a lot about the significance of human services and the significance of consumers as powerful forces and vanguard groups in the society. I have been involved in the development of a full-employment movement in the United States. This movement began with a concern for the expansion of public service employment as a major area of job creation in a service society.

A number of academics, social scientists, and human service agency people developed an organization called the National Conference on Public Service Employment, whose co-chairpeople were Lillian Roberts and Russell Nixon. The organization had a small constituency; it started about eight years ago. At that time we were looking for congresspeople who might be interested in a public service employment strategy. We went to see a lot of people, and found a powerful advocate in Gus Hawkins. Nobody heard of him then, but everybody has heard of him now. He is a black congressman, very mild and quiet--an economist by training. Since he was interested in an employment strategy we worked together for many years, building it slowly and putting public service employment bills before Congress, which rejected them at first. Finally, some public service employment legislation passed as the last recession heightened.

About three years ago there was a conference called in which we took a big stab. We said, "We wonder if we could invite Leonard Woodcock to talk at this conference. Maybe he would give a keynote speech." We were modest; we did not know him; he was a big man; and we did not know if we could get him. "We will ask Congressman Hawkins to call him. Maybe he could get him." We were very surprised--Woodcock was interested in this meeting. He attended, and it was widely covered by the press. During the trip from the airport we talked to Woodcock about what it would be like to develop a committee of one hundred for full employment, like the committee of one hundred for national halth insurance. Woodcock thought that it was a great idea.

Then it was suggested that we needed a big, national person, someone with broad influence who could bring all kinds of people together. We contacted Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. She was identified with no one political force and yet she had complete access to everybody. We persuaded Mrs. King to call together such a group. She called the fifteen big people that we wanted to lead that conference, including Senators Kennedy and Javits, Vernon Jordan, and Gloria Steinem. She wanted them to sign a telegram calling together a committee of one hundred. She got them all to do it; nobody refused. The meeting was held and over 150 of the leading people in the United States were there. They formed an organization called the National Committee for Full Employment.

HOROWITZ: What is odd in this line of reasoning is how the demographic theory of power you have outlined connects with what might be called the classical European theory of the division of labor (Durkheim) or the division of power (Weber) or the division of wealth (Marx). Social science has always had a problem with American exceptionalism. There has always been the problem of explaining why socialism does not materialize, and why crises are repeatedly resolved short of revolutions and counterrevolutions.

Now we have another problem of exceptionalism: why do we not have the formation of a radical movement as part of an integrated labor movement? Why does labor maintain a stabilizing role specifically directed against the advancement of a welfare society in America? Does your work offer one more theoretical framework to explain this exceptionalist hypothesis, or are you offering a paradigm of the struggles to come based on demographic considerations of Northern perimeters versus Southern rims?

What exactly is it that we are being told or asked to do? Why should there be this kind of sectoral crisis? Is it a consequence of the novelty of the economy of the Southwest? Is it a consequence of what Boulding and Benoit have called the World War Three industries, of industries which had no antecedent historical development and therefore live in terms of armaments and military contracts?

Is it simply a rising interest in leisure which leads people to desire a warm climate over the harsher climate of the Northeast? Or does your work constitute a grandiose response to the national frustration with the failure to solve racial problems? Are we witness to a huge, historic twentieth century sweep to the North on the part of the black population--moving from the South to St. Louis, Detroit, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston--while the white population is slowly moving away from the older Northern cities to Southern towns and retirement villages? Is this pattern a reflection of the failure of nerve or a failure to cope with the problem of race?

I am not sure that you are outlining a response to such larger tendencies. While I agree with some of your remedies, I do not hear your description of the illness. Can we cure social colds without uncovering the nature of such colds? And if so, does your view resolve itself as just another variety of left-wing pragmatics?

RIESSMAN: I would not call it my new demographic. The economic power of those areas relates to their basic industries, which are military and the only crucial industries in our society as it functions. We must nationalize energy and oil and enormously reduce the military sector. Only in this way can we reduce the power base of these sections of the country.

One of the favorite forms of political denial is to act as though the military question is necessary but not to talk about it or question it. But it is there--and it is big. As wealthy and as economically efficient as we have been, it is draining us enormously in countless ways and producing a self-perpetuating power base. That power base is attempting to affect the political life of the country. It has economic power and political power. The Northeast is an area from which a large amount of industry has moved, and there are the special problems of the cities.

There is an interesting struggle going on. One has to align oneself, from the liberal point of view, with the Northeast agenda, because those other forces are basically connected to private capitalism and military capitalism at its worst. The liberal forces increasingly need to call for planning nationalization and for moving along the lines of the Western European states where planning is accepted and nationalization and the public sector are increased. That is the sector which we have the possibility of controlling.

Ultimately the public has to control the public sector. It is interesting that we do not understand that term as the Europeans use it. We say the public sector, and we usually mean public employment, human services, etc. But they mean public control of big business, that portion of business which is owned or nationalized and run by the government. That development is significant. That concept has not reached American consciousness.

HOROWITZ: Why would a large bourgeoisie be willing to become allied, on a sectoral basis, with what ultimately is an effort at taking over that class through social planning mechanisms? It seems more likely that one would have as an outcome--or at least as an equal scenario--a coalition or coalescence of large-scale class forces in order to prevent the very kind of planning mechanisms for the poor you speak of from taking place. Therefore the actual ratio of forces, of the character and composition of social and class forces, seems far more weighty--in the short-run at least--on the side of that Southern rim strategy, than it would be if that strategy were to rest solely on political or geographical considerations.

RIESSMAN: I want to use the contradictions among the elite. Progress is dependent on struggle among them.

HOROWITZ: I want to ask more about the character of the organization you are involved with, the New Human Services Institute (City University of New York). You are not simply an ideologist, nor do you simply represent an academic viewpoint. I would like to know more about the new careers program--how it works now, what its projections are, and its support base. I would like to know more, not in terms of the "secrets" of organization, but about how you impact the policy arena. It is important for people to see how connections between ideas and agencies can be effectively established.

RIESSMAN: I will tell you some general things about it, but I am going to be brief. In the sixties I worked as a practitioner and trainer on a paraprofessional program at Lincoln Hospital (Bronx, New York). At that time I coauthored a book with Arthur Pearl called New Careers For The Poor. I went to New York University with the idea of setting up a center that would help train paraprofessionals, provide information exchange, newsletters, research, develop curriculum, etc. I convinced the Ford Foundation to put in quite a bit of money to start a center.

In the course of doing that we did a lot of other things. We still train paraprofessionals; we still put out a newsletter. We received grants to study public service employment, to develop a self-help group. We were able to build a cadre of people committed to doing the things we were talking about. Most of the people in our shop work very hard. For example, one of our paraprofessionals helped set up an organization of paraprofessionals or new professionals in the American Public Health Association. The association now has as one of its major sections a section called "New Professionals."

HOROWITZ: Is most of your support from federal agencies?

RIESSMAN: Much of it is. But the first one-half million dollars was from the Ford Foundation. We have private grants from a whole bunch of foundations and from individuals, and help from unions and other organizations as well.

HOROWITZ: An intriguing part of your effort is to show the differential rate of recovery in the public and private sector and how, in fact, the public sector has not recovered from our most recent recessionary round while the private sector is booming. Clearly this bifurcation of the two sectors hold out profound consequences for your position. It might well be that the new chief sources of social and political struggles will shape up precisely along a private versus public economic recovery axis.

You might address yourself to the question of whether this economic dualism is simply a game plan of a party or president or a reflection of larger economic considerations that are intrinsic to the nature of the American economy. What are the prospects for more public spending and less bureaucratic administration? Or is the United States in the process of rediscovering the advantages of a free market system, and hence willing to sacrifice everything from the democratic temper to basic equity demands in order to reap the rewards of this system?

RIESSMAN: The widely touted belief that our economy is recovering is in fact only a half truth. For while the private sector is booming, as measured by any variety of indicators, the public sector is in deep decline and shows no signs of recovery whatsoever. This imbalance between the private and public spheres is not at all typical in periods of overall economic upturn. Generally the public sector expands when the economy improves, and in some cases public expenditures are an important propelling force. Public works and other public expenditures can provide the expanded aggregate demand which is an important stimulus for the economy as a whole.

We are seeing not just an atypical pattern of recovery, but the manipulation of these months of crisis to systematically reverse more than fifteen years of steady public sector expansion. It is not merely that the public sector is neither leading nor benefiting from recovery, but that a well-established trend in national development is being reversed. The very jobs which were expanded at the stimulation of federal intervention through education, health, and a variety of community development efforts are now being removed.

What are the causes of this highly unusual situation, with its striking disharmony between private and public sector recovery? At the most obvious level, of course, it was part of the Ford administrations' game plan which was characterized by reduced social spending, not assisting the cities in their budgetary difficulties, maintaining the military sector, providing a variety of subsidies to the private sector via taxes and the like, accepting fairly high levels of unemployment in the midst of private sector recovery, opposing the federalization of welfare, and favoring the Southwest and the Western rim (the expanding segments of the economy). But there are other reasons too: the significant expansion of services in the 1960s to those people who had been historically underserved; the suburbanization trend, because as people moved to the suburbs whole new service systems had to be established while thre remaining city populations' services could not be cut proportionately (if at all); and the large increase in local expenditures in the last decade as the public employee unions caught up with their private sector brethren.

There are several action implications for the public sector and its constituencies. They must recognize that a strange bit of brainwashing has occurred leading to the acceptance of the notion that there is a basic scarcity of resources preventing the expansion of employment and services in the public sector. New forms of expanded revenue sharing would relieve the heavy financial burden of cities and states. A full-employment program with an increase in public service and public works appropriations would go a long way toward increasing services while reducing unemployment and the high federal deficit resulting from the payment of unemployment insurance.

State surpluses which may be developing should be used not for tax reduction for homeowners and businesses but for the expansion of servitically independent of this? There is some data that indicates that even the newer non-northeastern big central cities are losing population. They are losing it despite the fact that suburban housing costs are very high, and despite the fact that we have had a virtual cutoff of federal funding for new housing. If there should be a significant, large-scale subsidy program, not public housing, but housing for the broad middle range, the results would be a disastrous emptying out.

The President is required by the 1968 Housing Act, biennially, to file a national growth report. It is about one hundred of the dullest pages you have ever seen. There is nothing in it. We cannot stand the light of day being given to our de facto growth policy. Let me illustrate: The most generous government housing program that we have had was the 235 Program. It gave one percent mortgages for new home construction. The level of housing starts in the South financed by that program was eight-and-a-half times the northeast. The vacancy rate in the South at the time was running around seven percent; in the northeast it was four percent. The defense budget parallels the movement of private capital. I am not suggesting that the federal government initiated this, or for that matter is doing differently than private business. But certainly it is not acting counter cyclically in its expenditure patterns.

HOROWITZ: Does this not raise a consideration that maybe the unit of measurement you are dealing with, while it seems to be empirical, is really juridical? Perhaps we are dealing with a metropolitan area that cannot be defined or be limited by city boundaries. Perhaps what is required is a new vision of what constitutes a metropolitan area. Maybe by virtue of communication and job centralization, we have a whole new game in terms of center and periphery, that in effect obviates your conclusion that urban processes are in disintegration. An opposite conclusion may be that cities are in fact expanding in ways that were unforeseen when the center city had a radically more limited range in terms of transportation, communication, and services.

STERNLIEB: Let me turn to that point which I think has very considerable validity. Here is my rough sketch of the center city. Here is the circumferential highway ringing the city at a ten to twenty mile radius which for most American cities was the last piece of the National Highway Program. New Jersey is still being finished. Your classic road network was spokes out of the central city. As long as you have merely spokes but no circumferential, the pulling power, in terms of an isochron, time-distance zones, on any one point of the spoke was limited. Its pull was unidimensional.

When you develop a circumferential banding together, suddenly you pull the spokes on express highways in a fashion that goes up geometrically. That means that in every juncture of the ring highway where spoke and the ring cross, you can put together a million square feet of shopping center. You can put an insurance company employing two or three thousand workers there. The latest case in point would be the A.T. & T. shift out of New York to Bernardsville, forty miles from the city on routes 78 and 278: thirty-five hundred workers by historic standards out in the bushes. You can be twenty-five miles away from this site and make it easily in a half hour. What you develop is a new ring city.

There was one study done of Route 128, outside of Boston, in around 1960 (this is not a new phenomenon). The researchers looked at all of the new electronic corporations that had located on 128--ten, fifteen miles outside of the city--and they discovered that many of them had moved from the older trolley car inner suburbs. They went back to find out who had moved into these facilities, and ultimately discovered a partial vacuum of the oldest, least desirable facilities such as those of East Cambridge and South Boston. Everybody had upgraded one notch, and what was left was a functionless residue. What tends to parallel this development then is a new blue-collar exurbia in turn, forty to sixty miles out. In New Jersey that would be the equivalent of the Ocean County growth syndrome. Just about all the things the newcomers need, including specialized hospital services, now have attained critical mass on the rim.

So the need for the central city is obviously less and less. When you need a left-handed "widgit," Macy's may be the only place that carries it. But you cannot sustain two million square feet of retailing space on an occasional left-handed "widgit." The center of the por chop is out in that new regional shopping center.

What happens to the people left behind? They have fallen out of it. They are there because they do not have much in the way of choice. You have an incredibly small strata of the wealthy who, for any of a variety of reasons, job location and the like, are center-city oriented. They tend to be elderly and they are few in number. If you look, for example, at the realities of New York City housing, there are two million rental housing units, and you have less than 200,000 housing units with rents of over $300 a month. That is far from a reflection of affluencd and, at every fifty dollar increment the figure halves.

HOROWITZ: The regional shift, the fashionable movement to the southern rim from the Northeast is significant. Clearly, there are these shifts over time. For a variety of reasons, well described in your work, such regional changes occur. But let us get back to those millions upon millions of poeple who remain in the Northeast. First, we have to deal seriously with their racial composition. Second, we have to deal with the possibility of their political volatility by virtue of the fact that they are leaderless. Third, we have to consider stratification within a community and how mass movement tends to diminish the national harmony.

Let us say the top quartile of the black community is moving toward suburbia. Does not the vacuum created by leaderlessness create a kind of volatility and a violence-prone situation that does not permit democratic or parliamentary politics? What are you suggesting beyond a statement of urban residualness? We are now left with that residual population, residual in terms of enormous numbers of people who continue to represent a critical mass. What are the political dynamics of consigning people to a residual category? Are they not paramilitary dynamics? Perhaps my question is: What hope do you hold out for the damned of the earth?

STERNLIEB: Let us not use terms "would be," "could be," "should be," because those are all loser terms. We are all going to be winners. Our present pattern of dealing with central city can only be compared with that of Herman Hickenlooper, who was the football coach of Yale. When asked what his secret was for dealing with the alumni, he responded: "I keep them sullen but not mutinous."

Let us take Newark as an example: a city now down to about 350,000 people from a peak of 439,000. One phenomenon is the safety valves. Those who can make it to the suburbs now can find some place to go (by the way, regardless of race). If they can buy in they can buy in. The total municipal budget is nearly a quarter of a billion dollars. The bulk of this comes by way of transfer payments from the state and federal government. The locally raised taxes are about eighty million. For example, about seventy to seventy-five percent of the school budget is not paid for by Newark; it is paid for by transfer payments. With these millions of dollars, the Mayor, the City Council, whatever the powers that be can buy off potential leadership. Vital in this activity are jobs and programs to encase them. You do not have to give everybody a job. You just give everybody who pops his head up a job. We are very fortunate in that our deprived groups are true-blue Americans. They are very high-level consumers. Every used polished Cadillac in a slum area is a tribute to their Americanism. So you buy them.

HOROWITZ: The inevitable next point is that the ability to buy depends on the constancy of growth, the ability, in effect, to maintain a system in which equity demands are met by economic expansion. Given the infinite number of equity demands and given their urgency, we are left with two important issues. One is the ability of the system to deliver without depriving those who already have wealth, and second, and perhaps more important, the ability of the system to convince those who do not have wealth that there is some kind of payoff for them if they wait.

American society is in a strange paradox. It urges upon its citizenry restraint and delayed gratifications while it retains an infinite demand system: equal rights for women, old people, children, the disabled, and ultimately for everyone. On the other hand, a growing chorus of scholars advocate zero or limited growth, responding to energy shortages and ecological weaknesses in the structure, representing in effect those who do not want to be deprived of what they already have. Within the framework of such a double-interchange system, how are you really going to be able to continue, to use your rhetoric, and to buy publics off as they pop their heads up?

STERNLIEB: There is considerable question as to whether we will be able to continue this process. The Galbraithian thesis of the affluent society was panegyric to capitalism. Capitalism had been so successful that it had finally resolved the age old problem of want. The pie was now sufficient for all possible needs; the only question of public policy was the division of that pie. He said that in the face of the basic reality which was that there were very few people in America who would admit to having redundant dollars, who would say, "take them away; I do not need them," and the like.

Six percent growth in the gross national product and there is room for everybody. Zero percent growth in the gross national product, both present and anticipated, and there is room for nobody. Right now we are at that latter stage, at least mentally if not in terms of the accounting budget. The strains are beginning to be quite evident here. You notice, for example, the reluctance of Congress to continue revenue sharing. You have a Republican president, allied with the big city mayors and Congress saying "pass the thing." What is going to happen if you do not pass it? Maybe it is because it is an election year, but you do not see them passing it casually.

My basic response to your question is to raise an additional question. Implicit in your question is the thought that our present system is going to continue. I would have serious doubts about that. I say this, by the way, not as a matter of taste. I rather like the present system. I am a beneficiary of it: an affluent professor with tenure. I got there first. Capitalism is not a lovable form of organization. It does not particularly warm the moral fiber. What it has done in this country is to deliver a standard of living for most people which is the envy of most other people. The chief symbol of that good life, realistically speaking, are the automobile and the house. By every test and measure, despite some exceptions this is so. To a thin group of rootless bourgeois, intellectual nothings, and the children of the rich, the goal of most Americans is that free-standing house. This is a goal that they will struggle for intensely and for which they are willing to spend incredible portions of their incomes: sometimes as much as forty to fifty percent.

What happens to the system when those principal symbols--sold, oversold, resold by every form of media that we have, cannot be delivered? Revolutions are not started by the bottom. They are started by the displaced middle class. We are in the process of generating one of the world's largest clotches of displaced middle class. There are many people driving cabs who, for the first year or two, are a college student looking for perspective and filling in. The third year they are cab drivers and unhappy. We are now in our third year.

HOROWITZ: Let me turn to some specific contexts that you are expert in. The recommendation has been made that various areas of New York City, such as the South Bronx, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and East New York be steamrolled and industrial parks and/or airports be built in their place. What do you think of such a plan?

STERNLIEB: This specific recommendation came from Felix Rohatyin who essentially is Governor Carey's man in New York. Urban bulldozer renewal, in the very fullest, most perjoritive sense, is now much more required and much more feasible than it was when the program was implemented. Its political feasibility is absolutely negative. But its necessity is clear. The areas of the South Bronx are now characterized by substantial emptying out. Roger Starr has pointed out properly that the cost of servicing isolated remnants of squatters and people still in an apartment or two in a building that is burn out on a black that is burnt out, is excessive. The city, if it is to deliver some level of service, is going to be required to develop some sort of creative compaction.

Increasingly,you will have areas that are essentially defunct. What are you going to do with those areas? You have them already. Our host was mentioning St. Louis; St. Louis is down in population by about thirty-five percent. You do not have to invent the future of New York. You can see analogous situations elsewhere. The problem with the central city industrial park concept is illustrated by the recent history of some of our New Jersey municipalities. For example: We are sitting in the middle of enormous industrial and employment nodes of one kind or another: a function of the Route 1 spoke and the Turnpike spoke crossing the Route 278 circumferential. You have our host university, Princeton, which has just announced a six or eight hundred acre industrial part--virgin, intacto. You have a Newark which has a big hunk of the Meadowlands, and has had a Meadowlands Development Commission for a long time. They cannot get anybody in there. They have had four announcements, and all four firms faded out. One that came in as a toy stuffing operation. That is just millenial; for three months a year you have some work. And even that dubious asset was only brought in under a substantial government grant.

Your problem in New York City is who is going to open on those thirty acres that are going to be bulldozed. That is, assuming that they could get bulldozed. Let me touch on the question of assuming they could get bulldozed. The analogy frequently has been made between the space program and the successes achieved in it, versus the failure of central city revitalization. The large difference is not the difficulties of the respective areas. It is rather than in the first we had a simple objective; in the second, we clearly have no objectives whatsoever.

Mr. Badillo, Mr. Wangle, the minority spokespeople, have strong senses of territoriality and spoke up at once against touching one hair of the blighted areas head. They may be burnt out; they may be killing people; but they are ours--local turfdom if you will--practically a reflex mechanism. This is the same Herman Badillo who, not long ago, gave a speech on how the future of New York City depended on cutting off the flow of welfare seekers wherever they came from: Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, or the South. That was in a closed session. The Rohatyn response was in a public meeting.

The viewpoint of the potential mover-in reminds me of a piece of my mother's antique wisdom which was: don't marry into a sick bed. Right now New York is a sick bed. There is no group in New York who can assure you of a deal and carry that deal out over the long run. One of the differences between Chicago and New York is that Mr. Daly can and will; New York cannot and does not. While I am sympathetic with the concept, I do not see it happening.

HOROWITZ: What specific negative consequences do you envision for a protracted energy crisis. For instance, if the gasoline shortage becomes critical again, and becomes permanent, might that not lead to the revival of inner cities? What do you think the impact would be of such an energy shortfall on the urban-suburban dichotomy?

STERNLIEB: If I can use that little Toynbee paradigm, societies grow so long as they meet challenges. If the challenge is too hard, all of your energies are consumed as by the Eskimo, living pretty much the way they did ten thousand years ago. The failure to come to grips with energy reality, the complete fantasy of "It has not happened today; therefore it will not happen tomorrow," is a telling indictment of our imagination and our leadership.

My guess is that we will go on pretty much the way we are living until the last barrel of oil. And when that last barrel of oil looks as if it is going to be used up, we will bulldoze flat, Montana, Wyoming, and wherever there is coal, and we will liquify it. By that time we will have cars that do forty miles on a gallon of gas, and we will manage. The ultimate reality would be that we go to Saudi Arabia and take oil. The United States has essentially spent the bulk of its stored wealth from World War Two developing a pattern of housing, jobs, shopping, life, which is dependent upon the car. We have built a structure which simply cannot be modified within the time frame that is required. And we lack the guts to move for the next generation.

From a realistic point of view in the longer term, the realities of energy make obsolete the bulk of the infrastructure we have built in the last thirty years. I can envision no way that we can accept that reality until we are absolutely driven on the rocks to do so. I find that a frightening reality. Needless to point out, we are in a far worse condition in terms of energy alternatives now than we were two years ago. About half of all the centralized energy facilities on order at the time of the boycott were cancelled for lack of funds and -ecause of environmental constraints of one kind or another.

HOROWITZ: Does this not raise again the problem of the lack of predictability of crisis events? Examine the literature that we created up to the mid-seventies. Virtually no one mentioned the problem of dividing a finite energy pie. There are some occasional illuminations but they were of a random sort. Both neo-Marxians and neo-Keynesians shared a kind of contempt for Malthusian doctrines. That is to say, both believed that the only problem we had were allocational in character; not disagreements about whether there was such a thing as scarcity, but only the dispensation of the abundancy that existed.

All of a sudden we are thrust into a world where scarcities are real. The question I would then pose is: How does this affect the future of the post-industrial world that you are positing? Would it not be more rational to return to a more centralized model of urban living, where we can have better buses and railroads, rather than automobiles? In a renewed urban system we would not have to commute fifty to a hundred miles daily. Either the city will have to return to its industrial center, or industry will have to be dispersed to accommodate new suburban modalities. The present situation is clearly intolerable and implausible.

STERNLIEB: The failure of the learned professions to keep pace with longer term potentials and realities stem in part from the kinds of training, particularly in economics, which dominate the field. This is the age of regression analysis. It is called by fifteen different names, but basically it is least squares rampant. The problem with regression analysis, and most of the models that we have, are that they are essentially historical tools. They are extrapolations of the past.

In the past, when you punched here with two pounds it bulged there with a half ounce, or whatever the case may be. It is difficult to fit into models, significant step functions. Suddenly the relationships alter. While you can handle somewhat adequately, let us say, the results of a fifteen or twenty percent increase in gasoline, you cannot handle a tripling. Then you have to break loose. What you have left is the domain of the science-fiction writer. I would suggest that there is perhaps better forward thinking in Isaac Asimov than in Herman Kahn. I would sooner read Kornbluth and Pohl's Space Merchants than I would read Daniel Bell and Daedilus Toward the Year 2,000.

HOROWITZ: Would you expand upon how your proposals for a solution to New York City's housing problems came about? Was this contract work? In what sense are your policy proposals a necessary outcome of your field research? And in what sense do they simply register a frustration with past policy recommendations? Beyond that, in any urban resynthesis, just what would become of the remaining urban mass and urban poor?

STERNLIEB: First, the contractual relationship. Rutgers University undertook a contract from the Economic Development Council of New York. This is a private, non-profit body headed up by our economic royalty. George Champion, the former Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan Bank, is the head of it. This was to undertake an anlaysis essentially of what should the City housing policy be. Unfortunately, rent control was the first issue. We are also looking at a variety of tax abatement programs which have proliferated.

The problem of rent control is a simple one: the answer, beyond the immediacies of the computer. One, there are inadequate rent levels to support the buildings. This is beginning to manifest itself in terms of tax delinquency in the city which is rising sharply now to nearly a billion dollars in delinquent taxes. As a matter of fact, the city's default was triggered by an effort to sell two-hundred-million dollars in tax anticipation notes. The banks, for the first time, rebelled at buying them. The city was essentially putting out pieces of paper based on noncollectible taxes. In most areas, by the way, that is called fraud.

The third piece in this is the terrible reality of enormous declines in personal incomes within the city. In 1965 the income of New York City rentors was $5,500 a year. The median income of all households, homeowners and rentors in the United States at the same time was $5,900. In 1975 the median income of all rentors in New York City was $8,300. The median income of all households in the United States was in excess of $11,000. What you have is a failure -- not of the rent to be held down -- but rather of the city personal incomes to keep pace with the economic reality. How do you resolve this?

Our policy recommendations on the face of them look at rent control. Their prime target however is the drive toward condominium conversion. First it must be made legally feasible. As a function of rent control, the city has passed laws which make it impossible to convert buildings. You need thirty-five percent of the tenants in occupancy to agree to the conversion before it can be instituted. Secondly, the occupancy of the more expensive units which are controlled must be made open to the vagaries of operating costs. They must therefore be gotten out from under control.

In a condo-or-coop, you have to face the economic realities. You do not have a sheltered workshop. New forms of ownership and management are the salvation for part of the city. This condominium conversion will not take place in the outer boroughs, with the exception of some thin fringe areas of Brooklyn, and maybe a few selected areas of Queens. It would be meaningful for the better areas in Manhattan. The proposal further continues to essentially support tenants in occupancyq but as units become vacant, to decontrol them.

HOROWITZ: We have seen in the last several years that city workers whose unions have gotten benefits for them, including pension funds second to none, have been made to underwrite New York City bank notes. Do you see this as a way of taking some of the money back from the unions; and do you see this possibility taking place on federal levels in one form or another: for example, in terms of social security and benefit programs?

STERNLIEB: I hate to tell you this, but it is already taking place. Your social security money is invested in government notes, regardless of competitive yields. This is done automatically. The city desperately needs a creative bankruptcy. This is one in which you essentially peel off levels of debt and accumulated obligations, which your corporate entity has attached to it like barnacles which it can no longer support. They must be reshaped so that the ultimate vehicle can support whatever indebtedness is left and can continue to do business.

HOROWITZ: One of the problems you have not mentioned is a growing economic marginality of large urban masses. Before we reach a point of no return, where we are willing to squeeze out that last oil barrel or go until we absolutely burst - at that point policy will be reversed and things will happen that will take care of housing. Is there not something which can be done? What is your appraisal of so-called lifeboat measures as a resolution to the current crisis on the basis of an intermediary technology. What do you make of the small is beautiful rebellion against urban decay and disaster?

This does not imply a return to the soil but simply using the technology available at an intermediate level to produce capital intensivity. This is a policy which is being suggested from a policy standpoint by growing numbers of ecologists and environmentalists. How do you react to their visions of doom?

STERNLIEB: I commented earlier in our conversation on the Candide concept. One searches out the world for the ultimate wisdom, but then returns to where one started out. Candide turns to the worldly philosoper and says, "The hell with it all - let each man go and till his own garden." Whether that is a hydrophic garden or otherwise is up to the vagaries of the popular mechanics at the time.

Roughly half of the food produced in this country is exported. We depend upon those exports to support our standard of living, particularly the energies that we import. We do this successfully. There are perhaps some quibbles as to how well the United States does a variety of things, but there is no quarrel with the fact that we can deliver a three-pound broiler anywhere in the world cheapter than it can be produced there. We do it uniquely well. Unfortunately, or fortunately, the world needs that broiler and/or grain. In order to generate the requisite level of largess requires a highly detailed specialization of function.

I have not pushed the numbers to answer the question of whether a high level of decentralization would permit some reasonable standard of living for a country of two-hundred-and-ten million. I am fairly certain that at best it will not permit us to support a world which is growing at a rather substantial rate and in which we have a function. That does take specialization.

HOROWITZ: From a policy standpoint, how does your work relate to those kinds of technologies that might be available in a transitional form in order to feed, house, and clothe people who do not have the kind of income needed to take advantage of the specialization function that produces the social mobility that you are concerned with. More specifically,is not a new intermediary technology easier to generate than accelerating urban flight with its long term prospects for urban chaos?

STERNLIEB: The numbers work out so that depending on your definition of intermediate technology and the like it is cheaper to do production things the way we are doing them now. For example, I have looked at the numbers on fish culture. They are fairly well defined by now. There are a rather substantial number of experiments in large scale. What you are dealing with is protein delivery at about two-and-a-half to four times the costs of present methods.

The cost of the simple life is enormously high. Let me give a trivial case in point: You are attempting to optimize windmills, and it turns out that one of the big problems is the torque factor in the vanes. So you end up proposing carbon fiber technology to turn them out. Carbon fiber technology is so costly in terms of energy that I would guess the cost of a vane in terms of energy is probably equivalent to the lifetime of the windmill. It is this sort of romanticism that is dreadfully costly. Again, it is enormously popular. One of the more popular books, for example, of the depression went through more than forty printings. It was a book called Five Acres in Independence. If you read that book you really get the feeling for exactly the same kind of thing. Every furrier in New York wanted to be a chicken farmer on his five acres, except that it did not make sense.

If you look at the average horsepower of an American tractor, it has gone from fifteen horsepower in twenty-five years, to more than a hundred. The reason that it has done so is that it is a lot more efficient. Now, recalculate your efficiency. Increase the level of human labor and nonmachine labor, and go back to the world as it was circa, 1920. I am not sure that you could even in this country. I am really not competent to answer that question. But certainly, you can do so only if: one, the rest of the world would leave you along (which is highly questionable) and, two, only at a cost of a very reduced standard of living.

HOROWITZ: It becomes apparent when you inquire about the title of the organization that you built, the Center for Urban Policy Research, that the word "policy" remains ubiquitous. In fact, if your view is one in which all the windows of the world are closed, and volition is really minimal, what role is there for any sort of policy making? You seem to live in a deterministic universe where information exists and either rational or non-rational responses to information are possible. You seem to take pride in a non-policy orientation. Yet on the masthead of every book, every research your organization generates, sits the word policy.

I would like to know what, in fact, the role of policy in your thinking is: to sit by, watching the destruction and dismemberment of the urban universe, and claim "I told you so"? Or, do you say, "I am witness to certain events, and they are capable of modification or correction? Our task then would be to point out what those modifications and corrections are in the area of urban policy. Which of these two approaches best defines the efforts of the Center for Urban Policy Research?

STERNLIEB: There are three responses to that, the first two of which are facetious. When I inherited the operation it was called The Urban Research Center. We had a little jurisdictional clash, and it was renamed,without my getting involved in it, the Center for Urban Social Science Research. Then somebody pointed out that that spelled out USSR, and we had another jurisdictional clash, and ended up with C.U.P.R which I had not opted for either. By this time who can afford new stationery? The second, and equally facetious (or perhaps less so) response is that it seems to me that to generations to come the Chamberlain of the post-Munich declaration will be ahero. At least he said: peace in our time. And then we moved to peace in my time; and now we have peace until the election.

The third response, and perhaps a bit more serious, is that you must earn your way. Most schools that I have been exposed to have a bad tendency to assume on the party of the faculty, as well as the students, that you can be a philosopher-king by announcing: "Look world, I am here," with my fresh diploma, or my three monographs under my arm, and proceed to spout a variety of policy recommendations. My own experience has been to indicate that you really have to pay your way. You do enough work, reasonably four-square, and you begin to get beseiged by requests for polciy, not merely research, but for policy. I discovered something very quickly. At best, the academic, at least as represented by me, can be reasonably good at the counts-and-measures business. When he takes off his counts and measuring instruments and the like he is a civilian, as good or as bad as any other civilian.

I am smarter than many civilians, and vanity plays a role here. So when you start getting asked for policy you try to produce policy. You quickly find that your capacity may be reasonably substantial for what you think of as good policy recommendations. However, the implementation of those recommendations is subject to a variety of vagaries, a variety of noise, well beyond your competence to deal with.

I have served on two presidential task forces, four or five governatorial ones, and a number of local ones. I have written platforms without end. I have given written speeches of one kind or another. I have written housing bills, state-wide planning bills, building-code bills, and the like. Few of them get passed. That is the nature of political reality at a time of vast uncertainties and political immobilism. We keep at it as best we know how. There are problems inherent in the role, however. When you consult for somebody you end up taking on all of their aura; there is a transferrence if you will.

One of the less flattering reasons that I get asked to do policy things is that every good committee now, as once there used to be, included a clergyman and now has an academic. "Have you consulted the scholarly oracle?" "Yes we have." And that is me, or five thousand other people. It is a checkpoint on the IBM card. Sometimes the powers come back, and the reason they do is that I try to give advice without hurting them, keeping it within their limitations. The people that I work with are people who are bound in time and bound in political reality to the here and now. That may well be a rationalization for my own literally conservative temperament. I like the system, and my major goal is to perpetuate it through my days.

HOROWITZ: Let me make a final effort to address what seems to be a paradox, not only in your presentation, but in the position outlined by policy-makers in the urban sector. If you were a radical (which I know you are not--indeed on face value you are a conservative) and you told me that your view of policy making was what you have just described to us, I would accept it because in fact if you are a revolutionary, and if you believe that the system has slender, if any potency for reform, or intrinsic meliorative behavior, then your position does make perfectly good sense. But being a self-proclaimed conservative, and saying bluntly and forthrightly, that you believe in the American business system, and in its meliorative capacity, then it seems to me that your position has a built-in contradiction. For if your ideology presupposes that you in fact believe the system has both merit and survival capacity, then your work should at least optimize that survival capacity. As it is, you are content to let the facts speak for themselves, which in social affairs they rarely do. Only people speak for and against facts; especially when fundamental values are at stake.

STERNLIEB: I am much more a pessimist than you give me credit for being. If you recall your Russian history, you will note that in 1880 and 1890, and certainly before World War One, the Czars desperately were attemtpting to develop a constituency of small-holders. Their problems in dealing with the Boyars and the like were enormous, and they were too little and too late. The results were the revolution. In the United States, it seems to me that Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first accomplishment was the creation of new members of the propertied class through the virtual state enforcement of unionization. He thus gave a substantial stake in the status quo to the skilled worker. The FHA broadened this through homeownership. This developed a strong constituency which basically has carried this country for forty years.

The powers and capacities of that constituency are now, and circumstances which made that a potent constituency, are drawing to a close. You have been using the term policy. Let me talk about big policy and little policy. Little policy is what I work with. Zoning, land use, abandonment, that kind of thing. I am not capable of big policy. I do not know how you put together the pieces. I have a vague suspicion as to how those pieces will have to be put together. The cost of that, in terms of my personal comfort and personal wellbeing, and personal standard of living, I find too high. The reason I am a conservative is not that I believe in conservatism per se. The reason I am a conservative is that I believe in my own personal comfort. It is good for me. The rewards of alternative wisdoms are much too questionable.

DOMESTIC POLICY, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

An Interview with Ray C. Rist
Visiting Professor
Cornell University

DOMESTIC POLICY, HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE - Ray C. Rist

HOROWITZ: Ray Rist is blunt and bright - a special illustration of a younger breed of social scientist for whom policy making is second nature, and social analysis first choice. It was the outstanding characteristic of many people in the mid-1960s at Washington University where I taught and Ray learned, that this cohort combined concrete, empirical research with a strong sense of what is theoretically important and practically relevant. It was the mark of those people to combine humane concerns with a deep respect for the ethnography of people. Even on his first project, concerning a work in progress on urban education initially drafted by the late and great anthropologist Jule Henry, Ray Rist already understood how to relate the particular and the general.

For Ray and his cohort, it was never just a problem of studying the public school system or the tracking system in the city or county of St. Louis, but was more appropriately a specific manifestation of larger racial conflicts, myths, and inequities that calibrated throughout national, state and local educational levels. Ray Rist, who has been a professor at Portland State, has been involved in a number of works; primarily his center of gravity is his work on education, but more than that, I would say, the policy of education and education-making. He is now acting Associate Director as well as Director of the Desegregation Division of the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Dr. Rist is going to be at the Max Planck Institute in Berlin next year. He is to be a Senior Fulbright Fellow in West Germany, working on a fascinating topic: namely, the guest workers in Germany. There are a startling 4 million foreign workers in Germany, a country with a total population of 60 million. That problem has only just begun to be examined.

In addition to everything else, Ray embodies the best of the sociological tradition, as well as what you might call a Christian mission sense of social justice. He has a quiet but courageous standpoint on matters of race, education and equity, not simply as a policy ploy, but as a fundamental tenet of his private and personal life. He is an eminent scholar, and is editor of several works. He has a book coming out on Portland busing which will be published by Harvard University Press. He is also a gentle and kind soul who handles millions upon millions of dollars: a remarkable combination.

I would like to begin the discussion by asking Ray: How do you make decisions about proposals for projects that come in over the transom? How do you separate out the wheat from the chaff in the initial screening process, and what kind of checkups are possible given the volume of proposals sent in? How do you get to the funding process? And how do you get from the proposal to evaluation of the final document, and do you, personally, even read that final document?

RIST: There are three basic ways that federal research and development dollars are spend. First, we make a "grants announcement" that money is going to be available for research on a particular topic. For example: a recent announcement from the Institute was for research on mathematical skills and their relation to early learning. Anyone who was interested in doing research in this area was asked to submit a grant proposal. It then would be evaluated by an internal review panel. But it should be noted that this strategy is not nearly so prevalent as it once was.

The second approach, which surely has more impact on social policy and the social sciences, is through the contract. The shorthand for that is the RFP - all "Requests For Proposals." What the RFP does for researchers who are in the government is to say: this is the topic; these are the populations; these are the methodological parameters; these are the issues. Anyone who wishes to study this topic and approach it in ways that are within these specified parameters, is invited to submit a proposal. As an applicant, you should know full well that you will have to meet criteria that we have set down regarding populations, methodology, theoretical parameters, data analysis techniques, and the like. I believe this approach is increasingly becoming the way in which policy-related research is conducted in the United States.

Third, funding is distributed through what is termed a "sole source procurement." Division heads, associate directors, and the director are authorized to say that a particular person or group is so eminently qualified to do the work that we can bypass competition. Consequently, we can fund them directly as a sole source, if we provide an acceptable sole-source justification. For example: right now, I am deeply involved in questions of "white flight." There are perhaps four or five major demographers in the country who have the experience, sophistication and demonstrated competence to work with national level data tapes like the OCR tapes of H.E.W. or the Department of Justice tapes. I have, out of that total of five, been able to sole source three. We have now three of five major demographers in the United States working for us on the question of "white flight." We might like to bring the other two under contract, but they have other commitments.

You have, then, three strategies for spending funds. My own belief is that contract research is dominant in disbursement of major funds for social-science policy related research. The grant mechanism has simply not proven very beneficial because it is difficult to direct grants, and from the government's point of view, you do not have control over reports. Contracts provide that unless you produce you do not get paid. Grants, of course, are written so that generally there is no legal way by which you can require interim or final reports. You can request an interim report, or solicit it, but you cannot do more. Thus, a strong purpose behind the move to the contract is to make sure that the government gets what it is paying for.

HOROWITZ: But is not one of the great, if somewhat insidious, claims made by private contractors in social science, that they will deliver a product without the idiosyncratic characteristics of many individual academics. Do you then not have a problem of defining the character of social research in even more entrepreneurial terms than it has been in the past?

RIST: I am concerned about this; it is a double-edged sword. Social science research has certainly become more entrepreneurial. It has aggregated to a large scale as the dollars have become large. There is no more receptivity to a solitary academic going around Washington with a hot idea trying to find dollars. Research is now cross-disciplinary, and large-scale studies, often longitudinal studies of three to four years are now procured. For example, we now have a five-year evaluation underway that is costing us nearly a million dollars a year and has a staff of 38 to 40 professionals. It is difficult, if not impossible, for universities to gather such a group of people.

The obstacles are many; bringing them together, setting aside their teaching schedules, setting aside FTE concerns, setting aside tenure concerns, and then letting them do this contract work. Such parameters surely make the reserach process more entrepreneurial. On the other hand, the complexity of the policy questions, the imperative of multi-disciplinary approaches, and the federal concern for getting a product, have coalesced to put the university at a distinct disadvantage.

HOROWITZ: Let me pursue this for a moment because it is a concern for me as well, and at present is a fly in the ointment of private, entrepreneurial social science. I agree with you that institutions such as the Bureau of Social Research and the Social Science Institute, have always had strong entrepreneurial characteristics. But they also had a responsibility to the university for a concept of knowledge and legitimacy of information over and above product yield. Such a university connection acts in part to prevent what you might call overly accommodating reporting. With private research organizations such as Abt Associates, is there not a problem of a strong tendency to anticipate what the agency wants, and to give it the kind of yield it wants because the organization may have to come back for more money?

RIST: This is true, and the pressure for that kind of work is even stronger because people in contract houses exist contract-to-contract. As one contract is being done, they are already writing proposals for another. It is an ongoing treadmill. You have to stay on top of this in the contract houses, while the university does not. Such demands surely makes the organizations entrepreneurial; the dollars are large. Without guarantees of tenure and the like, researchers will stay on projects for reasons other than simply the pursuit of knowledge; they stay because they wish to maintain their employment. Academics have the freedom to say, "Well, I do not really feel like purusing this topic now." They can put it down. At a contract house you cannot. That surely has to have an impact on social science. It has other impacts as well. For example, the question of the non-academic employment of social scientists.

In sociology this year we will have probably four times as many new Ph.D.s as we have openings in academic settings. The prospects are bleak for others, as sociology is only acceptably legitimate in academic settings. New Ph.D.s view themselves as having failed if tye do not get an academic appointment when they finish. The sociology enterprise has not legitimated applied work, and it has not legitimated policy-related work within contract houses. But ironically, the only opportunity for many young Ph.D.s to do policy-related research or large-scale research is going to be in contract houses, because universities no longer are winning in the contract competition.

I have known several young scholars who have wanted the experience of policy-related research, and who wanted to do large-scale studies. They really had little choice but to seek out a contract house. Many universities do not take the Commerce Business Daily. Many universities do not have people reading it daily to learn what new contracts are being announced. As a consequence, if you want to do policy research, whatever its pitfalls and shortcomings, you have few choices but to leave academics.

HOROWITZ: Let me ask a parenthetical question that has concerned me since my own work on Camelot. In fact, the final essay in that volume concerns the relationship between amounts of money expended and the quality of the research purchased. Is there any bivariat correlation ces and employment. There needs to be a considerable cutback of military expenditures and a reduction of general waste at the federal level. Finally, a planned program of price and wage controls will be necessary to prevent inflationary pressures from arising in a full-production economy.

To defend their interests the various constituent forces affected by the public sector depression--unions, professional groups, minorities, the aged, youth, women, and the academic institutions--must join forces to counteract the basic ideology that prevents the mounting of appropriate action: the powerful localist, anti-big government mythology renewed in the sixties and flourishing in the seventies. The fact is that while the problems are experienced locally in the big cities, their cure lies nationally at the federal level. The misguided belief that efforts at the national level are doomed serves the forces that wish to maintain a long-term public sector depression and divides the constituencies that depend on the public sector.

In earlier recessions federal deficit spending in support of public services and public works was the choice over institutionalizing massive unemployment. We must insist on that choice again--only now we must add national economic planning and controls. A New Deal-style expansion of the national debt without controls would be inflationary and ultimately serve to rationalize the weakening of the public sector.

THE PESSIMISTIC POLITICS OF URBAN RESEARCH

An Interview with George Sternlieb
Director, of the Center for Urban
Policy Research

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THE PESSIMISTIC POLITICS OF URBAN RESEARCH - George Sternlieb

HOROWITZ: It would be almost impossible to envision the number of activities George Sternlieb participates in, from policy-making to publishing. He is, in the judgment of many, one of the outstanding figures involved in making and breaking policy in local regional and national planning. The Center for Urban Policy Research has been involved in policy decisions from New York City to Miami Beach.

It is characteristic of Professor Sternlieb's work that he has generated not only data, but also interpretative theories that have had both intermediary and large scale levels of public importance. The idea of the zone of emergence is derived from a regional study of Plainfield, New Jersey. This in turn grew out of the old Chicago School and Baltimore studies of urbanologists who linked demographic, geographic and sociologized information in a thoroughly imaginative way. His evaluation of the crisis of the Northeast is central to present levels of discourse.

This leads to my first question. For many years now, the work you have done with the Center for Urban Policy Research has seemed to contain an ambiguity. Do you believe your Center is doing policy-oriented work at all? Many research projects that you are involved with have implicit policy recommendations, yet there seems to be a corresponding avoidance of explicit conclusions stating your policy assumptions and recommendations.

STERNLIEB: I run something called the Center for Urban Policy Research, at Rutgers University. This is a modest operation with a few personnel lines supported by the university. The bulk of our activity, however, is garnered by contract research. Let me emphasize the contract research as against grants. Typically, our clients come in and they are hurting. They are not coming in for window dressing--they would go to Harvard for that. The compounding of reputation is a phenomenon which I deeply envy, but unfortunately we do not share in it. Most of the time the clients really do not know why they are hurting. They ask the wrong questions in terms of their own needs. This is the result of a number of things. Sometimes they are not very smart; sometimes the realities are very harsh and they try to avoid them; sometimes it is just the general puzzlement of reality. Our business is to do research. I do it in the same fashion that once upon a time I worked in the fur trade. I spent five years at it. While I was a craftsman in the fur trade I tried to be as good a craftsman as I could possibly be. I do research for a living; I also do it as a hobby. It is my thing.

My attitude toward the kinds of work that we do, and it is stressed to my co-workers, is reflected,although perhaps overly stated,in my attitude toward Newark where we have done a fair amount of effort. I suggested that God was very good to us in creating all the misery in Newark for us to study. Our role is not to directly meliorate, not to become involved with it, to try to avoid subjective judgments as best we can, and to build our data as four-square as we can.

Our role, at least initially, was to provide building blocks. A politician gets elected and hopefully he gets paid for taking those building blocks and putting them together in some structure. You may like, or not like the structure that he puts together. But that is his business. And there has to be a division of labor. When you start off with preconceptions as to what should be done it is very difficult to do research adequately. I have learned the hard way that when you bring your policy judgments into the same wrapper as your research, the audience response tends to focus on the former. If they like the policy recommendations, they say I agree with that guy; there is no need for me to read the data. If they disagree with the policy judgments, then they say: damned if I will read that data. It would be useless.

HOROWITZ: Your policy recommendations have increasingly focused upon New York City, not only its business crisis, but its social crisis. Your recent remarks have been devastatingly blunt at the predictive level, but somewhat ambiguous at the policy level. In your work on

Metropolitan Decline and Interregional Job Shifts, you summarize matters in the following way: "The only thing coalescing the inner cities is the high price of housing in the suburbs. The cities will continue to lose while rim cities grow. The alternative of moving people back into the city is not realistic. One would have to pay people to move back." And you continue in a blunt, direct way, saying that a conference on the fate of City housing in New York "is fifteen to twenty years too late. The time for illusion is over. The City has no money; the State has no money; and the Federal Government does not care." Apart from the factual correctness of this judgment, is there not a question: What happens after bankruptcy? I received a letter today from a former student who worked on the Pruitt-Igoe project who had occasion to go back to the project. Apparently some buildings were not blown up.

STERNLIEB: Pruitt-Igoe was a model project honored by architects as sort of the crest of the state of the art. The social conditions degenerated to a point where a couple of the buildings were basically abandoned in very bad condition. I was with George Romney. He received word that the cost of demolition using conventional methods would be something in excess of forty million dollars. The entire project cost a little better than thirty million to build. So the resolution was to use dynamite.

There is a great picture which I have hung in my office taken by a newspaper reporter at the moment of blowup, with the Memorial Arch in the background. That only cost a handful of millions, but they never removed the rubble.

HOROWITZ: That notwithstanding, a letter which I received, from Joyce Ladner who worked in Pruitt-Igoe, work that led to the book Behind Ghetto Walls, indicates that after capital flight is self management. She reports that people now are living more tranquily than in past years. There is a high degree of self management. They are more concerned with the bottom line than at any time in the past. There is even some effort on the part of the black residents of Pruitt-Igoe to reintroduce the idea of interracial housing. In general, rents have been stabilized; the community has been stabilized; and the rate of occupancy increased. My rather circuitously-routed question then becomes: Do the policy positions that you outline imply a kind of metaphysical pathos that prevent the possibility of self management? Or, is there not an implicit policy based on the improbability of the city surviving as a fiscally sound investment from the outside, or as a manageable place to live from the inside? Are there a set of possibilities, of options, that despite their lack of consideration by you, allow the possibility of renewal and resurrection? Or is this a far-fetched way of viewing solutions to current housing dilemmas?

STERNLIEB: About the only thing I remember of Herbert Marcuse's one-dimensional man is the title, so I am probably misciting his thesis. But if I recall it correctly, essentially that thesis is: Given tunnel vision, parameters of social and economic developments are fixed, and consequently alternative approaches, a priori are doomed. Failure becomes inevitable, and the like. Maybe in Pruitt-Igoe you changed the ballgame by developing a new form of self government which by definition avoids the racial hangups and pseudo-liberalism of its predecessor.

Can it survive and enhance the lives of the people that are left there? We must put the broader situation in perspective. I am not so sure what the revival of the city means. Let me touch on that briefly. The reason that Pruitt-Igoe and the equivalent are left to the natives, the reason that the federal government suddently, by default of any other wisdom, is reinventing urban homesteading, (a phrase which I think I invented) is very largely a function not so much of thought out policy as it is of a rationalization of failure.

Social policy in the United States, particularly in terms of cities and race, is much more the complement of a failure than of dogma or research. If keeping them white does not work, paint them black, both literally and figuratively. Theory is always around; theory is like a table. It is a 360 degree smorgasbord. The appetite for any one sector of the offerings on the table varies over time. But at any one time, there is theory available to rationalize just about any element of behavior, any element of social policy. Whoever does not think so is romantic. One can find scholars to any end and data for any purpose.

Going back to the immediacies of this situation, what you are describing essentially is the flight of the white bureaucracy and power structure from an area that no longer has payoff, in which the risk-reward mechanism is such that it is the final end of the used car. Anybody who wants it can take it. Even the junk is not worth anything. The original goal for the Pruitt-Igoe scrapheap was to make a ski mountain of the rubble; they have never done that.

The reason that the urban homesteading movement is suddenly fashionable is not because suddently someone has said: "Boy, that is really where it is at; and therefore we will do it." Rather,implicitly the reasoning is that what we have done so far has not worked. We are tired of what we are doing. Let us switch to the opposite. Besides, we have no interested buyers of the slum areas within the private market. So what you have in minority groups typically, though in some cases they are whites, are essentially receivers in bankruptcy. Now, if that is resurrection, it is resurrection certainly under a limited set of circumstances.

HOROWITZ: Let us carry this one step further. Are you describing a situation which is unique to an area, a region, a nation, or to the world at large? Is the pattern discernible in Newark five years ago necessarily replicable in New York today? And if so, is this because of similar circumstances throughout the industrial world? Or is Newark a unique phenomenon having to do with combustible variables of race, class, and industrial decentralization located only in the Northwest United States? Your work in this area, it seems to me, remains somewhat ambiguous. One does not really know whether you are describing a local microstructure or a microcosym of American or world society as a whole.

STERNLIEB: In the immediate secular framework, my own work takes the world as a given, for better or worse. Is the world as we see it inevitable? It depends on the circumstances. For example, God did not put Lockheed in Marietta, Georgia. Richard Russell put it there. God did not create the major naval ship-building program (which by the way has just been projected at about 155 million dollars), in Alabama and Mississippi. Their respective congressmen did. It could have been in the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Obviously, these are the products of secular circumstances which could be change in a secular fashion. If you are asking, "Do I think they are going to be changed?" my answer has to be no. There basically is no constituency for this change.

What we have is a power shift. The South discovered the federal government before the North. To the North, the business of America was business. New York City was the imperial city; Washington was a sleepy country town. Two generations ago the federal budget represented five percent of the gross national product. The South was ravaged and ruined by the Civil War. They understood the political process. They stayed at their little trough--the only trough they had. In the meanwhile, the North mastered the industrial state, the commercial state, and the financial mechanisms if you will. Now the ballgame has changed.

The federal government represents about twenty-five to forty percent of the gross national product directly and indirectly, and possibly more. And the newer areas of the South and West dominate it. They dominate, by the way, regardless of changes in seniority. The North, for the moment at least, is distracted by a variety of economic concerns. But their congressmen do not know their way around. A good case in point is Congresswoman Shirley Chisolm, from Brooklyn, who was given a position on the Agriculture Committee and turned it down indignantly, saying that her constituents were not interested in agriculture. Agriculture is one of the best trading places in Congress. Because a vote for corn means that the corn people will vote for you on the next go-around. Our people do not understand that. Their constituents do not understand it. So if you go into agriculture you die, because you will have to run for reelction every two years. In the South you get reelected.

We have a new phenomenon. We now have Harrington's visible poor, with an addenda--the redundant poor. We are going to continue to have redundant poor. I will defer certainly to Professor Horowitz on this point. But the last time I looked at the data, countries with relatively rapid gross national product growth--Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico--countries that have been getting between seven and nine percent GNP growth a year, compounded annually for the last ten years, I discovered that the numbers of people employed in manufacturing has remained constant.

Where is the absorption mechanism? We are the only major industrial country to have substantially completed our industrial-agriculture revolution. We have made the poor visible. And they are internal poor, unlike, let us say, West Germany. West Germany has very little unemployment; but now Turkey has lots of unemployment. I do not want to go into the dual labor economy, because there is a lot of looseness of definition within it, but for the moment, our fractional employees are residents of the country, unlike the case in industrial countries including Japan. These people are no longer the exploited poor. The concept of exploitation is a splendid rationalization. It gives one the feeling that if there was more equity there would be more rewards for them and they would be economically justified.

The reality is that we are developing a larger and larger force, no longer merely black or Spanish speaking, but increasingly white. My guess is fairly shortly they will be joined by s number of people who have gone to college, who are redundant. They do not fit into the machine, whatever skills, capacities, sweat they may have or be willing to exort. They are no longer particularly desirable. When I say desirable, we again come into a secular rationalization, if you will. The term is a drastic oversimplification. You have a choice of slowing down the machine and saying that work is so important that everybody should have some piece of it; or, you say, let me optimize the machine; let me use capital intensification wherever possible. The world's labor market is largely homogenized. Wherever I have a labor intensive good I will import that good. I will export the management and the money and the resources to exploit that pocket of labor,as witness the electronics assembly right across the border in Mexico and the like. I will even pay welfare to keep the native poor out of my hair.

If you look at the Sears Roebuck Catalog and focus the locus of manufacture of playshoes, you have a splendid progression indicating the range at which this is working. These playshoes start out as a classic product of Fall River. They move from Fall River, in fairly short order, to Italy after the war. The Italian labor market becomes too expensive and they move to Spain. They are now substantially in Brazil, and increasingly in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan. What you have is a specialization of world function in which the American core, particularly the urban core, now is too costly within this particular reality. I do not necessarily advocate it nor do I disavow it. But that is the reality, not wishful thinking, but the reality.

HOROWITZ: Permit me to change the focus of the discussion to an overseas context. Is there not an enormous contradiction in this budgeting approach, of envisioning an urban process as identical with management by objective? You speak of the urban core as too costly. To speak of the urban sector itself, at least some portions of it, as redundant may overlook the redundancy of urbanization generally. That is, the rise of marginality in the labor process that replaces the labor intensive forms that existed in earlier agrarian societies.

If one takes a Third World perspective of urbanization within a Third World, you are right--a lower number of people are required to perform essential proletarian labor, because industry has become capital intensive. Indeed, to underscore the point you are making, to show how cogent it is, in order to get the steel mills working in Pittsburgh in 1890, or in Birmingham, Alabama, one had to have something like a hundred thousand proletarians to produce a million tons of rolling steel. In the Volta Redonda region in Brazil, the society needs something like 30,000 workers to get five million tons of rolling steel. Thus, your point of capital intensivity is well taken. On the other hand, it seems to me that the lessons you draw from the rise of capital intensivity are the reverse of the processes taking place.

There seems to be two problems: first, a lack of appreciation that the city or the urban region is the center for marginality precisely in the light of capital intensivity; and, second, your position is a negation of all factors toward the city. One wonders if the vision,let us say from Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro, or San Juan, would not be profoundly different than the vision of New York, precisely on the basis of the kind of information you have. In short, do we not witness a growth of urban life as a result of capital intensivity? And, are there not pull factors, magnetic elements, that increase rather than decrease as the need for proletarian labor declines?

STERNLIEB: What you are looking at in the so-called Third World (and I am highly incompetent to speak on any of these several topics), most of that is rather a push than exclusively a pull factor. These are agricultural displacees. Their number is going to be added to shortly. Let me cite some required adjustments in other countries. About one-third of the Russian labor force still lives on the land. In this country, which is enormously more productive (and has a better climate) two-and-a-half percent of our people are involved in agriculture as the primary means of livelihood- The Russians are faced with the necessity for capital intensification if they are ever to liberate their agricultural yield from the vagaries of the harvest time. They are still facing up to that.

You may recall the hoopla when England was attempting to join the Common Market, and the big controversy over the fact that food in England was much cheaper than it was in the Common Market. France and Germany particularly are highly protective toward their agriculture. In part, this is a left over of war days. They are believers in self sufficiency. They believe in keeping people on the land at the cost of high food costs. England, on the other hand, was importing from Australia and New Zealand, and before it was permitted into the Common Market, England had to give up this form of food support. If you will look at Brazil and Mexico, very largely what you have is that first flight off the farm, driven by rationalized agriculture as well as government policy into the city. It is by default of any other wisdom, by default of any other place to go.

The Marxists viewed the enclosure movements of a number of centuries ago and the like as generating a new proletariat, providing the kind of fodder that essentially permitted capital accumulation and the growth of industrialization. Our conditions now are relatively new. This fodder is less and less significant to efficiency, at least as measured by the GNP, if not happiness. This is a new circumstance. Turning back to more familiar terrain, the great problem of New York City is not the decline of old industries. That has been forecast certainly for forty years.

Back in the late twenties, the Regional Planning Association reached conclusions very similar to the later Vernon Hoover study of the New York-Metropolitan Region, which came out in the late fifties. Both predicted the decline of manufacturing in New York City. The latter study, however, said there would be a tremendous growth in information handling, in face-to-face contact industries and the like. Remember, the United States is a frontrunner not merely in the rationalization of agriculture and basic indusstry, but in new service areas as well. Let me cite some examples:

The check-clearing operation at City Bank was the largest in the world. A half dozen years ago around 9,000 people were involved in it. The number of checks cleared has doubled; the labor force is down by a third. Second case: The New York Stock Exchange went into an absolute tailspin a half dozen years ago when it started reaching twenty million share days. There was a week when we did eighty million shares. Firms closed down; they could not handle the volume; nor could they clear accounts. The volume now is running nearly double what it was then; certainly the number of shares per transaction has gone up, but not commensurately. And even that increase is a tribute to the rationalization of labor involved in saving. We are moving to wholesale rather than retail approaches to the pension fund rather than individual savings.

Regardless, the Securities and Exchange Commission circularized the stock market firms, asking whether all back-room operations should be open on Saturdays. The response, with one or two exceptions, was "no." The first stage of automation in paper handling is one in which we attempt to do by machine what we did by hand. If we are very fortunate we do not go broke; maybe we just about break even, in spite of all the able selling of IBM. The second stage is where we are at now. That is one in which the processes to optimize the machine output are reanalyzed.

When you install machines you do not fire people. What happens is that you develop excess capacity so that you do not have to hire additional people. So old industries leave New York, but the new industries do not replace their labor utilization. Those industries on the spot do not grow in work force commensurate with the loss of the old. The brokerage pattern of the finance industries in New York epitomizes this pattern. They are flourishing; but New York is still down 39,000 jobs in the space of a very few years.

HOROWITZ: You are describing a situation of growing capital intensivity, and economic rationalization at the private sector level of the economy. Let me reenforce your position before going on to a fourth critical remark, namely, the irrationality of increasing public sector spending to compensate for private sector flight from central cities. In an attempt to compensate for the loss of jobs, one has a rise in the bureaucracy, to handle unemployment and to minimize the loss of talented people. One begins to increase public sector spending, so that unemployment figures do not accurately reflect the intensity of the urban crisis. But this intensifies the contradiction of big city survival: first, there are larger public payrolls, followed by a lower tax base, in turn reflecting a lower industrial yield. This cycle, or some variation of it, reflects the deepening crisis of the urban sector in America.

STERNLIEB: Again, New York is a lovely illustration because it gives some insight into the numbers. At the same time that New York City was losing about a quarter-of-a-million private jobs, the public payroll went up from about 160,000 to about 35,000 direct plus neo-governmental things which we will not even count. If you taxed while you were paying out this money you would have noticed it. But you did not tax. What you did was borrow money for current consumption. So the city goes from a debt load of about three-and-a-half billion to a debt load of about thirteen-and-a-half billion--a fairly substantial portion of which covers this growing governmental and neo-governmental employment. One day you wake up and somebody says, I am not going to take your I.O.U. anymore.

In large part, we may very well have the same function going on currently at the national level, in that the linkage between taxation, i.e., paying, and expenditures, jobs, patronage, and what have you, is loose. You find the Democrats, and the Republicans for that matter, both decrying taxes--the Republicans hollaring a bit more about big government--but both sides increasing the scale of expenditures. The National Debt goes up--the current deficit is difficult to measure--but certainly is in the order of eighty billion dollars.

Let me carry this analogy somewhat further. One of the biggest growth factors in the national deficit reminds one terribly of New York. That is in the pension area. The phenomenon is one which may be called the United States as a Latin American Republic. The pension privileges of the armed forces, which are now indexed so that they go up with the cost of living plus some, are enormously generous. These are not funded--that heinous sin that New York is accused off--and which, by the way, is true of just about all the cities in the United States, and most of the private corporations as well. The federal government has the capacity to print money, but the analogy is particularly striking.

HOROWITZ: Many societies have attempted to stimulate the growth of middle-size cities, but to no avail. In the United States, while we witness a huge overflow into suburbia, throughout the rest of the world, especially many portions of the Third World, there is an equal resistance to the new middle sized cities and suburban villages. This brings us back to the push-pull question. I do not want to get into a chicken-egg game. Yet, it would be erroneous to dismiss the pull factor of urban life: the pulsation of culture, the thrill of proximity to power, fame, and even notoriety. More significantly, health, educational, and medical care services are much superior in urban environments than elsewhere. People are not running to middle America; they are not running to the hinterlands. They go only where basic services are available. Where one cannot get medical personnel or legal personnel, one cannot get the pulsation factor.

Ignoring for the moment the special problems involved in old cities like New York, what do we have? Further, what picture are you presenting? Is it a picture of an emptying out of New York City by the middle sector? If so, what happens to the remaining population? Is it polarized? Is it a remnant or residual population? Does the middle sector go to large-sized cities? Do they go to other areas of the country that fit similar patterns of growth and decay? Social science must answer problems of universality not just particularity. Are you willing to claim that the malaise of New York is the face of urban future the world over? If you are, you simply have to say so. If not, you have to tell us why not. Further, what in fact is going to happen to the eight million people in New York, or the three million in Chicago, or the three-and-a-half million in Los Angeles? It is simply not sufficient to describe a situation of monumental disintegration and not tell us the next step, empirically if not predictively.

STERNLIEB: We have two phenomena going on at once, one of which has been studied fairly forcefully, and another which is just beginning to be fashionable. The first which has been observed and decried by some, accepted by others, was the growth initially suburbia, and now, at least by census definition, exurbia. All the population growth in the United States from 1960 to 1970, was outside the standard metropolitan area. This splits two ways; some of it was merely an extension of suburbia that escaped the census net, and definitions which were dated. Some of it was a shift to smaller communities--the rise of the new industrial South--the hill towns specifically, particularly attracting white populations. Some of the smaller Delta communities are drawing black population, sometimes as a way-station up North and the like.

The second phenomenon is the regional shift. Here the data are fabulous. We ran a conference on which this book, Post Industrial America: Metropolitan and Regional Jobs Shifts is based, a year ago. I had to explain what I meant by defining metropolitan regions to half the speakers. John Kain, a distinguished economist, someone certainly as intelligent as I am, in the course of the conference said the Census Bureau estimates are all wrong. He said there is no such phenomenon. We have subsequent data, however, which indicates that he was wrong. What they describe in the northeast in terms of population is about 900,000 whites and about 55,000 blacks leaving the region from 1970 to 1974. There is every indication right now for example that New York City is not losing merely 2,000 jobs a week, but is also a fast accelerating one-percent of its population a year.

Growth feeds on growth, and decline feeds on decline. You have all the ancillary activities of population which shift with it. And the choice is wide. The pattern of job growth and job development ultimately determines the path of residential development.. That pattern of development is leaving the northeast very much behind. This is not unique to New York. In part, by the way, some of the trauma in New Jersey, and its failure to respond to the beginnings of a buildup, are essentially part of that same reality. The date from 1970 to 1973 are much more forceful than the 1970 to 1975 statistics. The phenomena discussed here are evident. And this is before the energy crunch. The energy business has not gone away in terms of public interest, but has practically come and gone. The reality is right at the doorstep. That energy reality, if anything, certainly will accentuate these significant shifts.

Let me bring the two pieces together. To what degree are these shifts from central cities a singular phenomenon of the northeast--reflecting the total areas loser status? To what degree are they pracbetween a million-dollar project and a million dollar's worth of results? Or are we here dealing in largely mythical areas? Perhaps it is simpler to work with a private enterprise. It can handle large amounts of money, bypass the normal constraints of the academy, and avoid some of the bureaucratic dilemmas that are involved. But what evidence is there that when you give one-million dollars to one group of people to study educational accountability problems, you are going to get more than when you give another group eight-thousand dollars?

RIST: There are two base-line issues: To be effective in the federal system,when you have discretion over dollars means you know how to spend them. You have to spend your dollars. The second baseline is there is as much paperwork for a five-thousand dollar grant as there is for a five-hundred-thousand dollar grant. The same number of signatures is required; the same amount of paperwork is required. If you now set those things aside, you are left with a set of vested interests. One wants to maintain the effectiveness of the person in Washington who has discretion over dollars and who is evaluated by how well he or she spends them and how quickly he or she spends them. In addition, of course, there are political gains to be made by certain procurements. On the other hand, numerous groups of people are receptive to taking your dollars in whatever form you wish to distribute them. They are always willing to accommodate themselves to more funding rather than less.

The bureaucratic imperative is the nexus in which the evaluative question has to be answered. Whether $500,000 buys you more than $5,000 is not the question. Nor is it a question of whether the quality obtained for $500,000 is greater than the quality for $5,000. The question is, when you have defined the problem and when you have set the research agenda, what does it cost to gain the particular information that you need? There are times when some of our best data has come from small studies. There are other times when you cannot get the data except by large, multi-year funding contracts.

The question is, what do you need to know, and what are the constraints on how you can find it out? In select instances, large-scale, longitudinal studies are surely the most appropriate way to gather the desired information. There are other times when there is no doubt but that large grants are given as "funny money." There are many reasons for this. At the end of the year you have dollars left, and you do not want them to go back to the Treasury; so you spend them. You have political pressures; you respond. Defense contractors are involved; education contractors are involved; medical research contractors are involved, etc. I make an assumption that inevitably some percentage of federal dollars are used in this way. We live with this reality, knowing that it accommodates a broad range of interests, both in the federal government and out. The task of the policymaker is always discerning the constraints on funding options.

I have moved away from making evaluations of whether I get more from $500,000 than I do from $5,000. On the surface, of course, you should; but whether you make evaluations in terms of the ultimate usefulness of the information is always a question. It may well be that the effort is futile if the researchers always fail to ask the right questions. If they do not focus on the right dynamics, it is likely that the money and effort have to be written off.

HOROWITZ: At the other side of paradise, when you have the end-product in house, whether it cost $5 million or $5,000, what use is made of it, and how does research get translated from NIE or HEW into a policymaking pipeline?

RIST: Much of the research does not. It depends upon the issues, and if there are people who want information linked to specific issues. In NIE right now we are having more impact on the policy process down than up. That is, the impact is greater on local school superintendents, local and state boards of education, and state commissioners of education. For example, the material we have developed on bilingual and multicultural education for Chicano children is now being used by something like 400,000 Spanish-speaking children in this country. Our impact is more out and down to other policy arenas, particularly at the state and local level. In part, this is because education is diffuse. Local school districts, for example, maintain a great deal of autonomy over which books they choose, which teachers they hire, and what their policies are as to race relations, sex education, school administrative organization, and decision-making procedures. There is nothing comparable to this at the federal level. The closest we come is the state of Hawaii, which has a state board of education, no local or district boards, and which hires all teachers. That, in fact, is the most aggregation we get in terms of the direct day-to-day implementation of education in the public sector of American society.

When we talk about going "up" with policy influence, we need to place NIE within the organizational hierarchy of HEW. At the Cabinet level is the Secretary of HEW: below him there are eight Assistant Secretaries: Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation; Assistant Secretary for Human Development, Assistant Secretary for Education, and others. Two groups report to the Assistant Secretary of Education, the National Institute of Education and the Office of Education. The Office of Education is essentially responsible for most of the programmatic work in education in the United States that is financed through the federal government. Programs like the Teachers Corps, the Emergency School Assistance Program- and Title I Compensatory Education are funded through OE. Title IV, Title VI, Title VII, and now Title IX, are also funded through OE. The kinds of vocational education which came with the 1974 Education Act are all administered through OE.

NIE was established in 1972 as the R&D branch for education in the United States. Our mandate is comparable to that of the National Institute of Health, or the National Institute for Mental Health. Thus, OE has almost no research responsibilities; we have almost no programmatic responsibilities. We are essentially the research and development branch. If what we develop pays off, it is shifted over to OE to be administered. For example, the bilingual-multicultural material developed by NIE has been shifted to OE as part of their programmatic responsibilities.

To have said all this is to suggest that the upward influence of research is tenuous at best. Policy is seldom, if ever, based on research findings alone, and I do not think it should be. There are times, though, when research can surely help to clarify what is known or not known. For example, school desegregation is a sensitive and politically explosive issue; there is a need to know what is happening. The information we are gathering, the questions we are raising, the kinds of research we are doing, are being absorbed upwards. The findings are also being absorbed down and outwards. Important questions, for example, are being raised on processes of resegregation and the linkages of official acts of public officials to the educational opportunities of minority youngsters. Likewise, there are policy implications to be derived from our work on "white flight" and crisis prevention.

This latter area is a direct concern of the Secretary of HEW because he and the President in this election year are going to have to respond to questions about school desegregation and what HEW is doing to prevent more situations like Boston. I and others, are now in the process of preparing what could well be the administration's initiative toward school desegregation in this selection year. The process of preparing this initiative is taking place among four groups simultaneously. These four groups (the Office of Education, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Assistant Secretary for Education, and NIE) are being coalesced into a Task Force to work for the Secretary of HEW on the major initiative which will go to the President for his decision.

Desegregation is at present a "hot" political issue. Ohters at NIE will do their work day after day, month after month, year after year, and never really have to respond to the political and social presssures above them in terms of their analysis of data. For the information they are gathering is not of particular importance to the political arena in which all of us work.

For example, some NIE staffers are working on basic research related to the acquisition of mathematical skills. This is not something the President or the Secretary of HEW is going to put on the political agenda. School desegregation, however, is there whether they wish it to be or not. My position is a bit out of the ordinary because the work of our division puts us at the center of strong political currents. Several other groups at NIE are in comparable positions. The bilingual-multicultural group has a gremendous political constituency and a set of political concerns to deal with. The Compensatory Education study group also does, because Title I is the largest single educational expenditure in the United States, at $1.7 billion a year.

HOROWITZ: You speak of a social science perspective, and yet, as you know, within the social sciences there are sharp, antagonistic schools of thought, or at least that there is more than one vantage point, whether it is functionalism, organicism, ethnomethodology, Marxism, or what have you. Yet, do any of the theoretical or methodological arguments over which so much heat has been rendered, and so much blood shed, do any of them have any real role with respect to effective research at the level in which your research comes back to you as finished product?

RIST: In general, these theoretical debates are irrelevant to the policy process. The research that comes back to us is in response to what we asked for, at least in terms of topical areas. But here there is a crucial struggle, and it is a profound one as I see it, in terms of its implications for not only social policy, but for the resultant programs. The struggle is in part an epistomological one, and focuses on this question: "What are the causal assumptions?" Here theory is relevant, but at the discipline rather than sub-discipline levels. Assuming one moves from the problem to the policy, to the program, and then to the evaluation of the feedback, the definition of the problem takes you 80 percent down the road. In other words, how you develop your policies, and what programs you initiate, are in large part the result of how you first define the problem. The epistomological battle over the paradigm is by far the most important one.

What I have found rampant at the federal level in the assessment of social issues in American society, has been psychologizing of social problems. The reason that children do not learn is due to their psychological problems; the reason that criminals do not behave is because of their psychological problems; the reason the poor do not take care of their homes is because of their psychological problems. For the social sciences, the battle becomes finding the mechanisms and means by which to nurture alternative approaches and alternative paradigms so as to implement different policies and programs. The battle is not ethnomethodology versus functionalism. It is systemic vs. individual causal factors. The struggle over questions of causality--the struggle over how in fact one wants to move from a to b; the struggle over what in fact you wish to effect -- that is the contribution of social science. This, rather than saying: "I am really sold this week on functionalism instead of ethnomethodological studies." Such comments are purely academic. It is a debate that must be for the joy of academics because it has no relevance anywhere else.

I frequently find myself in struggles against beliefs and perspectives which try to interpret the problems of education as essentially motivating students rather than questioning, for example, the reasons we persist with a warehouse function in high schools. We do not know what to do with high schools and high school age students at present. We are playing around with career education, vocational education, and other such programs, assuming that somehow the structure of high schools is fairly sound and has an integrity behind it. I have a different set of views about what high schools accomplish and why they are there. But to argue this alternative implies that you have a different set of programs and the policies which you would implement for young people in our society between 13 and 17.

HOROWITZ: How do you transmit this kind of information to a university environment? I do not dispute what you are saying. I feel very much in sympathy. How do you get people to think in paradigmatic terms, and what are the consequences of not thinking paradigmatically?

How do you get a set of considerations filtered back into the educational network so that the disjunctions between university education, or what you might call larger empirical, or worldly concerns are narrowed? If what you are saying is accurate, then the real ideological struggle is between psychologism and sociologism, not between types of schools of each. How does this get brought back to the universities, and what would it do to the character of social science as a way of life? That is to say, one gros up academically with exactly these parochial concerns. On the other hand, what you are suggesting is that in the context of larger world definitions, these parochial consideration are indeed just that.

If this is the case, that means we are involved in some gigantic form of backwater education that does not count; or that you are involved, the policy-making process is involved, in a pragmatic network, and that it cannot get beyond that network in the handling, treatment, or estimation of issues. Is there a way to square this problem? If you talk this way to academics, certainly my colleagues of a more traditional variety would say thatyou are providing a paradigm of pragmatism, not a paradigm of sociology or psychology, and hence, what you are doing is presuming that nothing beyond the pragmatic paradigm exists, and possibilities of paradigmatic breakdown are simply excluded from your purview. So you are, in spite of all the research purchased, all the research utilized, surprised continually by events, because there is no larger than pragmatic frameworks to put all of this in. How do you respond to that?

RIST: There are several issues running concurrently. It is not simply a matter of pragmatics. The social science perspective, the basic assumptions guiding the social sciences, can form your view as you work out the policy process. I am convinced from those I have interacted with, that they hold a relatively complex and complete set of notions about where they want to go and how they plan to get there. There are visions. The pragmatism comes because the policy process is always in a power arena. Theories exist independently, and have their own life, regardless of whether they are true or fale. If they are in fact utilized, they are implemented from centers of action.

The consequence is that policymaking is always a process within a context of people who have more or less power, who have vested interests in a particular approach, who have personal career aspirations, constituencies, and values. The policy process does not take place in a vacuum; it takes place with human beings - with their own aspirations, views, and vested interests. As a result, you are always talking about actors in a process, and actors influencing a process, and actors making a process. The question of pragmatism implies a kind of atheoretical approach to social change.

The question of how you articulate your analysis and why an alternative form of research is beneficial, is not couched in the nuances of any particular sociological perspective. Just to raise the question of structure versus personality is in and of itself to have shifted paradigms so profoundly that anything within that is really a second or third order issue. To have switched the debate, the focus of one's research from questions of personality to questions of social structure is to have shifted the basis for causal analysis.

The pragmatism comes with the possession of power which one always seeks to maintain and preserve. You do not give it away for the sake of a paradigm. You win a few, you lose a few, but you surely do not put all your cards on the table and say: This is my paradigm; love it or leave it. It is not an effective way to hold power. Power is fluid and is best utilized when recognized as such. The policymaker is working as an actor in an arena, one that has its own axis, ideas, and entres; these are realities always being negotiated and renegotiated.

Personally, I frequently find myself speaking in terms which I hope have some level of understanding and some level of meaning to those who do not work from the same paradigm as I do. This is the level at which much federal policy work has to be done. Federal policy work always has to respond to a diverse set of interests. It is not a single department of social scientists that one is addressing. Rather, there is a tremendously diverse group of people, each of whom may be participating in the process because they repreesent a particular vested interest group. One person is there as a union representative; another for a particular minority group; another is the Secretary's watchdog. Everyone comes into high level policy meetings with their own agendas and reasons for why they are there. There is no notion of the group as a cadre of colleagues pursuing truth. The ambiguity, the difficulties with language, the imprecision of terms, the need to give and take, and to grasp definitions and problems in fluid terms, is at the core of the policy process, and the very antithesis of life in the academic community. The academic community is undergirded by notions of discipline, of certainty, i.e., Point.05, (Point .01 if you are fortunate), etc. In the university there is agreement as to essential levels of knowing, ways of knowing, and the ways of assessing the validity and replicability of work presented for scrutiny. It is a totally different context and framework from which the policymaker must work. I have seen many academics paralyzed simply because of ambiguity and muddleness in the ways the policy process works so as to accommodate all the people at the table who have their own agendas. You cannot let them leave without feeling some of their concerns have been met, or you wind up going nowhere. The policy process is a situation of continual compromises and tradeoffs. Academics are not nurtured in that kind of milieu. A dissertation defense is probably the most extreme example of what is alien to the policy process.

HOROWITZ: I am at a loss still to understand how the larger dynamics of the social system enter into the kinds of cogitations that you engage in. For example: When you purchase research now, do you take in mind a political milieu, an executive atmosphere, a legislative retreat from the sixties with respect to problems at a practical level like busing, or more abstract types of questions, such as putting the damper on equity concerns, for example. A current issue of Public Interest has an article entitled: "Can we afford more equity?."

In other words, how do you handle frontal assaults, not of the psychological paradigm versus the sociological paradigm, but what you might call the conservative paradigm in which you demand certain levels of zero growth or limited growth, to minimize stress within the social system, rather than minimizing or alleviating stress and suffering. Essentially, that too is paradigmatic. We are confronted not only with a social science paradigm, but a political paradigm, which probably is more overwhelming. Given the fact that your Division is an equity division, one wonders what you might call a frontal assault on equity.

RIST: What is being stopped is not the research, but the programs. I have had almost no political pressure not to fund research because of its implications and linkages to questions of social change. NIE has been an outstanding place to work in that regard. The resistance comes when it is time to take research toward implementation. The conservative milieu in Washington seems to see research as irrelevant. At a purely political and pragmatic level they are right, because the issue is not really research; it is the effort after you get the research findings and seek to work toward their programmatic implementation. That is where the conservatives aim their guns, and they are effective when they do so. I have not felt pressure not to fund this study of white flight or that study of crisis prevention. To use one's political energies to stop research is senseless when one has the option instead, of being able to hold up 2,000 community action lawyers who work in poor communities, for example. The political question is not research.

As an example of the latitude available in my work, we are going to move fairly soon on the question of metropolitan solutions to school desegregation. The metropolitan solution to desegregation is perhaps the most sensitive and volatile in the desegregation struggle. Metropolitan solutions imply that school desegregation efforts are no longer restrained by present school boundaries in urban areas. The implications of this approach are essentially as follows: desegrgation is now an activity of an entire urban area and local school district boundaries are no longer sacred. Rather, we are going to think of metropolitan school systems the same way we do of other municipal services: water, fire protection, and port authorities. It would mean that white suburbs would no longer be able to perpetuate neighborhood schools and white schools as one and the same. The implications of that for urban America are astonishing. Efforts at metropolitan solutions are moving through the courts right now, and we are trying to catch up a bit because there are two major metropolitan court decisions, both Indianapolis and Wilmington, that will be decided within the next six to ten weeks. We are waiting to see; but we are also trying to anticipate the consequences, should they decree metropolitan plans for these urban areas. The Supreme Court, if it rules in favor of metropolitan solutions, as it did not do with Milliken v. Bradley, will have changed the bases that underline present discussions of school desegregation.

I can put research into sensitive areas right now, in part, also because research is a diffuse endeavor. NIE has two to four thousand grants and contracts. For an outsider, it is difficult, to say the least, to keep track of this many studies. I myself will have 50 to 60 major projects underway by the end of this fiscal year. To monitor and evaluate these studies is the task of a full staff of professionals. Those who wish to challenge our efforts are surely at an extreme disadvantage. I have a great deal of freedom in terms of the research I wish to fund, for I and others know full well this is not the critical point at which to intervene. The ultimate struggle is at the time of implementation. The separation of research and implementation is perhaps one indication of how the seventies have distinguished themselves from the sixties.

HOROWITZ: Given the large amounts of support available for applied, or task-oriented research, and the relative paucity of funds available for nonutilitarian research efforts: for example, general discussions on the efficacy of policy remedies in systemic contexts that may not admit to incremental solutions, does not your position on federal funding encourage a basic myopia when it comes to the study of fundamental issues of the survival or failure potentials of the social system as such?

RIST: It is important to differentiate the efforts of agencies which support basic research and those that support research as it is linked to their mandate as a mission-oriented agency. If you have a mission, you have goals and you have objectives, and you use your dollars to achieve those goals and objectives either directly, by funding research to give you answers, or indirectly, by funding one group and keeping them content so they do not cause problems while you send someone else after the answers. This is an important distinction. I work in a mission-oriented agency. I am not there simply to nurture knowledge for the sake of knowledge. I must add, though, that we do not ignore basic research. Perhaps 25 percent of my funds are in basic research efforts.

HOROWITZ: There is a gratuitous assumption that the Academy is not a pressure group or a constituency. It is an odd thing about academics: everyone else in the world is a constituency, but themeselves. Public school teachers know better; but university personnel, steeped in noblesse-oblige, do not understand their own power, and limits.

RIST: When NIE first began, it drew on people from the academy to help plan and eventually staff it. NIE, in its first two years, poured millions of dollars into academic research. As this was occurring, NIE began to do badly on the Hill; two years ago the Senate marked us for zero funding. The academic community, having received millions of dollars from NIE, was singularly distinguished by its deafening silence on our behalf. Academics do not really care where the money comes from as long as they get it.

I frequently get proposals that have gone to four or five different agencies in Washington: NIMH, NSF, NICHD, OE, to name a few. Academics really do not have agency specific affiliations or fealities. If NIE cannot fund it, they will give it to NSF. If NSF cannot do it, they will give it to NIMH, and so on. They go fishing. When NIE was marked at zero, academics must have thought it was our own problem; they simply would go to fish in another pond. Now, NIE no longer views academics as our chief constituency. We fund them and we work with them, but we no longer believe our future must coincide with theirs.

The HEW budget is a zero sum. When we lose it someone else gets it. Academics have not been of much help; they do not go to the Hill and say, "listen, NIE really ought to be held on to. It has valuable research underway." Rather, academics are silent. But I understand another reason for this is that academics are not effective in the political arena; they do not coalesce. They are a fractured set of private entrepreneurs who come to get their dollars and leave.

HOROWITZ: What you are saying is harsh,and probably no group deserves it more. On the other hand, in all fairness, and to somewhat balance the record, movements took place and were stimulated by the academy in the sixties, and in part produced people like yourself; these involved the growth of a national social science foundation movement. When you were my student, I spend a lot of time in Washington with NSF, to develop the quality-of-life approach; to develop all kinds of things in relation to Senator Mondale, and at that time, to Senator Fred Harris. We made possible wider bases of funding and wider and more ample visions of how monies ought to be used. It seems to me that it is important to bear in mind the work of people who are, oftentimes ironically, peripheral to academic life. For example: if one were to talk about who is important in Washington, Talcott Parsons or Ray Bauer, the answer is unquestionably Raymond Bauer. If one is to ask, who is important in Columbia - Robert Merton or Eli Ginsberg - there is no question but that the answer is Eli Ginsberg. It is complicated.

RIST: It is complicated because you raise the historical question and also the broader context. What I was raising was the pragmatic issue of an agency existing, sustaining itself, and doing battle in the political arena. You do not exist in Washington on historical and filial ties. You exist on the basis of particular strategies, powers, programs, and the impact of your own nook and cranny.

HOROWITZ: If we are going to have a second generation of people like yourself serving the larger public commonwealth, it cannot come directly from the agencies. It has to come either from a medieval institution called the university, or a capitalist institution called private research contractor. It is hard for me to imagine private contractors getting the bulk of the NIE funding, performing the kind of intellectual services, however awkwardly, and admittedly with flaws that fill the cranny. How can they perform an objective, scientific role in a purely mission-oriented context? If government funding becomes so exclusively pragmatic, a danger exists that the next generation of scholars will not emerge. You must surely appreciate the anomaly in your hard position.

RIST: I doubt that you can argue our funding has any direct impact on the nurturing or creation of anew generation of researchers.

HOROWITZ: It odes, by indirection - by permitting the support of personnel. After all, the Office of Education grant supported you in your first major study. On the other hand, the nature of that granting process may have been circuitous. In other words, the payoff matrix may be much more complicated than a simple, causal chain. It may well be that you were the best thing to happen to the Office of Education. But they did not know it at the time. Had they taken their dollars and put them into a contract house, it might well be that you could not exist. I do not see how you can get around that severe problem merely by taking a strong position for a constituency advocacy, as you have, without taking into account this rather strange, medieval octupus called "the university," with admittedly, the stumble-bum characteristics it has.

RIST: I was a direct cost.

HOROWITZ: And a direct benefit. But now you are telling me you do not want to go that route.

RIST: Significant numbers of dollars continue to go into the universities because many of the researchers are there. But there has been a profound constriction. Dollars are not going to as many different universities as the way money moved out of Washington in the sixties. Retrenchment is, in part, a result of the growth of the contract process. Only places like Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, Chicago, and some few others have the wherewithall not only to monitor the Commerce Business

Daily, but to write the RFPs in response. The activity at most universities will be restricted to the little private entrepreneur at the twenty to fifty-thousand dollar grant level. There are significant amounts of this form of social science research monies still going to the universities.

I am convinced that in the Washington milieu I have worked with, the notion of using funds to support future researchers is probably a third-level consideration. I do not hear people saying that by funding this or that effort we are nurturing graduate students who in ten years can come and do good work at NIE. If one were to do a statistical analysis, the explained variance of that factor would be infinitesimally small.

The number of researchers is growing; the number of dollars is not; therefore, competition is more intense. The numbers of schools that compete is dwindling, and there are a whole series of factors. But to say that by doing this research I am nurturing second-generation types, is not relevant to the question. People in Washington do not say that it is in our best interests to continue to nurture the universities. In a way, I am playing devil's advocate; but it is better to argue it, in fact, at the level where most policymakers are. Few understand social science, let alone its contributions. Thus, another lure of the contract house is its appearance of ideological neutrality, which is a myth, but that is another discussion.

One other point about contract houses: They are increasingly drawing "big name" social scientists who want to do policy research; and they want to build teams of researchers to do the research. Thus, a lot of bright young Ph.D.s are going to private agencies like Abt or the Urban Institute because, first, there are major researchers there to work with; second, the work is unencumbered by administrative details; third, the financial rewards are greater than the university offers, and fourth, a direct pipeline into the policy apparatus is available. All of these reasons coincide with the rise of the contract procurement which staisfied more directly the need to respond to pressures for accountability of the expenditure of public funds. For this reason, private firms, the entrepreneurial networks, have been able to take over the bulk of social science research within the polich-making arena.

But lest I be misunderstood, I do not see this transformation as an unencumbered blessing. There are serious problems and implications for the generation of knowledge, for the parameters of research analysis, and for the likelihood of the government receiving the kind of skeptical and critical analysis it so badly needs if limited dollars are to be spent wisely. It is my own belief that the scientific community and policymakers alike will be shortchanged if the universities are finally and completely eliminated from this process. At this point it has not happened; yet it surely could. To prevent it, there has to be concerted action by both the government and the universities to make sure academic research penetrates the policy arena. Inevitably, though, universities must make the most accommodations, for the simple reason that the contract mechanism appears here to stay. And so long as universities remain so ill equipped to respond to the contract procurement process, contract houses will dominate the policy-linked research effort.

HOROWITZ: What can be done to orient academic social science training so that it more nearly reflects the actual study of policy research? Or is there a necessary dichotomy between theoretical systems about the world as a whole, and practical applications intended to ameliorate specific wrongs? How much of the tension is, therefore, built into the structure of science, and how much is a function of pedagogic misdemeanor?

RIST: The tension is there on both accounts. The world of knowledge is not comparable to the world of action, but knowledge is also not so divorced from action as the current orientation of academics would suggest. If one begins with the proposition that policies are not theories, but that they are deeds, one can move beyond the futile effort of seeking a synthesis that would only make the latter understandable from within the framework of the former. Each exists with its own internal order and logic. My own view is that so much of the current academic analysis conducted under the broad rubric of policy studies is bankrupt because it fails to acknowledge that dichotomy.

But having said this, your first question remains pertinent. What in fact can be done to orient academic social science research to be more cognizant and viable within the policy arena? This is, of course, not the place to sketch such an approach in any detail, but suffice it to say that several key components are absolutely essential. First, academic research orientations have to allow for multi-paradigmatic interpretations. It is immensely useful from within the policy arena if research findings are presented so that results can be interpreted in several ways, and implications can be derived from each mode of analysis. Essentially, if academics can move to where they suggest analysis A has this set of implications, analysis B has this set, and the like, the policy process is enhanced through the articulation of options. And a decision must always be made among a finite set of options.

I would suggest a field apprenticeship for anyone serious about policy research and analysis. It must be beneficial to have first-hand experience in a decision-making process, based on incomplete data sets, on tight time frames, on only limited options, and always within a political arena. It is a different domain than the academic pursuit of "truth and certainty" at the .01 level. Finally, none of the above will be pertinent so long as academics withhold legitimacy from those who work outside the academy. There has been a persistent notion in the socialization of graduate students and new Ph.D.s that they are not successfully ensconced in a professional role if they are not in the university. Thus, a phrase like "non-academic career lines" carries a negative connotation, implying only left-over jobs for those who did not find the hallowed academic slot.

So long as the academic community suggests to its offspring that fulfillment is only possible within its own domain, and that those who address themselves to the amelioration of specific wrongs have somehow tainted themselves by their deeds, the gap shall not be cloded. For I seriously doubt that those who are in the policy arena, who exercise power as part of their daily routine, and who value deeds as much or more than words, will forfeit this so as to bring about a rapprochement with the academic community.

PROFESSIONS, POLICIES AND POWER

An Interview with Wilson Record
Professor of Sociology
Portland State University

PROFESSIONS, POLICIES AND POWER - Wilson Record

HOROWITZ: When academics go into government service from the field of social science, do they leave their social science behind? Or do they take any portion of it with them into the work of government: whether federal, state, or local government? What, if any, is the impact of background or training variables in the policy arena?

RECORD: First, I have had considerable experience with sociologists who have gone into federal agencies in recent years. However, with few exceptions, those who sought such positions were not particularly competent scholars. This is especially true for those who entered on a more or less permanent basis. They could well have left social science behind since they did not have very much to begin with.

Second, those who moved from the groves of academe to the corridors of government agencies might well have been reacting to their failure to make an imprint on their field, and calculated rightly that they would never be able to do so. Their publishing records have been poor, if not in quantity, then certainly in quality.

Federal agencies provide a setting and environment in which they can avoid rigorous intellectual endeavors in favor of administrative routines. They are transformed in most cases from failed or failing scholars to safe, if not bright, bureaucrats. It is not a comforting though to realize that they may be making significant decisions concerning the proposals of serious and able scholars whom they cannot really understand. In conversation, the refugee from academe emphasizes the high rank he/she holds and the amount of money controlled. Bureaucratic modes of thinking and feeling become central in their behavior. Their commitment to the bureaucratic ethos is probably strengthened as they observe the current crisis in academe: they will not be particularly disturbed by the increasing denigration of intellectual activity in favor of career training in many colleges and universities. The latter are seen as undergoing rapid change and exhibiting a heretofore rare instability.

How much more reassuring is the network of federal agencies, which will always provide a place for those who have demonstrated their refined bureaucratic sensitivities. One should not expect them to make much social science input into these structures; they had only a little to begin with. Now they may not even recognize it.

HOROWITZ: Then fundamentally what you are claiming is that the quality of social science input is not so much a question of participation in government activity, but the other way around: that government activity reflects a paucity in social science participants to begin with. Is this a correct rendering of your views? What happens when increasingly practical problems emerge, when there are relatively few positions within the academic environment to absorb a growing social science population. Does this not lead to a higher quality of scholarship in those who are impulsed toward the policy or government arena?

RECORD: Government activity does reflect a paucity of social science generally. But what I am underscoring is the difficulty of changing that condition. A part of the deficiency is due to the general character of social science knowledge at the present time. It does not seem to have any central thrust; its several fields do not mesh even roughly with one another. Further, within each field there is no high order of agreement on the core of the discipline, to say nothing of its details and particularities.

Professional associations in the social sciences, which I have lately been studying, must struggle continuously to spread the institutional umbrella over ever more diverse groups who increasingly proclaim the absence of any common interest and who must be given nearly full autonomy to keep them from forming new sects. The second problem here is that the people who attempt to carry social science into the arena of government and public policy are not the most able in their respective fields. There are some exceptions, of course, and I would not want to overgeneralize. Possibly this can be changed with the growing concern among social scientists with the implications of their disciplines for public policy.

Even the exceptionally able man or woman, people with flair, imagination and a lust for battle, seem to be tamed and domesticated in only a short time. And with that, they cease to be much of an asset either for the government or for their own discipline. Some of them perceive quite clearly what is happening and they gradually work their way back or hurriedly flee to academe. Who can fault the government administrator or legislator who is bewildered by the equally authentic and conflicting recommendations coming from the social science community, if indeed, we can speak here of community?

HOROWITZ: That still leaves open the issue of what to do with an academic residual social science population. Are you arguing the case for a two-tier or two-track system? Those who are trained for academic work are presumably better qualified intellectually, and more capable of utilizing their social research techniques and theories than those who are less qualified, who then wind up in government service. The problem arises that those who go into policy work or government service are weaker in their abilities or achievements precisely where the needs and risks of error are highest. Is government activity in the policy arena to be a residual dumping grounds for social science castoffs?

RECORD: This seems to have been the case, particularly during the last two decades. During the New Deal days, government was able to draw heavily on the intellectual community, including the social scientists. The latter took pride in their involvement and felt they were making signficant contributions to policies that had an important bearing on the well-being of the society. And this happened at least to some degree, during World War II. However, few of the social scientists in either period ever saw themselves as permanent workers in the government agencies. Now, in a sense, we have no similar challenges. Perhaps this is because we are more aware of the limits of social intervention, possibly because we detect in government no strong commitment to significantly alter the society. And the social scientist turned bureaucrat wants to alter it only a bit, if at all. For now his fate is bound up with stability and not change.

I am not sure what you do with the residual or redundant group of social scientists who can find places neither in academe nor in government. For one thing, we could cut down drastically on the supply by eliminating many graduate programs and cutting back sharply on others. But I see little likelihood that the graduate departments are going to take such measures. Whatever they want, it does not include the reduction of faculty, the consolidation of curriculum, or honest dealing with the would-be graduate student. The rate of growth of the surplus is likely to be slowed only by the refusal or prospective graduate students to be lead down what may rightly be seen as a dead-end. Social scientists have no reason to be proud of what they have done in continuing to recruit graduate students for training for positions that no longer exist, and that are not likely to reemerge. It is curious that right now every academic professional association in the social sciences is frantically trying to identify non-academic sources of jobs for their unemployed graduates, while just as frantically trying to recruit new graduate students who will, in time, be added to the ranks of the unemployed.

Most unemployed social scientists now would accept government employment if it were available. And there would be some quite able ones in their ranks. If the latter entered the bureaucratic federal agencies, they might generate some lively changes, and be a source of no little discomfort to their less competent elders. I would like to see more social scientists move into the policy arena. How much better it would be if they were to do so because they saw policy work as a challenge and had been specifically trained for it, rather than as an alternative to driving a taxi or selling insurance.

HOROWITZ: How prepared are you to move the social science training process in the direction of accommodating policy-making requirements? Or is a change of emphasis within university life the solution? What is the responsibility of academic sociology to this process of study?

RECORD: I would certainly like to see both sociology and political science openly confront and deal with the issues of relating professional endeavors to the formation and application of public policies. But to do this you will have to back way up. In the first place, most graduate faculty members are capable of turning out finished products only in their own image, and little more. They may well have developed what Veblen referred to as a "trained incapacity" to select and socialize new types of men and women to fill policy research and policy-making roles. One has only to look at the rigidities in curricula of graduate departments in the two fields to realize how much minimal change is called for. Both sociology and political science seem to have rather awkwardly backed into the policy area. That is to say, they have shown serious concern only when it becomes apparent that their growing ranks of graduates could not find suitable positions in the preferred academic area.

There probably have been a considerable number of graduates in both fields who brought an interest in policy problems and issues with them to their graduate studies only to have that interest denigrated and squeezed out of them before they were certified as Ph.Ds. The preference for the "research" degree remains strong, indeed, in spite of the glaring lack of quality and creativity in most of those carrying that designation. Change will take place slowly, if at all, in faculty and curriculum. Perhaps public policy orientations and personnel will be able to move into the two disciplines funeral by funeral: longevity of sociologists and political scientists is quite remarkable.

HOROWITZ: One troubling aspect of the policy scientist debates is that after so many years of policy work and research, the idea of an entity known as the policy scientist has seemingly not taken root within an academic context. There are many people who do policy work. Sometimes it is upper-echelon work, or evaluative research at middle levels of analysis, or simply data gathering at a still lesser level. But with all of that, the Lazarsfeld, Lasswell, Lerner faith in the emergence of a policy scientist still has not borne fruit.

There is no department in the United States of America, to my knowledge at least, that gives a graduate degree in an entity called policy science, this despite the huge increase in policy-related courses. The anomaly seems to be that the need for policy-related activities increases, but without a corresponding field for policy science within academic life. Within government life, at all levels of government life, there is a desperate demand for trained personnel. But, if the concept of the policy scientist has resulted in dismal failure, what is there on the academic horizon to fill such a gap? The innovative physical scientist tends to be heralded and rewarded. But when a social scientist flies in the face of established wisdom, they are differently treated. The demands for new kinds of evidence become much more stringent. James Coleman, who might well have been criticized for the methodology of the original report concerning the abilities of black children to perform in integrated schools was not queried because he was saying what everyone wanted to hear. But using the same methodological formulation and coming out with findings that his liberal colleagues do not want to hear, he becomes an object of attack rather than veneration.

The demand for methodological rigor seems to be a function of the disposition of either a policy-making group, or a sub-culture to move or not move in a certain direction. There is no objective demand for rigor apart from the sense that the policy recommendation is going where the body politic wants to travel. The problem becomes: what constitutes an appropriate style of work, if what is demanded of social scientists is a mandarin response to the political system rather than an innovative response to that system. Can one ever really have a policy science that is not dependent upon the will of those who wield power, or the will of those very much removed from the commitments of the social scientist? Are those in government really capable of functioning as social scientists in non-academic surroundings? What exactly does it mean to call such people social scientists in those new political contexts?

RECORD: Frankly, I do not think well known or lesser known social scientists function as social scientists when they are in policy-making and policy-execution positions. They serve at the pleasure of their superiors who are not likely to be concerned that their efforts adhere to the canons of social science. Coleman has always been a puzzle to me: an excellent technician in specific areas, but somehow not able to define his own values and priorities, and greatly over-confident about the capabilities of quantative methods in sociology and in other social sciences. The effort to hail Coleman before the ASA ethics committee would have been a farce if it had not had such serious implications. Coleman's critics in the social sciences were reacting essentially on a political level in 1976, as were those who enthusiastically applauded his work on school desegregation a decade earlier. This is not to say that all those who responded did not face squarely the issues of theory and methodology. Of course, when social science findings receive wide publicity, the finder becomes publicly identified with a particular point of view and specific conclusions.

This may be a position from which he is later reluctant to back away. A confession of being in error, or doing faulty work, is not easy to make. It is a personally embarrassing thing and generates denigration of one's fellow social scientists who are associated with the researcher. I must say that I admire Coleman's willingness to change his mind in light of the new data he collected and analyzed. There seems to be a particular fascination of some social scientists for power, or rather for the chance to be continuously close to those who wield power. In this society, sociologists or political scientists as such have little power, and that may be a quite desirable arrangement since there is absolutely no evidence that they would use it better than lawyers, or funeral directors, or hog farmers.

Social scientists may be willing to give up quite a bit, including their critical perspectives and social science in exchange for power or even the appearance of power. I am essentially pessimistic about the prospects of linking social science to public policy. Power relationships are necessarily involved, and in time, the nasty compromises essential to linking the two add up to an enormous, if not always fatal, concession. But we ought to keep trying.

You would think that social scientists would have been greatly sobered by their experiences in the 1960s when the way was open for them to try to apply a great many things they thought they knew, to the many new programs underwritten by the federal government. Their performance must be rated quite low. Their successes were few; their failures many. And most of the returns are in. I was involved in several such programs, one of them an NDEA Counseling Institute, in which I was the staff sociologist. The idea was to develop in high school, counselors with a greater sensitivity to, and knowledge of, racial and ethnic minority group members whom they were likely to encounter in carrying on their professional activities.

It was difficult to talk about the significance of school or community social structure as the context for counseling work or about the need to change such structures to improve the chances for successful work in individual cases. There was a strong and uniform tendency for the counselors to try to reduce structural issues to individual psychological problems. They never were able to see structures as problematic, and they became quite impatient with my continued insistence on their significance. I found the whole experience frustrating. At first, I assumed that I was not communicating well. But in time it became apparent that I was probably communicating too well. The counselors simply did not want to change the school and community contexts which shaped their work, and apparently provided an environment which they found comfortable. I concluded that sociologists would need a great deal more knowledge and persuasiveness than I had if they were going to change public school policies in the counseling area.

But talk about changing structural dimensions of society can be cheap. It becomes significant only when the proposal concerning counseling, as in the above, or any other ingrained practices in the society, are somehow linked to power. And it is that link that many social scientists have been unable or unwilling to forge. If we are going to take ourselves and our ideas seriously, that is, applying what we think we know to issues about which we are deeply concerned, we will have to discern who has power and who does not, and how that power is to be handled, supported or opposed. And if the latter, what alternative sources of power may be available to the social scientists?

Returning to an earlier point, I am disturbed by the degree to which social scientists have removed themselves from sustained contact with people whose behavior they attempt to study. In much of survey research, the principal investigator usually employs only partially trained graduate students as interviewers, or he may subcontract the interviewing to some commercial organization. He or she rarely gets directly into the field and associates closely with the "subjects." Assuming that verbal responses to questions raised by intruding strangers are an accurate reflection of attitudes and behaviro, they in a sense, con themselves and their fellow social scientists into believing that they have plumbed reality. Perhaps it is this lack of in-depth understanding of groups of people and their interactions that result in policy recommendations that are superficial at best. We should not be surprised that serious legislators or administrators who make good-faith appeals to even outstanding sociologists, are almost invariably disappointed with the results. We could learn something from the anthropologists and psychologists who are not afraid to expend a lot of shoe leather or to get their hands dirty.

HOROWITZ: It is noteworthy that economists and psychologists (to a lesser degree) have managed to institutionalize their relationship to power at a more advanced form of efficiency than sociologists and political scientists. Does this not suggest that the state of the particular social science, rather than the level of involvement in government, remains the crucial variable?

RECORD: The economists have a rather high order of agreement on basic concepts and issues, on "the apparatus" and its theoretical foundations, although they frequently disagree on what specific measures ought to be adopted to attain societal objectives which necessarily, in one way or another, require specific government actions. There are concrete and continuous demands for the services of economists in a wide range of institutions, including government at all levels. And the economists can be said to have delivered to a substantially higher degree than the other social sciences.

Ours is a society which can be termed "Marxist" in the sense that the economic order is seen as the basic foundation of whatever other characteristics the society may display. We can get much more excited about a .05 percent increase in the unemployment rate than about the exceedingly high psychological and physical prices that blacks must pay in having to cope continuously with the demands and limitations of a racist society. And there is the widespread conviction that if the economic order is in good shape, all other things will necessarily be added unto us. What better proof do we need than the existence of the crucial Council of Economic Advisors at the federal level? The economists have an advantage in having at their disposal a vast amount of relevant data which they themselves do not have to generate. And they seem to be a confident lot. They are willing to lay their methods and findings on the line and to challenge those who might disagree. Nor are they afraid to communicate with laymen in terms that the latter can understand.

As for the psychologists, my reactions are mixed. First, psychology in the United States is exceedingly diverse. Within the field, and specifically within the American Psychological Association, internal strife is so pronounced that one wonders why both field and association do not fragment into a hundred different groups. The APA has had to struggle continuously to keep heretical bands from withdrawing and eventually forming a viable sect, and later a new church. In this society there is a widespread popular interest in psychology, much more so than in sociology and political science. Perhaps this is due largely to the fact that they see social problems not as structural deficiencies, but as individual failures or willful deviations. We seem to have substituted psychology for religion, and an hour on the psychologist's couch for an hour at the altar. There is a lot of hucksterism in the psychology field, much of it conducted by members in good standing in the APA and related professional associations.

But there is the strong conviction among decision-makers that psychology can be a useful resource, and that psychologists are valuable people on whom to call. Psychologists are ubiquitous - in the schools, in industry, in the military, in almost every organization that has some responsibility for identifying, judging and labeling people on a large-scale basis. This says nothing of the thousands of psychologists who are in private practice. On the whole, psychologists do not seem to be able to define significant structural limitations of American society. That structure is more or less taken for granted. Their aim is to facilitate the individual's participation in it. What can they contribute to the policy sciences? I am not sure. Perhaps they could anticipate some of the implications of public policies for wide ranges of individuals and groups. However, the predictive power of psychology even at the individual level, after intensive studies, is not great. Probably it is no greater than that of sociology. Psychology, whether justified or not, enjoys much wider public acceptance than either sociology or political science. It purports to explain the elusive phenomenon, human behavior, and to measure its many dimensions. But, as the Association of Black Psychologists and the Association for Women in Psychology have pointed out, the discipline has functioned largely to keep two disadvantaged groups (and others) in their "place." Black psychologists, with few exceptions, have withdrawn from the APA, finding it impossible to associate with some white psychologists (including prominent APA members) who proclaim a genetic base for black intelligence scores. But, as I see it now, while psychology may prosper in both the research and clinical areas, even with its many and frequently contradictory perspectives, I would not expect it to contribute much to the policy sciences. But we should not forget that psychologists are out there on the line trying to deal with real problems or real people. I wish as much could be said for sociologists.

HOROWITZ: A considerable amount of funds which formerly were channeled to universities, is now going elsewhere. A whole new industry has come into being: entrepreneurial estates often underwritten by social science research. They are involved commercially in satisfying the demands for policy statements of an agency. It is directly through these private groupings that social science research findings are now filtered through government agencies. Clearly, research funds for policy-oriented questions which formerly went to universities, no longer do so, in part because of what you said: The ineptitude of the university-based researcher. But are government agencies going to buy greater ineptitudes? Will they purchase it from the private sector directly? Are we moving into an era of social science populism which will itself be a source of draining off the best and the brightest? What happens to the critical role of social science when the private agencies are able to perform and out-perform the universities on specific tasks to such a degree that almost all the money is directed toward these private agencies? What sort of linkages are possible between entrepreneurial social research which accentuates positivist criteria of results and services to clients, and academic social science which still accentuates critical criteria and long-range analysis of whole systems?

RECORD: I wish I knew. We have assumed that there are some significant differences between universities and commercial research outfits. However, the more we learn about the operations of academic grantsmen and grantswomen, these differences diminish. The social scientist entrepreneur outside academe behaves in much the same way as any other businessman. That is, he aims to deliver a product to the purchaser and to make a profit in the transaction. He may have some influence in helping the client define the product which is to be produced. But if the potential purchases balks, the social scientist, if he wants to maintain a viable enterprise, will grant that the consumer ought to be sovereign.

In the present social science labor market, the commercial firms ought to be able to recruit some good young people at a rather low salary. And the shift from graduate school to the research firm may not be all that upsetting. Indeed, do not those who have gone through the academic mill become callous and cynical, having watched and perhaps become involved in research undertaken by their mentors where cutting ethical and professional corners was fairly standard operating procedure? My guess is that the entrepreneurial group will continue to grow. It should be able to meet clients' demands without protest or reservation. And at a lower price as well. Also, academically located researchers may be suspect since they may still insist on paying some small homage to their earlier social science calling. We ought to remember that government agencies that are now going for the contract rather than the grant route, had some very good reasons for doing so. The behavior of university grantsmen had become notorious--projects not completed, funds unaccounted for, inexcusable departures from original proposals. Perhaps we should be surprised that the funding agencies did not crack down sooner.

HOROWITZ: In The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, I made a sharp distinction between projects and grants. That is, between work initiated by agencies, and those initiated by individual scholars. I am pleased that you are making this distinction as well, since in my opinion, it indicates the great gap between policy as a function of government, and policy as a spinoff from social science. One question does arise with your position: If the care and feeding of policy researchers are not intellectually an academic responsibility, or, if universities are not obliged to produce new types of scholarship, to face contemporary issues, why, on the other hand, should the government have any sense of responsibility in the policy domain to the universities? Under such circumstances, would they not be justified to provide funds to the entrepreneurial groupings who seem better qualified to yield a product, whatever the quality of that product might be? I am plagued by just what it is the government contract is intended to purchase: problems that, it seems to me, should be faced frankly and candidly by positivists and critical theorists alike.

Does one buy a set of results? The process of reasoning? A set of hypothetical conclusions? Or simply new ways of battling old networks? Too often, the word "product" in the area of social science, obscures the profound differences between various styles of social science performance.

RECORD: I too am plagued. While I would prefer that the policy researcher be committed primarily to academe, I cannot make a compelling case for it, as I indicated before. I suppose still, that the university is the preferred place for such training, but only if it is willing to make some significant changes to which I referred near the beginning of our discussion: changes in curriculum, in faculty, and in general attitudes concerning the relations of the university to the rest of the society. The links between the university and the government in this society have always been important. And concern with public issues has not been lacking among the men and women in academe. Those links were not as many or as strong as they now are, but they were significant. The idea of "service" as a function of the university was not denigrated as was the case up until recently.

If the university is to be the principal trainer of people for the policy sciences, it is going to have to define the application of knowledge to public issues in a different way. That means that the social sciences are going to have to select and train people who understand from the beginning what the outcomes of experiences are likely to be. If that is done, the newly minted Ph.D. is not going to suffer cultural shock when he enters a bureaucratic structure which is likely to provide considerably less autonomy and a great many more rules than did the graduate department. There are quite a number of efforts along these lines at the present time; they take the form of interdisciplinary centers or institutes, or schools. However, it is my impression that they remain step children in the academic family; they tend to be staffed by people on a part-time bssis, whose hearts lie elsewhere; that is, in their particular social science field.

This could change significantly if resources for established departments were reduced and there was a decline in their enrollment. More and more, the social sciences on university campuses are providing "service" courses for schools, institutes, centers and the like, which are coming to offer their own degrees. The choice to become involved in such ventures usually was not a positive one. The participation may indeed have been based on no choice at all, and was seen frequently as an imposition.

HOROWITZ: Perhaps we have been asking the wrong questions. Rather than wait for the academic world to produce its first policy scientist, ought we not to be raising the question of what happens to the scientist in the policy process? What is the content of the policy process that seems to make it almost impossible to develop a core curriculum in this area? Here we have a serious issue of whether the concept of policy-making has a theoretical underpinning and represents a scientific endeavor unto itself, or is simply like social welfare: an applied activity generated by society to meet highly practical needs on an every-day basis.

RECORD: You refer to a significant failure. Even those social scientists who would like to see the university make significant contributions to the development and application of public policy have great difficulty in reaching minimal consensus on just how people are to be trained for these functions. What frequently emerges as requirements in the product of a lot of inter-departmental higgling and bargaining, an essentially political process; changes in curriculum tend to be conservative and the protection of academic turf may be paramount. It is a rare exception when there is a high order of agreement among the faculty of a department, or among those identified primarily with interdisciplinary policy programs. Another possibility is that social scientists themselves have lost substantial confidence in their disciplines.

Among a great many that I know, there seems to be much despair, possibly a reaction from having claimed too much in the past, and assuming that there is (or was) much greater flexibility in the political and social orders. Of course, the younger social scientists have had to invest much of their energies in learning increasingly sophisticated quantitative methodologies. The philosophical dimension of their preparation has been limited. They do not seem particularly able to think "big." They are likely to avoid policy questions because they cannot reduce them to minute measurements. In this sense, the heavy emphasis on mastery of quantitative techniques in the social sciences, and not least in political science, has been a disservice to both the would-be social scientist and to the society.

HOROWITZ: One problem that arises with respect to social scientists who perform policy roles, is the public attitudes toward the social sciences, no less than the general attitudes toward the policy question under consideration. Thus we are faced not simply with the public attitudes toward desegregation by means of school busing, that is, the attitude of the public toward the problem, but also whether there is a public belief in the credibility of the social scientists who make statements about desegregation, or school busing. That is to say, even if we acknowledge the legitimizing roles of the social sciences in government service, does the same kind of legitimation extend to the larger publics, and if not, what are the consequences of this dichotomy of attitudes toward the social scientists in his or her policy-making guise?

RECORD: In my view, the public prestige of the social sciences is lower now than it was a decade or two decades ago. As you have pointed out, there has been also a deligitimizing of desegretation in recent years, Coleman and Armor being two outstanding examples. Yet, I do not think of any one who weighs their data carefully would likely agree that they are as persuasive as that offered previously which presumably elaborated a "scientific" basis for desegregation. What are sociologists to make of this? But more importantly perhaps, what are the various publics going to conclude, not only about the contradictory findings, but also about the social scientists? Do we expect the several publics to determine who is right and who is wrong, particularly if we have already concluded that laymen lack our social science expertise? We should not be surprised if a cynical public concludes that "you place your money and you make your choice." Item: Have you noticed, during the last few years, the increasing frequency in the media to put sociology in quotation marks?

HOROWITZ: What can be done in situations, often transnational, where there is a firm understanding of a policy orientation, or a decision-making complex when such a network of ideas confronts social and political systems which do not have the same kind of social science footing in their own policy and decision making? For example: What happens when social science studies, if we can call them that, confront Marxist studies? What impact is feasible in a universe lacking in intellectual isomorphism, or more practically, in a world in which the social scientific role is not universally or uniformly accepted? Can one have a policy oriented framework in transnational settings? Or is the social science role limited to those arenas where its legitimacy is already accepted?

RECORD: We have already missed a great many opportunities to relate social science to public policies. For one thing, we have tried to maintain something that is essentially false, or at least highly improbable, the value-free posture which has provided an escape hatch of sorts for those who have not sorted out their priorities, or who do not want to assume the moral responsibility that is required in extending findings to relevant public issues. This has enabled us to stand aside as irresponsible critics, or it has been an excuse for not getting our hands dirty with essentially tough issues. For example, sociologists in the field of crime and delinquency have rarely come up with strong innovative ideas. When their proposals have been given serious application, the results have been largely disappointing. For example, the indeterminant sentence. In the "applied" areas we frequently assume that established external structures -- law enforcement agencies, schools, mental institutions, military organizations -- are unresponsive to social scientists, and thatno change is possible.

By getting involved, however, we may be able to bring some changes in these structures, provided, of course, that we have social scientists competent to recognize opportunities and sufficiently resourceful to link theories to practice. And, it might be added, that we need people who can make compromises in existential situations without compromising the basic discipline or their basic selves. But this means risking the disdain of one's colleagues who remain "pure." It may also mean that the social scientist who tries, rather than talks about the linking of theory to practice is likely to have to pay the price of low salary, slow promotion, and generally low prestige in the department.

HOROWITZ: Perhaps we are facing the kind of problem that the physical scientists have with the engineers, namely the unpredictable gulf between pure and applied disciplines that nonetheless acts to create a useful tension between the theoretical and the pragmeatic. Is there a way in which social science can harness the work of the intelligence community and the policy apparatus in evaluating commitments, strategy, and premises, and hence provide a more responsible behavioral attitude without necessarily resolving issues of fundamental theory? Even if one accepts your belief in the profound difference between scientific tinking which goes on at a university, and designs that go on in the government, the latter has such an enormous impact on the entire citizenry, on the society as a whole, that some effort has to be made to bridge the gap, at least at elemental pragmatics, if not at more profound theoretical levels.

RECORD: I would agree that there is an enormous gap between the pure and the applied in the social sciences. I can recognize also some benefits growing out of such an arrangement. However, there are also liabilities and they are increasing. I can well see why those who work in the policy field regard the social scientists with something less than awe. How one bridges this gap, I am not quite sure. Could we do something to change the reward structure in the academic community? Could we honor and reward those who in a sense are performing a more demanding and difficult task than those whose compelling activity is theorizing? Could we reduce the undue influence of the "pure" social scientists in the selection of staff additions?

If we cannot do things like this, there will be some serious consequences. For one thing, the poorest social scientists will continue to drift into the policy communities, or perhaps even seek it out. For another, publics are going to be fed up with those academic people whose concerns appear to have little to do with the wellbeing of the people who support them. Sociology in particular is vulnerable here. It is likely to be pressures from these sources, rather than internal redirection that narrow the gap between the theory and applied oriented members of the intelligence community. There are enough parasitic institutions in this society without the social sciences assuming even partially that state. Uninvolved social scientists claim, of course, that their detachment is in the long run a societal benefit. This is an unproved bit of lore that has yet to be seriously tested.

HOROWITZ: One has to appreciate the well of feelings involved by those who work in the policy world. So much emphasis in our discussion has been on how the academic social scientist views the policy world that we forget the other side of the coin. Many policy personnel, in interviews I have conducted, think of academics as largely unimportant people dedicating their lives to trivial subject matter: people who in a world of aestheticism, and who are neither willing nor capable of reasoning their positions and opinions in the larger realm of public policy discourse. Perhaps the problem of two cultures is not that of the sciences versus humanism, but rather tha academy and its medieval frameworks, and the government and its contemporary bureaucracies. Again, even if these issues are not resolved in general theory, what kinds of organizational networks can be created that would provide organizational umbrellas, if not ideological warranties,for linking up the interests of social scientists and policymakers?

RECORD: We cannot lightly reject the feelings of people in the policy field as we have been so long inclined to do. I would have to say though thatthe stereotyping and derogation of academic people is widespread among those in the policy area. Their percetpions of us are not without some justification. For one thing, they find our vocabularies convoluted and difficult to understand. In sociology in particular, there seems to be a constant striving to use involved terminology when straightforward English would convey the desired meanings. All too often, social scientists try to hide their ambiguities behind a professional terminology, as if they were striving to be misunderstood, or were overly concerned to be "scientific."

You cannot communicate with an outgroup by using an ingroup vocabulary. But that is not infrequently the way that social scientists want it. It should not be surprising that those in the policy community see the over-specialized vocabulary not as suggesting knowledge, but rather, the mark of uncertainty, ambiguity, and an inability to perceive the real world that lies outside academe. Is there the possibility of constructing an umbrella under which members of the two groups might find common shelter? I doubt it. However, I do see the possibilities of specialized groups in academe and in the policy areas finding some common concerns. But this can happen only as the social sciences themselves further fragment with the sociologists or political scientists or other social scientists, disregarding the core theoretical basis of their discipline, and not being concerned to relate the specifics to it. Maybe what you end up with is a "gerentology" community of a "delinquency" community, and so on.

HOROWITZ: Few people within the social sciences have any kind of organizational clout. Certainly those in the academic world have only vague and indirect impact on the policy process, while those working in the policy apparatus itself are clearly limited by their bureaucratic frameworks and their levels of appointment. As a result, is there any way in which a greater impact can be registered by the social science community on government? Is there anything specifically that can be done by the scientists themselves to bring this greater awareness to the larger body politic?

RECORD: I have attended my share of conferences whose purpose was to bring academic and policy people together around some specific issue of public concern. There tended to be, in most cases, a mutual uneasiness and an unexpressed longing to get things over and done with. I have rarely heard any policy participants express any interest in moving into academe or in developing any strong ties with it. On the other hand, the social scientists frequently conveyed the impressions that they were either slumming, or in some cases, performing missionary work. When there is a recess or lunch, the two groups seem to separate, and one senses that members of each group are telling each other that they are only there by necessity, and that they will be glad when it is all over.

Perhaps we should make it mandatory that all social scientists, in earning their degrees, spend a couple of years in what are essentially applied settings, and that they renew their acquaintance with reality every three or four years by doing another stint. A like requirement might be imposed on policy people to become involved in academe. Also, why should a social scientist in a sense be licensed for life when the Ph.D. is conferred? Why not have it come up for periodic renewal, the latter contingent, in part, on his demonstration of competence in policy areas?

HOROWITZ: I great push has been made in recent times to translate problems of the kind we have been dealing with, from an empirical to an ethical framework. As a result, almost every professional society now has an ethics committee that adjudicates the type and character of research performed that might remotely have a practical impact on the policy process. However, my problem is that this kind of ethical approach only reinforces the bureaucratic and administrative control of social science by its own elites, without addressing the problems at hand, namely, reaching the policy apparatus at its most vulnerable point: a breakdown in its evaluational feedback. Indeed, if empirical issues and the need to know generally yield to ethical issues, and the need to behave properly, such social science would be less, rather than more impactful on government policy needs, and would only encourage further steps in that direction by making the researchers less willing to submit to organizational and professional castles.

We are, in other words, not simply dealing with the problem of the relationships between the university and bureaucracy. What the points of leverage are, no less than the committing a greater portion of our time and energies to policy matters, itself becomes a problematic requiring careful analysis. The point I am certain of is that ethics committees multiplied bureaucratic tasks without resolving specific problems.

RECORD: I have to conclude, after having served on a number of association committees concerned with essentiall- ethical issues in sociology, that they cannot be effective in influencing the behavior of members. Many of the grievances which came to our attention involved alleged harm done to one or more members by other members. Rarely was administration or some granting agency designated as the offender. I have been impressed also by the weaknesses of such committees that have been set up in associations in other social sciences. We cannot really police our own terrotory. This may well reflect a lack of consensus on what is proper and improper conduct. Also, it may reflect the fragmentation in the field where "party lines" may be drawn along theoretical or methodological lines, and the deviant ostracised or fired. There may be a strong, unspoken personal dimension to the discrimination visited on a department member. We do not have any way of saying this is sociology or economics, or political science, and then seeing what behavior is intellectually or morally consistent with it. Such committees are not likely to be involved until all other avenues, including the courts, have been tried.

HOROWITZ: The dilemma of para-legal services is that they result in para-ethical activities. They create confusion in the minds of professional personnel as to what is and is not permissible in research terms. Such para-legal performances tend to set limits on the work that can be done, rather than the procedures for doing it. A good indicator of the dilemmas in legal resolutions is the growth in adversarial relationships between the academically young and old, between established and nonestablished, tenured and nontenured faculty, or political and nonpolitical types. The appeal to law is at the same time an admission of a most tragic sort: that the professions have not been able to resolve the grievances that are currently outstanding within the social science community.

RECORD: Yes, but that means that we have such little agreement on substance or ethics within a group with which we are strongly identified, that we must go outside the profession if differences are to be adjudicated. It is not a pleasant realization.

HOROWITZ: Perhaps we are at a point in time when the problems cannot be resolved because the nature of our organizational life is so ambiguous. The unifying threads may no longer be psychology, political science, or economics, but rather such items as area studies, or social problems, or demographic and gerentological issues. If so, the capacity to provide support mechanisms for the policy researchers becomes a problem. For example: Can you have social science offering useful guidelines to a policy world when it itself is in such a state of intellectual transformation?

RECORD: The gap between clinicians and researchers is astonishingly wide. What has happened is that the umbrella will hardly cover the many philosophical, methodological, and theoretical differences in the field. It is almost civil war. We have some experience with the ways in which ethical issues are handled in medicine and law. Frequently though, the issues in social sciences are much less specific, and "malpractice" can hardly be defined. Even if it could, there is really no enforcement or discipline resources.

We ought to be able to specify the proper relationship between academic and policy people but we have not. Social scientists have accepted situations as hopeless because they felt that they did not have any colleague support. The social scientist in the applied field is vulnerable because his professional association cannot really provide him any protection . A union, or some similar organization, is likely to do a better job. Unionism among social scientists is likely to increase, but it does not, in my view, really get at the problems that we have been discussing. It cannot narrow the gap between the university faculty and policy community. It will focus attention on narrow, on-the-job issues, and may place still another organizational barrier between the social scientist who would become relevant in the policy field and the policymaker who would welcome his interest. I assume that there are still those who would value such an arrangement.

Associations may well be in a position to exercise some influence on both the legislative and administrative branches at the national level, but they will have to be concerned with issues that go beyond their narrow professional concerns. They will have to identify issues for which they have knowledge and resources, and demonstrate that knowledge to be relevant for the specific issues which policymakers are considering. But the positions taken must be seen as having a basis in social science knowledge, and not something dictated by narrow group interest. In other words, there will have to be public men acting in the public interest in light of the best knowledge their respective fields have to offer.

I have mentioned already the efforts of associations to open up new areas for the new Ph.D.s in their respective fields. But this should have resulted in a discipline that had something positive to contribute, no a last-ditch effort to reduce the high level of unemployment in a market that they had helped to glut. Policy people will know why there are now so many social scientists eager to join their ranks, and we can be sure that they will anticipate that if academe should recover (which I see as an outside possibility) there will be an exodus of the socia- scientists from the policy areana.

HOROWITZ: Just how powerful the policy apparatus has become is indicated by the fact that so many social science and physical science associations are located in the Washington, D.C. area. It is curious how, without so much as a murmur or a whisper, the academic center of the world has gravitated to the political center of the world. This is an anomic existence: that while the major university offerings are in such places as New York, Illinois, and California, the national associations are uniformly located in the District of Columbia. This would indicate, to me at least, that whatever the nature of academic likes and dislikes, the drive toward participation in the policy process has become inexorable. This is not a prospect, but a fact: not something to be celebrated, but it is certainly something to take cognizance of.

The world has a way of imposing its own solutions, even as we waste away offering theoretical explanations, or worse, reasons why explanations are impossible. Power will be served; and the intellectuals have always somehow sensed that in this world they are the unwitting servants. That is the message of this movement of professional life of social science to the Washington,D.C. area.

RECORD: One of the things that one of the Executive Officers of an association told the governing council of the association, was that he should be able to spend at least two days a week on the Hill working with legislators and their committees on issues on which the discipline could claim expertise. It was agreed that this would be a good idea, but that resources would not permit it. Only if the association had a direct and immediate interest at stake should he venture into the halls of Congress. We seem to be uncomfortable about the presentation of substantive knowledge (in sociology at least) to decision-makers, possibly because we have doubts about its really being substantive, or because we fear that our offering will be disparaged by our associates. The psychologists and the economists seem a great deal more willing to speak out, oeven if there is not solid consensus in the field, and with the possibility of being contradicted by their disciplinary colleagues.

SOCIAL RESEARCH ON WOMEN IN POLITICS

An Interview with Marilyn Johnson
Research Director of the Center for
the American Woman and Politics, of
the Eagleton Institute of Politics,

SOCIAL RESEARCH ON WOMEN IN POLITICS - Marilyn Johnson

HOROWITZ: In an environment where demands for equity are so widespread on the part of every specialized interest group, how can an agency such as the Center for Women in Politics, operate? How can it effect political outcomes nationally, or even on a statewide basis? Does it provide a mechanism for effecting policy, or is it simply a research arm of an interest group? More concretely, does the Center provide a mechanism for creating an ideological climate whereby other groups then affect the policy apparatus? Or do you know what the desire outcomes are of the work in which you are involved? Do you have any way of foretelling or assessing the outcomes of the processes that you unleash at the research level? This is a cluster of questions that come down to whether the Center has primarily a research function or an ideological mission.

JOHNSON: We have no formal mechanisms for prediction and evaluation of the consequences of our activities, though a number of informal channel permit some judgments. Before I try to answer your questions in more detail, however, let me comment briefly on our origins, the broader context in which we see ourselves as operating, and the limitations imposed on our activities by the realities of resource allocation in the society.

Like many organizations whose sole focus is the status of women, we are relatively new, established only five years ago by a grant from the Ford Foundation to the Eagleton Institute of Politics. Eagleton, devoted to research and education in applied politics, was founded in 1956 through a gift from Florence Peshine Eagleton, who had a special interest in the education of young women for citizenship and public life. Legend has it that her lawyers persuaded her to include men in her statement of purpose, and for seventeen years the ladies appear to have been forgotten in the male bastion of the Eagleton Institute.

Thus the founding of the Center for the American Woman and Politics (CAWP) is itself an indicant of the changing status of women -- or, at the least, of the trendiness of the topic. In addition to general support money from Frod, we receive support from Ruters Univeristy, from project grants (most prominently from the Carnegie Corporation), from contributions by corporations and individuals, from consulting and publications.

Although we seek to serve the needs of women, our ability to operate is dependent on legitimation of those needs by agencies in control of resources -- in this instance by the university, foundations and governmental agencies. There is a kind of circularity hidden in this requirement of legitimation: we must affect policy before we can receive the money required in order to do research and education aimed at affecting policy. If we are seeking to influence change in an area of consensus about the values to be applied, this process would be barely perceptible. In the absence of consensus regarding the status of women, there is a sense in which, instead of our feeding the women's movement, the women's movement feeds us. It does so by creating awareness of issues and pressures for change, enabling us to obtain the resources necessary to supply information or technical assistance to activists and policymakers. As a result, I suspect that research organizations such as ours will never lead movement activities. Intellecual leadership is more likely to come from theorists or essayists, whose product requires relatively little monetary investment. Centers of research and education are more likely to supply documentation of empirical beliefs and guidance in selecting strategies for implementation of goals. I see these patterns as tendencies, not as exclusive patterns, but nevertheless as necessary to an udnerstanding of the connection between what we do and social policy.

Our dependence on outside agencies of support also has the consequence of serious economic limitations on our activities. There is a common misconception that because women are now a trendy topic, money for research or action projects is plentiful. Ordinarily, funding becomes available when an issue or social problem gains high public visibility. This has occurred, for example, with population problems, the elderly, juvenile delinquency, criminal justice, alcohol or drug abuse, or minority problems. But the pattern has not typified the issue of women's status.

Women remain a low priority item on the agendas of most organizations with the power to allocate resources. Many foundations and governmental agencies have set up women's programs but have put little money into them. Such programs may even have the effect of increasing competition for scarce resources, since all kinds of substantively disparate proposals are now consigned to underfunded women's programs for consideration.

In 1974, the government spent $10 million in special projects to support career education projects; only $161,000 went for "female youth." Another study has shown that female owned firms receive less than their proportional share of federal contract dollars. Mary Jean Tully's analysis of foundation grants between 1972-74, sponsored by the Coalition for Feminist Funding of NOW's Legal Defense and Education Fund, found that only $12 million out of $7 billion in foundation funds went to programs designed to improve the status of women, with half of these monies coming from the Ford Foundation. Of the major foundations, Ford and possibly Carnegie are probably the only ones that have made a notable commitment to changing the status of women, and even their generosity must be measured against the scale of their other commitments.

Whether women have not posed enough of a threat to be taken seriously or have posed too much of a threat to be granted equity is not clear to me. Of the limited sums spent on women's projects, some areas do receive more attention than others. These areas tend to be either those in which the fundamental battle over women's right to some form of participation has already been won, such as the labor force or higher education, or those in which public recognition of the seriousness of the problem has already been secured, such as rape or assault.

Currently far less appealing to potential sponsors is a direct emphasis, such as ours, on the participation of women in political decision making. Within the current structure of political elites, equity for women is much more obviously a zero-sum situation than is the labor force or higher education, or any form of mass participation. The number of formal leadership positions is finite, meaning that the inclusion of women will necessitate the replacement of men by women.

A third limitation stemming from dependence on legitimating agencies reflects the discomfort of academic institutions with problem-focused, interdisciplinary, applied research and the discomfort of activists and many foundation representatives with any kind of research, an investment that may have little immediate payoff. This kind of tension between academics and practitioners has always existed, and we are merely among the more recent beneficiaries.

We believe that the suspicions of both camps are misplaced. The traditional disciplines have developed in such ignorance of the lives of women that studies of women's work and retirement, of female criminals, of father-daughter or mother-daughter relationships in the family, or of women's political behavior cannot help but clarify the theoretical models of the disciplines. In addition, the results of such research have in numerous definable instances served as intellectual ammunition for practitioners.

Given the situation in which we operate, your question about whether we can really effect a large political outcome nationally should probably be answered negatively. I see the consequences of our activity as necessarily partial and incremental. We exist as only one corner of the women's movement, as only one of the many agencies devoted to improvement in women's status. We are, however, the first to focus exclusively on women's political status. Our principal goal is to increase the representation and effectiveness of women in the policy-making and political apparatus. We do this as a small, university-based organization, in a context of scarce resources and of larger societal forces that may be manipulable to only a limited extent.

Our emphasis on the elite political participation of women--on their numbers as officials--comes out of a sense of the precariousness of gains that women have made. There have been gains: maternal mortality has declined and life expectancy has increased; the education gap is narrowing; labor force participation has increased; women are beginning to enter occupations traditionally reserved for males; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 forbids sex discrimination; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can now sue and move against employment discrimination; there has been some reform of tax, credit, banking, and insurance practices that discriminate against women; the Supreme Court has declared abortion a private matter between a woman and her physician; affirmative action programs have proliferated; the Equal Rights Amendment is within four states of ratification.

Yet the fact is that whatever gains women have made have occurred with the consent of men, within the framework of a male-dominated power structure. Women remain dependent on the benevolence of male decision-makers and, as long as they remain so, what has been granted may be withdrawn. The income gap remains and is widening. The Supreme Court may alter its abortion stance, despite the wishes of U.S. women. The Equal Rights Amendment, supported by a majority of women (and also of men), may not achieve ratification. A male-dominated health care industry may continue to push dangerous contraceptives. And male-dominated school boards may interpret Title IX in a manner that falls short of removing sex discrimination.

Women have little direct share in the making of public policy, whether that policy is identified directly as addressing a "woman's issue," or whether it involves policies such as peace and military defense, on which women's views differ systematically from those of men. There are at present no women on the Supreme Court, none in the Senate, and only 18 in the U.S. House of Representatives--fewer than in some previous years. Although the Carter administration has taken some positive steps in executive appointments, women remain a small percentage of federal appointees. Two women are state governors; fifteen percent of those appointed to state boards and commissions are women. In the state legislatures, where women have made striking advances, they are still only nine percent of the membership. Estimates of the proportion of women among the membership of county and local councils range from four to nine percent, Among school board members, fifteen percent are women.

Those few brave and hardy women who do achieve official positions face the same kind of sex discrimination that marks relations in the rest of society. Isolated incidents may be amusing but their cumulative effect is not. A senator turns to a woman member of Congress and asks: "Who do you work for?" A divorced woman running against Congressman Mills at the peak of his public clowning is asked by the press whether failing in such an important relationship as marriage could give anyone confidence that she could succeed in Congress. A guard, after forcing a New York state senator to show her identification, commens: "Jesus, I hate to call girls 'Senator'."

A candidate for local office, appearing before the screening committee of her party is asked: "How's your husband going to take this because, honey, you will be out with a lot of men?" Women in office commonly complain of an almost automatic devaluation of their competence. Women must prove competence while that of men is taken for granted. Women are not taken seriously, are not consulted on pending issues, are excluded from informal networks.

It should by now be clear that even our decision to focus our interest rather narrowly for the present, on women in public office, means addressing a situation far broader and more complex than our Center can encompass. Nevertheless, we chip away at the situation with a good deal of determination, and I think we can demonstrate some impact. Indeed, one measure of our impact may be that most people, knowing the Center only by reputation or first learning of its activities, are surprised to find that our staff is as small as it is and that we spend as little money as we do.

We aim for a multiplier effect in all our activities: research that will generate additional reserch or be used in policy recommendations; information service to media, public agencies and private organizations; educational programs that can be used as models by other institutions; programs of technical assistance to officials that can be developed as demonstration projects; a specialized library and published bibliographies that facilitate dissemination of information among scholars, students, and practitioners; a biographical directory of women in office that facilitates communication with women officials.

Almost every project of the Center has constituted a "first": an educational program of resident politicians on campus designed to interest young women in political careers; a first national conference of women state legislators out of which emerged the first scholarly in-depth study of women politicians (Jeane Kirkpatrick's Political Woman), the first extensive bibliographies of work on women and politics; the first national who's who of women in office; the first national data on the numbers and characteristics of women in office at federal, state, county and municipal levels; the first examination of the appointment of women to state boards and commissions; the first broad study of women's campaigns; a unique small grants program that has had remarkable success in generating research on announced topics. At the request of the U.S. Department of State, we conducted a program for politically active women visitors from twenty-one countries. At the request of the women's caucus of a state legislature, we have assisted in the development of a student intern program that promises to become a model for several states. We have also run programs of technical assistance in campaign techniques, advocacy, municipal budgeting, and municipal-state fiscal relations.

How do we select activities with a view to their potential impact, and how do we assess the consequences of what we do? We spend a fair amount of time just "getting around" -- attending women's conferences, talking with governmental officials and activists, consulting with other researchers and scholars, receiving suggestions from women's organizations and individual women. We have tried very hard to select projects in terms of perceived need, and we have avoided projects whose principal appeal is that they are easily fundable.

On occasion, we initiate projects simply because the need seems so obvious. For example, until we did the first directory and statistical description of women in office in 1975, no systematic count below the level of state legislator had ever been made. The data have received widespread use by media, public agencies and private organizations not only to dramatize the paucity of women in public life, but also to challenge some common stereotypes about politically active women. We are now repeating the 1975 surgey, expanding the kinds of data sought and adding samples of men and of former women officeholders.

We get some insight into the impact of what we do through feedback from our "clientele." Unfortunately, this feedback is unsystematic and undoubtedly selective, though it has been very positive. A woman in Congress tells us that she first thought of running for Congress because of one of our programs. The chair of a political party uses our data in a major speech. We hear that our report on the appointment of women to state boards and commissions, done for the Women and Power Committee of the President's Commission on the National Observance of International Women's Year, has been directly instrumental in one state in increasing the appointment of women. We know who orders reports and publications distributed through our office. We know who calls the Center for information and assistance. We hear from a co-league who has been traveling about the country that our grants program is having a large impact. We receive 300 completed applications for six grants. The overall picture is that the demand for the Center's services far exceeds our capacity to respond.

HOROWITZ: If one divides America into two post-wartime halves - between 1919-1939, and the period after World War Two, 1940-1976 - the attitude toward getting equity, or gaining one's fair share, seems to have changed dramatically. Up to the present period of time, political struggles were largely governed by a concept of class struggle. There was a proletarian struggle against management and ownership sectors. There was the racial-sectional confrontation of black and white at a fundamental level in the South. It strikes me that the paradigmatic change from the earlier period to the later period is enormous. The women's movement in general, and the Center very much reflects this change. The movement has shifted from economics to politics, from class demands to racial, religious and sexual demands. It is now a struggle basically to impose legislative reform, judicial review, and executive decree. Political processes have themselves become more central in the lives of Americans. As a consequence, gaining political power, or seeking electoral and judicial office, becomes a more significant part of life than at any time in the past. Your Center, for example, does not seem directly concerned with economic levels of women per se; but much more heavily concentrated on the political process, and through such processes achieving economic parity and justice. Is this a correct assessment of what you are aiming at? I am not saying the Center is oblivious to the fact that there are wage differentials between men and women, but rather that the center of gravity for this new organizational style and formation, is in line with this new paradigm, this new architechtonic of American politics: if you want something done, you go to the appropriate branch of the government and demand legislative or judicial reform and relief. The women's movement exists aas a special interest group in its own right; what does this signify in terms of a gerneal shift from macro to micro politics?

JOHNSON: Because the Center is nonpartisan, tax-exempt and university-based, we ourselves do not go directly to anyone with legislative demands or ideological programs. Our research and other activities are of interest to women both in and out of government, to women in the movement, and to women who reject the label "feminist."

I do not see much interest from politically active black women, except for black feminists. There is some research evidence that black women officials, while favorable to women's rights, give them low priority as political issues. In addition, we seem to have little appeal to many Marxists, feminist or otherwise, who I suspect regard us as serving and perpetuating the politics of the ruling class. Perhaps of greater significance than whether we reach women in government vs. women in the movement (who may be the same individuals) is that our impact to date strikes me as highly differentiated by sex. Most of the officials, journalists, professors, organizational representatives, political activists, corporate executives, foundation officials, students and ordinary citizens who use our research or request our services are women. Probably most men in these same circles remain happily ignorant of our existence. This differentiation of networks is a serious problem in its implications for the policy impact of our work.

Shifting to your broader point, I quite agree with your comment about the increasing centrality of conventional political structures in equity demands. I wonder whether the declines in trust and confidence in government shown by the polls may not in fact reflect the increased importance of government to people. Efforts to use existing political channels may also be the other side of the process described by political incorporation theory--the process of state-building implies that government, at least at the federal level, becomes increasingly responsive to minority demands.

If you are suggesting that the women's movement represents a basic shift in kind from past social movements, I am not sure that I share your image. Like the labor movement or the struggle for black liberation, the women's movement has gone through an extra-legal, extra-governmental actividst phase, moving increasingly in the direction of litigation, demands for inclusion in government, and demands for legislative remedies. Like other movements, the women's movement has been split among revolutionaries, separatists and reformers, with the reformers attracting the broad base of support.

There are, of course, limitations to the parallels. The oppression of women and widespread public violence against them have been inhibited by traditions that enjoin men to be the chivalrous protectors of the weaker but purer sex. Women are not geographically or residentially segregated, but live in daily intimacy with men. And the fact of class differences among women means that economic exploitation takes different forms in different classes.

My own image is that the social history of the twentieth century is largely one of challenge to ascriptive bases of allocation, whether hereditary wealth, sex, religion, national origin, or even age. The fact that age and sex have come relatively late in this process may reflect the universality of age and sex as bases of social differentiation and as criteria for the distribution of rewards and opportunities.

HOROWITZ: Let me turn next to the contrast between achievement and ascription in the new American political style. There is a sociological terminology that has important policy correlates. If in fact the goal of organizations such as the Center is the breakdown of the ascriptive society, and ascriptive factors impeding equality, how can they constantly be resorted to as the source of all demographic information concerning blacks, women, elderly, Chicanos, Spanish speaking surname people? Many newer social movements that have gained a certain fame, even a certain notoriety during this period as a result of their ascriptive position.

As a result, they are less interested in breaking down ascriptive phenomena, but rather using ascription more profoundly than at any time in the past to gain particularistic rather than universalistic ends. The rise of ethnicity as a kind of parallel movement to the black movement--whatever its shortcomings, peculiarities, abberations, even idiosyncracies, does not move toward the elimination of ascriptive factors in human relations. Many of these movements for equity have as their source, the maintenance and even strengthening of ascriptive phenomena.

Ascribed status provides demographic ammunition to register special claims. There is a peculiar dialectic, one might say a strong ambiguity within movements such as the women's movement: On one hand they assert a drive toward equity and the elimination of barriers, while on the other hand, they utilize the ascriptive phenomena as a rouce for certain strengths through separate interest identification.

How can a society withstand, much less satisfy, all competing demands; and more, how can a society sort out its priorities if everyone is speaking on behalf of a special interest, and few, if any, asserting the conditions of growth for the general interest? Or is there such an entity?

JOHNSON: It strikes me that the use of ascriptive categories in the women's movement has at least three aspects, each of which represents a problem of management if the unintended consequence of perpetuating ascriptive allocation is to be avoided.

First, ascriptive bases are used as the demographic data of analysis merely to document the extent to which ascription is operating. Implicitly or explicitly, there is a benchmark model of distribution that is random with respect to gender categories, against which actual distributions are compared. This use of ascriptive categories for emprical description results in demands for adjustment of underrepresentation. The problem then arises that ascription forms the basis for correction of underrepresentation, as in programs of affirmative action.

Unless the underlying conditions creating the original imbalance are also corrected, ascriptive inclusion may become a permanent substitute for ascriptive exclusion. This is clearly a more desirable situation from the perspective of women, but it does not represent the removal of ascription. However, I think that most women would regard this variant of ascription as a short-term palliative, a way of breaking into the generational cycles of socialization and allocation that perpetuate the status quo. Once women perceive the possibility of obtaining positions on the basis of achievement criteria, and men become reconciled to the presence of women in the circles of power, and are forced to recognize at least the possibility of their competence, the socialization of the next generation in a manner that would make ascription irrelevant becomes greatly eased.

A second way in which ascription enters the women's movement is through a kind of subcultural separatism aimed at solidarity and consciousness building. I see this as a phase, one that has characterized many movements. Realistically, separatism is not a long-term solution. Few women would exclude men from their ideal society, and few women in the movement want to see women remain indefinitely a separate and identifiable class.

The third use of ascription in the women's movement strikes me as simultaneously the most fascinating as an intellectual problem, and the most dangerous in the long run to women's interests. There is a traditional mythology of femininity that some feminists have adopted. These argue that the gates of power should be opened to women because women will humanize the society by virtue of their special qualities. Women are said to be more loving, more peaceloving, and socially concerned, more cooperative, more honest, more sensitive to the needs of others, and so on.

The question of how much of a difference in the content of social policy would be made by the inclusion of women in policy-making is intellectually fascinating because it is more broadly a question of the degree to which gender-specific differences are biologically inherent vs. the degree to which they are socialized or situationally determined. It is potentially dangerous to women's interests because, if the prevailing sociological perspective is valid, women could be just as aggressive, competitive and dishonest as men, given the appropriate socialization and opportunities. If women were to share power and could not deliver on the promise to humanize the world, they would be inviting a considerable backlash.

Yet the question could become moot if the equity demands of women were truly met. Some women in the movement have suggested that the liberation of women means also the liberation of men. I consider the women's movement potentially one of the most radical of the century in its potential for structural change, a potential that many women fail to recognize when they consciously aim only for an equitable slice of an existing pie. There is no way that women, as half the population of the society, can receive equity in the sense we are using the term without a radical change in all the institutions of society. There would be an enormous restructuring of the work force, with males less involved than previously.

Loosening of ties of males to the work force could well mean greater familial responsibilities for men, as well as an elaboration of institutions that could serve as multiple bases of individual identity for both sexes. In addition, the link between maintenance systems and holding a job could well be altered. If incomes continued to be allocated on the basis of employment, then some kind of economic value to work in the home would have to be assigned. Equity for women might even mean the abolition of the nuclear family, not as the living arrangement of preference but as the legally preferred social unit.

In addition to women, you mention all the other groups demanding equity. If we were to include in the labor force all those who are pressing for inclusion, we could not possibly have the kind of occupational structure and the kind of income distribution that we have now. Ultimately, simple equity demands are radical demands. People who do not perceive this do not really understand the connectedness of social institutions.

HOROWITZ: Given this operational framework of what unlimited equity demands are, is there not still a problem? For even if society can satisfy the demands of women, old people, youth, fat, skinny, short people, the infinite nature of equity demands still creates a problem of ranking -- who gets satisfied first or last. People may be involved at the Eagleton Institute or at similar Centers in America, and also participate in ecological and environmental protection movements that talk about zero growth or limited growth: a world in which the environment is made safe for ducks, deers, and doves; but of necessity pushes back equity oriented agenda items.

Can one simply announce that the world will be different when women, or blacks, or Chicanos get theirs; and that the distributions are going to be different, if in fact we are also living in a world where people assert the need for finitude, or limits in the kinds and amounts of growth? Is it a matter, therefore, of taking that pie and redistributing the wealth, inviting class, sex, and race war, all in the name of unreachable demands?

What value do we place on holding social fabric together? To argue for absolute equality, one should at least entertain the possibility of the deterioration and disintegration of that social fabric, and be willing to assume the consequences of social revolution, and not just a bland, incrementalist vision of social change.

Most commentators and ordinary people are painfully aware of the changes being wrought by social movements and sectoral movements; and they are responding by raising questions of the cohesiveness of the social fabric, and the values of thatfabric to the needs of citizens as a whole. There are parallel problems which emerge: people are asserting demands which are mutually contradictory for equity and growth on one hand, and ecological balance and finitude of growth on the other hand. Beyond that, the question of whether core members of social movements do not themselves have special agendas that raise demands that are so exaggerated, and the asking price so high, that the bulk of women, or the bulk of blacks, or Chicanos, or minorities of whatever kind, are repelled by movement participation, rather than by the goal of equity they share in common.

I am not raising here a spurious problem by any means. The outcome of the State ERA referenda in New York and New Jersey, would indicate that NOW strategies and tactics are themselves experienced as serious problems primarily by women, and not just by those opposed to women's rights or any other human rights.

How, intellectually, as a sociologist, do you cope with competing demands and claims on the social fabric? And organizationally, how does the Center respond to what it feels or intuits, to be the conflictual nature of the equity processes of a group on the social fabric as a whole? In short, are there any differences in a standpoint based on social science and another based on a political mission?

JOHNSON: I doubt that anyone at the Center sees the equity process as a social danger. Instead, I would regard it as an inevitable concomitant of long-term historical trends.

As a sociologist, I would suggest that the term equity refers to the distributive features of a society, not to the size of the pie to be apportioned. It defines the criteria by which available opportunities and rewards are to be allocated. Whether or not there are limits to growth, whether the pie is finite, has little theoretical relevance to the equity concept. There are problems in the way we approach social problems. In the past, we have tried to meet demands for equity not by a reduction of inequalities but through an expansion of the economy in which the absolute conditions of people would improve without any redistribution and without any really hard choices about who would give up what.

Improving the conditions of everyone through an indefinitely expanding economy may postpone or mitigate demands for equity, but such a strategy does not deal with issues of distributive justice. Let us imagine, for example, a worker earning $20,000 with a spouse working at home. If we were to allot $10,000 to the labor force worker and $10,000 to the houseworker, or if we were to allot each $10,000 for twenty hours per week in the labor force, freeing each to share the housework, we might be satisfying an equity demand of women within a finite framework.

Second, not all equity demands are primarily economic. Demands that men invest themselves in parenting, that physicians learn more about female physiology, that schoolgirls be allowed to share the basketball court with boys, that executives stop referring to their secretaries as "my girl," that women be granted leadership within political parties instead of being consigned to sandwich making for the strategists all represent demands for noneconomic distributive justice that would merely apply to women the official values of the society.

Finally, I simply do not see demands for equity as a long-term threat to the social fabric, if by social fabric you mean social integration and solidarity. As a sociologist, I recognize that new structural arrangements require new forms of integration; the bases of solidarity become redefined. In the process, temporary dislocations are likely to occur. But what is so threatening about replacing a cohesiveness designed for the libertarianism of white, middle-class, middle-aged males with one that would seek to optimize the dignity of all individuals and the application of basic social values to all members of the society?

I am not talking about violent revolution, but about the possibility of achieving even far reaching change by utilizing existing mechanisms. Perhaps the real danger to the social fabric inheres in the refusal of the privileged to recognize that the ascriptive bases of their position conflict with concepts of merit in an achievement-oriented society.

To refuse demands for equity, or to persuade excluded groups not to make them would also require fundamental structural changes; and I suspect that such reactionary shifts could be accomplished only with greater disturbances than those implied by equity demands. Rechanneling the aspirations of women, for example, would probably require closing secondary schools, universities and the labor force to them.

An argument can be made that equity demands represent demands that would strengthen the social fabric, that would create a higher order of integration by removing inconsistencies in the valuations of individuals. When ascriptive criteria are superimposed on judgments of equity, there is the strain of maintaining separate definitions of what is equitable for differing segments of the population--of saying, in effect, that the work of women, whatever it consists of, has less value than the work of men. This kind of specification of equity, this maintenance of separate scales of justice for various ascriptive categories of the population, creates severe strains on the social fabric. Gunnar Myrdal made essentially this point in An American Dilemma. I wonder if you are not underestimating these inconsistencies as sources of erosion of cohesiveness.

Your reference to the state ERA referenda does raise the issue of how broadly women in general suppor tthe goals of the women's movement. Voting analysts have concluded that the state referenda were defeated by women, not by men. However, it is not at all clear what their votes symbolized, for to my knowledge there have been no follow-up studies. From what we have been able to tease out of scattered studies of anti-ERA activists in a few states, the negative vote represents the result of a highly organized and well-funded campaign of fear. Fear of abandonment was heavily exploited. Woem were told that if their husgands left them, they would not receive alimony; they would not receive child care support; their children could be taken away from them; they would be forced into the labor force; their daughters could be drafted; the father role would be so weakened that their sons would become homosexuals.

What has not been effectively communicated by the pro-ERA forces is that women do not currently enjoy the protections they fear losing. Moreover, there is nothing in the ERA that would put women into the streets who are not equipped for employment, or who have dependent children. In all, I would have to question whether the outcome of the state referenda represents any kind of a rational response to what you call the "asking price" of the women's movement. It strikes me, instead, as a response by dependent women who fear that they will not be taken care of. In fact, they are less safe in their dependency than they would be with some legal guarantee of their independence.

HOROWITZ: Originally you said that family structure would have to change; and later you said that really the social fabric would not have to undergo very much change under the impact of the women's movement. It seems that saying there is going to be a change in family structure is getting at something very basic to American women; especially to a traditional sense of guardian of the family. What forms of social solidarity are available that would replace the family unit?

JOHNSON: I did not intend to say that the basic social fabric would not have to change; I do not think it would be destroyed. Other bases of solidarity would develop. Twenty years ago a family's solidarity relied on the woman's acceptance of the notion that she existed to serve her children and her husband, that her true destiny was to live through these people vicariously. Even her education was justified not as something she did for herself, but as something that would permit her to be a better companion to her husband and her sons, and a more creative homemaker. She did supply a kind of social cement to the family. But regimes have been held together by all kinds of social cement that involved a great deal of suffering.

The basic contradictions of the feminine role have existed for a long time, stemming from the educational system. There has been far less differentiation between boys and girls in the educational system than between men and women in their adult roles. Talcott Parsons pointed out this source of strain in the early 1940s, although what he foresaw as the likely solution--the wife as companion to her husband, and volunteer worker or secondary, part-time job holder--was already being challenged by the mid 1960s.

Other proposals for resolving the contradictions made by male observers ranged from psychotherapy to changing the college curriculum for women to make it more relevant to their domestic status.

HOROWITZ: Let me focus this more sharply at two levels. I am not at all disturbed over the question of the white, middle-class male losing some of his privilege, power, or prestige. That is an inevitable outcome and a foregone conclusion. What I am asking is: whether a higher involvement of women in the political process changes the character of the political system as a whole. Are there organizational prerequisites in the role itself? Ella Grasso may have severe limits as the Governor of Connecticut because the dynamics of being Governor of Connecticut at this time would require someone with the wisdom of Solomon and the bankroll of a Rockefeller. For this reason, whoever is Governor, male, female, or transvestite, they are going to inherit a certain level of problem because of the political structure that they are inheriting. As a result, are you speaking of a demographic redistribution?

Or are you talking about problems where the demands of women are for higher access in the social system? Then the problem becomes the ability of the socio-political system to absorb these demands. What you are really talking about reduces to problems and prospects of social revolution: employing a kind of linguistic subterfuge that has become transparent to everyone who is looking at this problem from a wider viewpoint of systemic survival. To be blunt, are we dealing with the capacity of the system to absorb women? Or are we dealing with the capacity of women to absorb the system?

JOHNSON: Certainly the organizational prerequisites of political roles would limit greatly the opportunities for women to change the character of the political process. However, to the degree that politicians do make choices of style and priority, I would expect in the short run that women would make at least marginal differences because of past socialization.

We know, for example, that women officials have more contact with constituents than male officials. In state legislatures, women are heavily concentrated on good government, health, education, and welfare committees. In the long run, if women really were totally integrated in the society, there would be little reason to expect male and female politicians to behave differently.

Perhaps revolution is not the appropriate word, but the process does imply a kind of social revolution--a peaceful one, I hope. I would suggest that no linguistic subterfuge is intended by those pressing their claims. Instead, I am speculating that achieving the goal of demographic redistribution, which is apparently what most feminists are aiming for, would result in extensive structural change as an unintended consequence.

What I am really attempting to suggest are the long-term consequences of what you say is a foregone conclusion--the reduction of male privilege, power, and prestige implied in women's demands for equity. Because of the size of the famale population, equity for women does not imply merely minor adjustments here and there. And the men are not yielding gracefully. Perhaps in the long run, the men will find that they have actually lost little and have gained a great deal by sharing rights and responsibilities in all spheres with women.

In the short-run, however, women face a tough struggle. At retirement, for examply, my pension will be considerably lower than that of my comparably situated male colleagues. Because of sex differences in longevity, different actuarial tables are used by the insurance industry to calculate benefits. Only gender has been singled out for this special treatment, despite numerous other systematic differences in life expectancy. The insurance industry is strongly opposing efforts to correct this inequity, even though it could theoretically be accomplished simply by lowering the benefits of males. I suspect that few of my male colleagues would willingly readjust their expectations for retirement in order that I might enjoy the same level of security (or insecurity) as they.

The conclusion of the struggle may be foregone and inevitable, but I sleep better at night knowing that women in the movement are pressing forward with litigation and legislative demands.

HOROWITZ: How do you connect up sex variables and sex roles to questions of race, ethnicity, and religion? How does one correlate the variable of sexuality or femininity with other variables employed in the decision-making process?

You mentioned that 1975 was International Women's Year. Yet, the International Women's Year proved to have been an extraordinarily devisive phenomenon. Built into this transitory organization was a struggle, not around women, but whether being an Israeli woman allowed one to participate. There is a question whether in the world women really represent women in a primary way, or whether they represent a political establishment that may be entirely male dominated in character. How does the establishment of a Center for the American Woman and Politics permit plugging in to other broad frameworks or movements? Or how does such a Center serve, counterproductively, to stimulate feelings of competitions for scarce resources? One answer is that the powers that be always want those lacking in power to compete for resources. Feelings of scarcity set off a chain of competition between groups: women's groups, black groups, and other groups.

But how do you organizationally deal with this kind of cross-cutting in interest groups? What efforts does the Center make to overcome the potential for difficulty in levels of women participation that may have little to do with specific interest-laden demands?

JOHNSON: The Center tries to offer opportunities for women to discover what they have in common insorar as they want to act as women. They have many different kinds of affiliations and solidarities: they are black; they are Republican; they are secretaries; they are Catholics; they are Texans. They also act in terms of these other commitments and solidarities.

Last year we held a day-long program on lobbying: part presentation of academic research, part discussion with a panel of women lobbyists from Washington, D. C. Of the five panelists, one was from a labor union, one from a national black women's voluntary association, one from the League of Women Voters, one from a feminist lobbying organization, and one was administrative assistant to a black feminist Congresswoman.

In the discussion, it became clear that all wanted to do something about the status of women. But the underlying potential for division also emerged. Their interests were not necessarily in conflict; but each had a set of priorities that differed from the others. I have decided that there is only limited potential for the women's movement to develop a unified ideology and a rationalized program and strategy.

What is more likely is coalition around some issue, limited systems of trade-offs on others, and a great deal of specialized activity reflecting differential priorities.

One should not assume, however, that the women's movement is utterly fragmented. I am particularly impressed by what has been accomplished through the Women's Action Alliance. National women's organizations, and their numbers are still growing, have subscribed to the U.S. National Women's Agenda, which consists of 75 specific demands in the areas of politics, education, work, economic equity, child care, health care, housing, criminal justice, media, and the arts, physical safety and respect for the individual.

More impressive than the numbers of organizations is the diversity of those participating: they include, for example, the YWCA, the National Women's Political Caucus, the Girls Clubs of America, the National Committee on Household Employment, National Council of Jewish Women, American Home Economics Association, National Gay Task Force, National Council of Negro Women, and the Association of Junior Leagues. Even considering that the leadership of some of these organizations may be more sympathetic to the women's movement than their rank and file membership, the Women's Action Alliance supplies striking evidence of the breadth of the movement. The diversity of these cooperating organizations simply has no analogue among male organizations. The mass media have largely ignored this development--another example of the failure to take women's activities seriously.

Just as the potential for cooperation and coalition has often been dismissed, I wonder if the potential for militant mobilization is not being seriously underestimated. Last year I attended a large conference at which a substantial proportion of the participants were government employees in those print jacket-dresses that speak of respectability. In one workshop on women in policy positions, the only proposal that met with enthusiasm was for a tax revolt. Fifty and sixty-year-old women who had made their entire careers in the federal bureaucracy were seriously considering a strategy of no taxation without representation! I would wager that if the ERA is not ratified, there will be a notable increase in militant activity.

HOROWITZ: Is there not a danger in a lack of any overall ideological persuasion in the sort of interest-group politics you are describing? Clearly, there is the well-knwon problem of being so dogmatic as to lose the very people you are trying hardest to influence; but your organization effort seems pinned down to the pragmatic level. Does not this invite a series of fragmentations, a whole duster of new interest groups constantly claiming a portion of the women's movement pie, and thus sending the movement itself off into so many directions as to create an opposite, or directionless, effect? How does one strike a balance between pragmatics and dialectics, between pure interest group orientations and a general societal orientation based on long-term evaluations?

JOHNSON: The dangers of well planned, ideological, programmatic efforts are not dissimilar. The purer the ideology, the greater the risk of fragmentation of a movement around competing ideologies. Moreover, ideologues have an unfortunate tendency to refuse to engage in most any action because no activity is sufficiently pure. In Jo Freeman's terms, they prefer to stand outside the gates and howl. Thus, although I recognize the potential fragmentation of the women's movement around competing interest groups, I am skeptical about the integrative potential of an overall ideological framework.

HOROWITZ: There seems to be an underlying tension between what one might call the role of women's movements in heightening social awareness in order to create a more pefect social harmony, and an equally potent recognition that movements of this broad nature tend to break the social structure, and bring about desired ends through social discord.

On several occasions, you indicate as a preferred scenario waking up one morning to find a number of these problems blown away because they will have been looked at in a quiet and effective manner.

You refer to this as a Fabian or Utopian tendency in your organizational effort. But in all candor, do you anticipate this kind of Fabian outcome to the struggle of women to gain equity? Or do you see the movement involving, at the other extreme, a sex war that leads to the breakup of established institutions which you have alluded to before?

Perhaps, what will actually take place is a liberal resolution: some mid-way point whereby, as is so often the case in American history, a "creaming" process resolves old dilemmas. At one point in American history there is the movements of women's participation in suffrage, their right to vote. Next is the women's participation in higher education, the right of twenty-five percent to participate in the educational process. Next, or rather currently, is the growing claim of women to participate in the world of commerce, business and industry.

Is this third pattern most likely a reformism by stages over a long period of time? Or can we only look forward to a revolutionary confrontation along sexual lines--a hidden hand of Providence whereby we wake up one day and all of our good works are rewarded by a move toward the society of new harmony?

JOHNSON: In all truth, I am not entirely comfortable with the personal fantasies or the sociological scenarios I have been weaving. Speculation is good fun, but a really careful speculative analysis requires identification of the critical contingencies for a variety of outcomes.

In a sense, it is easier for me to predict the long-term outcomes than to predict the next decade or so. Whether we will be seeing reformation or transformation depends, I think, on whether we focus on the ongoing process or on the eventual outcome after a long period of time. Viewed over the next ten or fifteen years, the process will appear to be one of "creaming." Viewed at the end of fity years, the process will appear to have been radical change.

There are also a number of short-term contingencies that may intervene to disrupt the long-term process: a war, an economic depression, a baby boom, another President from California--any number of events could affect the status of women. I feel certain, however, that the trend will persist, that the women's movement and the revolution of women's status will be major topics in the history of the twentieth century.

The women's movement does not hold the keys to the gates of heaven. The higher harmony that I have suggested as an eventual result is a very real possibility with respect to the relations between men and women and with respect to the ability of each to organize their work, family, and leisure in more gratifying ways. Yet other social problems will remain, and quite new ones will arise. Humankind may have been permanently expelled from the Garden of Eden, but it will struggle to return as long as social life endures.

HOROWITZ: My next question concerns the actual research done rather than the policies advocated. You mentioned research on the characteristics of women in politics. Do you have any comparisons between these women and the men who are in politics? It might be interesting to determine whether there are any particular social characteristics common to both, or distinguishing men and women that help to explain the wide disparity in office-holding.

JOHNSON: We are now in the midst of a large-scale survey, by mailed questionnaire, of men and women in public office. If our response rate is not a disaster, we will have the most extensive data ever gathered, outside of studies of convention delegates. Until our analysis is completed, we are dependent on studies of convention delegates and a few relatively small, geographically scattered studies of men and women in particular offices. I have recently made a search of this literature, and some patterns seem to emerge with a degree of consistency.

Both men and women of political elites differ from the general population in predictable ways: they are better educated, have higher incomes, are organizationally more active, are disproportionately white. In their personalities, they are more confident, dominant, competitive, gregarious, and have internalized norms of public service.

Within political elites, men and women differ in ways that are predictable from the general nature of sex differentiation in the society. Women are older, are less likely to have children at home, have less education, and are drawn heavily from traditionally female occupations such as teaching, nursing, or secretarial work, rather than from law or business. The personalities of men and women in office are not notably different, though men appear to be more politically ambitious. Men also are more likely to stress career and self-serving motives as reasons for entering politics. Women do not differ from men in having held prior political offices, or in service to political parties, though the women receive less support from the parties in their candidacies.

There are also gender differences in the official activities of men and women in office. Women devote more time to officeholding than men, but this fact apparently reflects women's lesser tendency to outside employment. They have more contact with constituents than men but less contact with lobbyists and special interest groups. Their committee work reflects their occupational backgrounds. Women are less likely to achieve leadership within their governing bodies; and I have already mentioned the discrimination, stereotyping, or exclusion that most have experienced at one time or another.

In their legislative activity, they introduce fewer bills, but get a larger percentage of them passed. Limited analysis of roll call votes in Congress and state legislatures suggests that there is a "women's vote" on some issues. And one analysis of Congressmen and Congresswomen shows Congresswomen becoming more cohesive over time in ways that are not predictable by party affiliation.

HOROWITZ: If you had a much larger amount of money to work with, what kind of research would the Center engage in that it is now not able to sponsor? Would it concern itself with policy-relevant programs more directly? Would it develop a set of guidelines of higher participation by women in the political process? Would it do more "primary research," oriented toward data gathering of a special sort?

I am not entirely convinced that there is such an absence of primary data on women as you seem to indicate. There seems to be a good amount of information that is scarcely referred to by researchers. On the question of women in politics, there are now guidebooks and registeries of women in politics, women office-holders. Does your Center compile available data archives, or make use of such documents?

Is the data-gathering process in this area of women in politics of an inferior quality? Is it that we need a clearing-house center of information on primary data? What kind of special research tasks would be done with additional funds? Where do you feel the Center will be going in the next two or three-year period? At one level, the Center is about primary data gathering; at another level, it is supplying the movement, whatever its ubiquitous nature may be, with intellectual ammunition quite apart from data.

There are two strategic ways to go. Have you made up your mind personally; and has the Center made up its collective mind organizationally? This is a whole gamut of questions intended, not to summarize, but rather to speculate on future research trends in organizational efforts devoted to full participation by women in American politics and society.

JOHNSON: It is quite possible that there is material in your office with which I am not familiar. The primary data and the registry would have to be ours. In the literature directly on women in politics, I know of two anthologies, two others in progress. Of two books on women in state legislatures, one was commissioned by the Center, and the other was subsidized by us in its transformation from a dissertation.

There will soon appear an interesting cross-national analysis of the family and political socialization of differing types of politically active women, in which I was involved as an editorial advisor. There have been two large-scale studies of convention delegates that compared men and women in some detail.

Thanks to the University of Michigan's election studies, we know a fair amount about mass political participation of women. And, since all the national public opinion polls code sex as a variable, we know something about gender differences in positions on issues. There are also analyses of the women's movement, histories of feminism and of changes in women's status, a couple of books on women and public policy, a few biographies and autobiographies, and a number of feminist tracts that are informed more by the individual experience of the author than by research or scholarship.

This is a small literature relative to what has been done on male political behavior, and also relative to the existing research on women's family roles or labor force and occupational behavior. The body of literature is increasing, however. Much of it now exists in the form of dissertations, convention papers, or unpublished manuscripts, and still other work is in progress. Like academic work on any topic, about half is of dreadful quality, about a third is passable but would represent little loss had it not been produced, and the remainder is competent and occasionally even exciting or distinguished.

What direction would the Center take if it had more money for research? The primary data gathering would certainly be continued and expanded, if by "primary data" you mean quantitative studies that would permit us to describe, analyze, and interpret the political activity of women. In the current state of knowledge, these data constitute the most useful ammunition for activists and policymakers. One might imagine, for example, the election and appointment of women to policymaking positions as a potential subject for the design of public policy.

Before policy can be designed, however, we must document the nature of the problem. We are still in the stage of empirical mapping. You might suppose that policymakers could just look around and see that women are being excluded; but they seem to have their own perceptual filters. The quantitative data are needed as a way of overcoming both the tendency to perceive the idiosyncratic as general, and the tendency to explain away the general as being a special case.

We still need basic data on numbers and demographics for some areas. For example, we know little about the judiciary and about appointive positions. In addition to descriptive research, we need research that will permit some reasonably authoritative interpretation of the descriptive. To what extent do socialized expectations and preferences explain the relative absence of women in public office? To what extent does the able and willing pool of female candidates for elective or appointive office exceed the willingness of gatekeepers to respond? Is the electorate more willing to vote for women than the political parties are to nominate them? What special advantages or disadvantages do women face as candidates? What kinds of electoral situations are relatively more favorable to women candidates?

Can we demonstrate that male colleagues of women in office exhibit a general tendency to perceive women as less competent regardless of their actual qualities, a tendency well-established in small-group laboratory studies? Under what conditions do women's caucuses develop in governing bodies? What functions do these caucuses perform? What are the conditions under which gender overrides other attributes or affiliations as a basis for political action? What are the parallels--and where do they end--between the experience of women in the political process and that of blacks or minority-ethnics?

This last question is my personal choice for research. I am one of a small group of men and women who have been doing some preliminary work on this question with a view to collaborating on a larger study. Studies of women in public office constitute one one of the areas in which we would like to design research. We would also like to look into ad hoc community movements, political mobilization around issues, the connection between membership in voluntary organizations and political activity, the connections among political involvements and roles in other institutional spheres.

The Center would not hope to engulf all these research activities. As I mentioned earlier, we are eager to stimulate others to do research on the subject.

I cannot easily answer the question of whether we would give priority to primary data gathering, direct policy analysis, abstract theoretical treatises, laboratory experiments, historical analyses, or whatever. Decisions about the direction to take must be continually assessed and redefined in light of changing events, research decisions by other organizations, and new theory and research in the disciplines. I do have a deeprooted conviction that there are few discernible differences between "pure" and "applied" research, and that if one could evaluate the social utility of all those studies labeled as one or the other, the "pure" research would turn out to be the more useful.

I am also persuaded that when one moves into an area of inquiry in which relevant theoretical issues have not been previously identified and formulated, the best research investments are in descriptive data-gathering--in simple empirical mapping. Finally, I might note that I do not see our subject as becoming a permanent specialty or sub-specialty of political science. The most useful conceptual tools for research on women and politics lie in sociology.

Even in sociology, however, I see an intellectual focus on women as a temporary phenomenon that, in the long run, will be incorporated into the more general concerns of the discipline. Ultimately, one cannot organize the specialties of social science around segments of the population. I would take the same position with respect to gerontology or black studies. If the Center does its job well, it should go out of business in twenty years.

RESEARCHING FOREIGN POLICY

An Interview with Paul A. Jureidini
Vice President, Abbott Associates, Inc.
Washington, D. C.

RESEARCHING FOREIGN POLICY - Paul A. Jureidini

HOROWITZ: Professor Paul Jureidini was formerly with the American Institute. He represents what you might call a new breed of political scientist in many ways, and an old breed of good human being. The paramount feature is his authentic humanism, a well of concern for political issues that have no geographical boundaries -- certainly none described or defined by any of the social sciences. Paul Jureidini represents an agency that does social science research in a policy context, directed toward changing foreign policy parameters, or at least indicating what they are and are not. He is trained in social science, but his work world is entirely in a private, entrepreneurial setting. Although Abbott Associates is smaller and younger than Abt Associates and Rand, like them, it is an enterprise dedicated to research in the public interest.

In 1975, for the first time, more social scientists were gainfully employed outside than within the universities. This must be ranked as a foremost development. However, Abbott Associates largely works in the area of foreign policy, for the most part Middle Eastern affairs. Foreign policy, at least in these interviews, has been represented by the State Department or Council of Foreign Relations, which presumably is a membership organization.

Professor Michael Curtis, who was also our guest, represents an association of roughly 14,000 academics, but they have no social science research tasks at all. They represent basically a pressure group with a political goal. Abbott Associates is a group of people, no more than ten at the moment, involved in the actual production and manufacture of research tasks, very largely through government agencies. I am giving you this background so that you can have some idea of how Dr. Jureidini fits in with some of our other speakers, and how he is distinguished.

I am going to begin, as usual, with a question to which I have received at least 14 different answers. Now that you are involved in the policy apparatus per se, what exactly is the role of social science? Is there any part of it that is more important or less important? Is sociology as a whole more important, or is it a methodological device, or a series of devices? Or, are the legitimating aspects of being with social science important? What difference, if any, does social science training make in the research product?

JUREIDINI: That is a question I can answer only from my own personal experience. As you said, I am a transition between the old role and the new. I view the old role basically as a tool that was used, principally by the government, to validate, or have validated, certain agreed upon policies. Now we have more of a partnership. We are asked to validate or agree, through research, that policy is correct. The government does not have sufficient staff to do this kind of validation; or it wants to make sure that it has not entered into an incestuous relationship. Therefore, they bring in outsiders to help them, and give us the same task, to see if we come to the same conclusion. If we do not, then the government wants to know why. How can we, as outsiders, presumably using classified material, have reached a different conclusion?

It is hard to tell at this stage exactly what we are. I cannot really put my finger on it. We not only validate for the government, and they accept honest criticism or disagreement, but we can now suggest to our sponsors areas that we should be looking at, reasons why we should be looking at them, the importance of these things. Basically, we sometimes tell the government: "You are wrong in what you are doing; you should not do it that way." There are two processes working. There is a set of requirements that come down from our sponsors, and there is a set of requirements from us to them. The two merge and we work together.

In a sense it is methodology, it is sociology; it is political science. Here I should say that the change in government has brought a renewed interest in learning what went wrong, and how our chances of not making mistakes can be improved. It has been rumored that after the October 1973 war in the Middle East, Kissinger just put out an order: either he got better research or else a lot of agencies within the government would have their funds cut off. So many of them went out looking for help. We have come in to provide this help, and it has been this kind of transition. We have not yet reached a goal; it may remain transition. But the best I can say is that it is really a partnership, in which we do the old and we do the new.

HOROWITZ: Does the fact that some of your people are trained in psychology, others in international relations, and others in sociology or economics, create internal competition with respect to the research design? For example, suppose you are evaluating the role of cultural phenomena in the decision making process which is one of the projects you are working on. Do not differing concepts of culture, derived from the social sciences, lead to differential outputs? Culture for the anthropologist may be the essential organizing concept; for the sociologist it may be a subset within the social system. How do you ortanize your work to avoid dissidence between the social sciences? Does this not come up as a problem?

JUREIDINI: There is no question but that it does come up as a problem. If it is a project that we ourselves are proposing to the government, we write it up, indicating to the government the kind of scientists or people we plan to use in a specific research context, and why we plan to utilize them. If they agree, we assemble the team. They may be people within our organization, or they may be people outside that we know who we can bring in to help. It is basically a one-person effort; but realizing the problems, and knowing that there are inputs that have to be made, the project designer calls upon sociologists, psychologists, and others from outside. The field of international relations recognizes sociology, as well as political science. One does not necessarily sit in his own corner and insist on his own piece of research and say: I am right and you are wrong. They are all brought together in an inside working arrangement.

HOROWITZ: How can you resolve a problem where the very form of the discipline is at stake? For example, economists have long minimized the importance of cultural phenomena in the decision making process. How do you work on the organizing interdisciplinary conceptual framework? How do you recognize the quality in output? This is a serious question that cannot simply be resolved by saying that we have interdisciplinary characteristics in foreign policy research. Perhaps what I am asking is: Do we bleach out our previous training so that it becomes less important? Or do we make an amalgamation based on strictly methodological guidelines, without regard to the theoretical input of each of the social sciences?

I have often wondered, in relation to firms such as Abt and Rand, whether there is not a kind of tacit acceptance of a power thesis, without questioning the nature of power, or a tacit acceptance of the priority and supremacy of the military. In other words, is there a tendency to become remote from fundamental issues in the name of getting on with the task? How do people with different training, extending from psychology to international relations work out problems together? Does the social science portion have to kneel to other domain assumptions?

JUREIDINI: Even when we write a proposal that is based upon an assumption, and even if the government buys that assumption, once we get involved in the research, we might find out that the assumption does not hold. No one in my outfit holds to any assumption. We obviously begin with a methodology, and we try under it to bring in all disciplines to try to see how we can work together. I have not encountered a situation where we began with an assumption and followed it blindly, throwing out anything that did not fit. Research is no longer being done that way, mainly because people will not accept it.

We begin with an idea, and maybe it is based on an assumption. But the minute we get involved in research and find we are having problems - somehow this assumption is not holding water, or is coming under too many attacks - we inform our sponsor that we were wrong, but we think we can do it that way. Generally he is responsive.

HOROWITZ: I am still not sure that the question of the relationship between previous training and the resulting research has been answered. Why is it that in many ways you represent a new wave? Why do you think that private agencies such as your own, are set up almost on the model of a law firm, with partnerships, associates, and people performing adversarial roles? Why is it that the federal government and municipalities, seem so ready to give support to agencies such as your own, even new ones, without a track record, and do not seem as weilling to support universities or university-based research activities?

JUREIDINI: You have to add one more reservation; they are also reluctant to give support to individuals. It is easier to reach a contract with a corporation than it is to reach one with an individual. A corporation has a set of by-laws and is governed by it. A contract-to-contract relationship is much easier. With an individual, you do not enter into a services contract. You perform a service by the day or by the job. In the universities, the sixties were troubling years. The previous honeymoon that had existed between government and the university think-tanks soured for a variety of reasons: Vietnam, foreign policy, internal policy.

Here I must be candid; I feel the problem is not so much with the government as it is with the universities. The universities still make distinctions that I believe are fallacious. They will accept money from government, but they become choosy. They will take money for medical research, or money from HEW, but they will not take money from Defense. The excuse that is given is that: Defense, State, the CIA, or others, manipulate research, whereas HEW and others do not. That is to me one of the worst arguments. Every agency manipulates research if they want to. The university has not itself decided to seek a partnership with government. The government is available; the money is there. In areas that are not controversial, like medical research, universities are having no problem getting money. It is only in areas limited to the behavioral sciences, that there is still a feeling that the government manipulates; you should not work for the government. Therefore, the money is not available.

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Since most of the work that the government requires is based on more than the input of one individual, it needs several individuals to do the work, and it is easier to get involved with a research firm where you can enter into contractual relationships. Again, the government does not enter into contracts with people who do not have track records. We have a track record. Abbott Associates does not have a track record, but individually, as a team that existed within the American Institute for Research or otherwise, we have a track record which the government appreciates. Therefore, when we moved out it continued to fund us.

HOROWITZ: How do you distinguish yourself from the American Institute, from Rand, from Abt? Do you have any organizational framework, any goal that delineates your research agency from others, other than simply the foreign policy orientation? Is there anything beyond the foreign policy orientation? Because, after all, Rand does foreign policy as well. How do you envision coming before a group for large-scale research funds and competing on an ideological basis with other agencies?

JUREIDINI: We do not want to grow to be big. We do not want to be the size of Rand. Both Dr. Abbott and I are afraid of getting involved in management and not research. We both like to do research. More important, we have set for ourselves two goals: One, that our kind of work would be more in terms of a basic emphasis on the Middle East, using science, collecting data, and a long-range predictive institute. This is what we want to do: to be able to look at situations before they evolve and act as an early warning system.

HOROWITZ: Are all of the research grants generated by Abbott Associates involved with Middle Eastern affairs thus far? And do you have organic working relationships with Middle Eastern governments?

JUREIDINI: Some of them are not; some have nothing to do with regions. One of them would be involved with selection, training, and screening for the Middle East. But it is basically involved with the selection, training, and screening of personnel for specific jobs in the Middle East. Culture enters into it, but not as the principal thing. Yes, we have relations with Middle East governments. At this point they remain on a private basis--myself, and sometimes a member or two from my team. Not as as Abbott Associates, but at the American Institute, we have done a couple of projects for Middle Eastern governments. We do not want to go into the Middle East and compete with organizations similar to ours that are beginning to grow in the Middle East, but prefer to work with them, to backstop them. We want to let them do the bidding, to give them the kind of experience and work to help them, rather than going in and taking it away from them. We do consult with Middle East governments.

HOROWITZ: What has happened with Middle Eastern governments in the last several years to reorient their policy toward social science? When one shifts away from your own organization onto the national panorama itself, does not the infusion of a whole new infrastructure of social science trained personnel secularize the character of decision making in the Middle East? Has such a profound change in the character of decision making taken place that the war game analogy employed by Western social science itself, becomes the model for Arab nations and Arab diplomats? How does this new development react to another wave of secularism--what you might call the Marxist wing? What is the relationship in Syria, in Egypt, or in Lebanon, between the new wave of social science trained personnel, let us say the Harvard and Princeton people, and those who are trained at the Lamumba University in Moscow and the home-grown products who still have a high degree of what you might call theological politics imbedded in their thinking? How does that cacaphony of sound get resolved in the policy making process? How does an organization such as your own filter that information out? How does it re-filter it back into the system?

JUREIDINI: Let me set the stage. We are talking about a pragmatic, scientific approach to decision making. To me, the dividing line would be 1973. After that year, I see more Harvard and Princeton trained social scientists beginning to enter government, and basically to take it over. The age of the technocrats is almost at hand in the Middle East. But the stage for these technocrats was set in the Middle East by two things: First, business began the innovative approach and was allowed to do so with the introduction of computers. Second, the government did not challenge it because it remained with business. It had nothing to do with politics. The second one was, of course, the sudden wealth and position of the Arab world.

When you have established this foundation, and you have the large number of Princeton and Harvard trained technocrats as I call them, you get money. Obviously, if you have money you want to buy the best. The best in America, and your best agent becomes those who are trained at Harvard and Princeton. Those theologians you talk about are still necessary because if you allow these Harvard and Princeton trained technocrats to run with the ball, they would run so far with it that they would create a revolution. Theologians take two steps forward and one step backward. This has not yet gotten to the top ranks of government.

The decision making process, when it comes to pure politics, alignments, or alliances, is still the domain of the individual, whether in Egypt, Syria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The politician says: Tomorrow I am going to align myself with the United States. He turns down a social scientist. What should I do to align myself with the United States? Soon you have this thing developing.

But until 1973 Harvard or Princeton graduates were all looked upon as CIA or pseudo-CIA agents. Pragmatism seems to have become the ideology of the Middle East. It is clear that those who are trained at Trieste Lamumba do not have the tools, nor is their relationship with their country and the Soviet Union such as to require these people to be technocrats. Basically your technocrats mostly are from Harvard and Princeton. If a country has the money, the decision is to turn toward the West. Technocrats are the agents, and politicians begin to listen to them because they are the facilitators; social scientists are facilitators more than anything else.

HOROWITZ: What is the utilization of social science for policy purposes in Syria vis-a-vis Egypt, vis-a-vis Lebanon, vis-a-vis Jordan? Is there any marked differentiations at that level? Parenthetically, does this hold out a prospect for a technocratic dialogue between Israel and the other countries of the Middle East, or do you have a kind of volte face, with the Israelis becoming theological as it were, and therefore not having a dialogue either? Are we talking about a model of social science which is a matter of technocracy?

I am getting back to my first question because each time I have asked this question, and I am getting different feedback in terms of answers as to what the social science role is. Here, I begin to get the feeling that we are really talking about a vanguard technocracy, not a particular kind of Parsonian or Functionalist, or Phenomenologism. What is important seems to be "hard headedness" or "levelheadedness," that permits the dialogue to go on because the domain assumption become s in time identical. Am I right? Is this your perception? I asked three questions: 1. social scientists vis-a-vis each of the Arab nations; 2: social science as a possible bridgehead between the Arab nations and Israel in the Middle East dispute; and 3: social science as something new, or only a new variety of the technocratic phenomenon.

JUREIDINI: Let me give you an example of what actually happened to me. In my discussions with an Arab leader at one time, he turned around and said: I am sick and tired with my foreign policy formulations, of relying on no data, or guesstimates, or somebody lying to me. Why don't you create for me a kind of National Security Council, so that when I require some input to formulate my policy I can be assured that I have something? We agreed, and devised a proposal that was thick and detailed, because we felt we had to be detailed. We created for him a kind of NSC, but we attached to it something that basically the NSC does not have, which is an information system. We not only created the research staff, the policy staff, if you will, but an information acquisition system.

We put the proposal to the person and he bought it. We still have not impkemented it because the Foreign Minister got into the game and their jealousy destroyed it. Then came the question of loyalty: could we find sixteen people who had the qualifications that we felt they should have, who would be available? They could not find sixteen people. Then the question came in: Well, what if there is a policy disagreement between the man and his staff? How is that resolved? We made it clear that it would not be fair for the person to say: I have reached this conclusion, and now you do the research to back it up. That would destroy the whole purpose.

The shell was there; the idea was there; but the way it is being used is not what we intended or what the person initially intended. Do that for me; plant me a tree; or write me a speech. Yes, the only people who seem to have an input are technocrats. I would say that applies across all Arab countries. None of them, with the possible exception of Egypt (and there you have a slight difference) are at the level where the dialogue between those technocrats and Israeli technocrats is going on directly. It goes on either through articles, or at meetings that take place internationally where they come together, or by exchange of information through a third party.

HOROWITZ: Repeating my third question, is this a concept of social science as technocracy? Is there any other meaning operationally to social science? (Jureidini: No, not at this stage) What does that do to all inherited theories of social scidnce and social research? What do we do with this baggage that these people spend years doing? -- these poor savages that we tool up for civility and civilization with reading lists that can choke horses?

Here we have training programs to create a cadre of people. Is this simply a Jesuitical humanism, a training ground to prove that a savage can be converted into a civilized being, and then shed all of that information like some kind of excremental vision? If in fact, person after person is going to come into this room, all of whom are well trained, serious, and dedicated people, and none seems to have any trouble in answering in this way, we either have to question the premises of policy making, or we have to question the premises of academic training. What do we do with all of this inherited wisdom?

JUREIDINI: I will speak only as I apply it to the Middle East. There I question academic training. Nothing that has been taught other than perhaps creating something that needs to be validated, applies to the Middle East. We have situations there that somehow in the West we are not prepared for, and we do not learn how to deal with. Let me give you a simple theoretical setup:

Take Saudi Arabia: We have a country there that for the next 25 years will have unlimited wealth. Tell me if any one of you is trained to deal with the concept of unlimited wealth,in academic training?

HOROWITZ: If you add to the concept of unlimited wealth, a fixed notion of the heavens and the cultural setting of unlimited wealth in direct conflict with visions of how the world is carved up, the problem is even more severe. I am concerned that we are training people in unplanned obsolescence; we are giving them a kind of new theology in which there seems to be little worldly payoff. This contrasts with a school of medicine. One learns of the latest techniques in heart transplants, then the student presumably will be able to go and do that kind of surgery better than the prior generation. Are we providing any analogy within a graduate setting?--People who are even remotely equipped to deal with the kinds of problems that are the every-day source of the research task?

JUREIDINI: We are not, because our whole foundation is based on our own experience and that of Europe, and the relationship between the United States and Europe. The validation, the process, the theories all apply to those two domains. They have no relevance, and have not taken into account inputs or what is taking place elsewhere. When you try to apply them outside of the United States you have only a theology. You have taught people theology, but you have not done anything else.

HOROWITZ: If you were to design a program for perfect graduate students who would be acceptable as associates, what kind of training would they have? Where would they derive this training from?

JUREIDINI: I would take them at the B.A. level, or maybe the M.A. level, before their minds are made up at the Ph.D. level. I would tell them: Take everything you have learned and go, let us say to Saudi Arabia, and show me when you come back where these theories apply, where they do not apply, how they apply, and what should be done to change them. Maybe then I will give you a Ph.D.

HOROWITZ: How do you avoid the problem of exceptionalism? How do you avoid a problem that I encounter in a developmental area where people do go overseas, let us say to Uganda, Tanzania, etc. and they become expert in these countries. But is there no correlation between the analysis of Uganda and the analysis of Tanzania? How do you avoid training specialists in nations with little spillover for general theory?

JUREIDINI: You bring them back and put them in the Ph.D. program. The student benefits because you start to broaden him again. The academic institution benefits because it gets his input and suggestions. Then you send him back out again. (Horowitz) Basically then, you are saying that the field is most important. (Jureidini) Because everything we have theoretically has been derived from the United States and the West European environments. There is nothing fertile about them. The field today is elsewhere. You are beating a dead horse as far as the United States is concerned.

HOROWITZ: On the other hand, is not the work that you do an attempt to resurrect the dead horse?

JUREIDINI: It is not. What we are doing for the first time is saying that it is not our perception of these people that counts. It is their perception of us, of what we do, that determines whether we are going to have a successful dialogue or not. Up to now, it was our perception of these people. We based our policy on our perception, and therefore we made the tragic mistake of dividing the Arab world between conservatives and radicals, only to find out that does not work. Now we are making other mistakes along the same line.

We are saying: wait a minute. We move in certain directions; we get up in the morning at 8:00 A.M., have our coffee, and go to the office. We work until 6:00 P.M. How do they perceive us? Once we understand how they perceive us we can have a dialogue.

HOROWITZ: Is not the question of perception a function of power and a shift of real power?

JUREIDINI: Not necessarily. Why should it be a function of power or a shift of power?

HOROWITZ: Beyond that point, is not the question of the perception of others simply one of good interaction research, so that in order to do real research you have to know how the two sides mutually perceive each other? I am suggesting that there is a problem, not only one of theory, because person after person says there is.

The people who are out there making policy, whether they are Frank Riessman in paraprofessionalism, or Paul Jureidini in Middle East research, all lean in the same direction. Is there not also a problem of no real domain assumptions about the nature of the world that may create a source of problems that is almost insurmountable? If we all live within a game theoretic model, can you then devise a world of risks, benefits, costs, the game of chicken, the problem of showdown--all of this you can manage. But if you live in a world which has theological decision making rather than theoretic decision making, can you really have a rational outcome, or rationally predict events? Can you work to create better social research, better analysis, or better predictions?

JUREIDINI: It is surprising how little we know about people outside of the United States or Europe. In talking, I just had to bypass my last visit and brief an assistant to a head of government in Europe. I was appalled by how little he understood of the political processes of today. The information that we have on the Middle East stopped in

1970, or 1967, and nothing new has been contributed since. Our perceptions of the Middle East are based on data that is not beyond 1967. We always go on the assumption that everybody plays the game model. We forget the rational approach. We begin to formulate our policy on assumptions that everybody is going to cost-benefit his policy the way we do and the way Ford does. McNamara committed that mistake in Vietnam.

HOROWITZ: How do you account for the amazing success of Abbott in gaining contracts, apart from knowledge of the people involved? What happens on delivery date of these contracts? Are you now equipped to do work largely involving computers and computer training? Is this work largely involved in theoretical speculation? Or what you might call ballpark predictions? What do you see as the direction, or the tendency, of the kind of research that you are involved in with respect to the Middle East and techniques of research per se?

JUREIDINI: I hope that the success of Abbott Associates continues. One of the reasons we are successful is that we have the only Middle East team in the nation. No other think tank has ten people working on the Mi-dle East. (Horowitz) Does that include Jews and Israelis? Within the team, are there experts on Israel? (Jureidini) Yes, definitely--Abe Wagner. He has his own firm but we work together when it involves Israel.

We have several kinds of research going. We do work, as you know, with advance data systems. Our work in this direction now is to try to develop cognitive maps. We realize what was missing for prediction rather than postdiction. Advance data analysis is a cognitive map. This is where some of our research is aimed. Other kinds of research is basically what we call "net" assessment of threat. It is basic research that takes into account not only if you want order and battle-type stuff, but cultural factors such as training and other things that enter into the picture. Some of it is long range, if you wish, ballpark, but it is the kind of ballpark that has a solid foundation, and looks five to ten years down the pike.

HOROWITZ: I am curious about the role of intuition. In fact, does it ultimately take people like yourself to put together pieces of a puzzle that have almost nothing to do with data banks or information? Does not the fact that the good Lord blesses you with a certain "verstehen" or understanding, have a great deal to do with decision-making in a foreign context?

JUREIDINI: That is becoming more and more requested these days. But that is because I go back to those who supposedly are being produced. Academic institutions cannot produce the tools to help scientifically predict as far as possible. Therefore, they rely on intuition, or my ability, or the ability of others to look at a situation and put the puzzle together and come up with a picture which could be right or could be wrong.

HOROWITZ: Could you give us an idea of the nature of the questions that you address? What level of specificity characterizes the problems which you would study?

JUREIDINI: I do consultant work. Somebody calls me in and says: I have a problem, help me with it. Another says: Here is a situation, research it for us. In the middle of a crisis, a war: Hey, please come with us and look over our shoulder and tell us whether our answers and reactions are correct. I was looking at something that way back in November. I wrote a paper that was supposed to be published but was turned down, on "The Syrian-Jordanian-Lebanese Entente." Now they want the economic, political, military implications of this entente. What does it mean for the countries themselves and for the region?

HOROWITZ: When you say "they want to know," do you mean the United States government?

JUREIDINI: Yes.

HOROWITZ: Has any question been raised of the possibility of Abbott functioning in terms of ideological commitments to an Arab position? Are there any questions in your mind, or in the minds of your associates, that you are functioning in terms of scenarios which are realizable, and beyond that, do you have any scenario yourself for a pacific outcome? Or is there a built-in bias? How does some kind of long-range scenario affect the character of your work?

For example: if you see Israel as a long-term survivor in the Middle East, you will certainly have a different series in terms of decision making. If you do not think of a Jewish state as a viable entity in the Middle East, would that effect the outcome of the kind of work being done on a day-to-day basis? Perhaps I am asking this of you personally rather than organizationally. I would be interested to know how you account for the charge of bias? One way certainly would be by some kind of candid expression of what you feel would be a long-range pacific solution for the area that more or less guides the day-in, day-out work that you perform.

JUREIDINI: When we look at the Middle East we seldom look beyond the five to ten year span. So it contains a bit of bias. If I look at the Middle East in a five to ten year span, I have to say that Israel remains viable. We go on the assumption that Israel will remain viable. The 1973 war is the first war that carried with it the seeds of a peaceful settlement. The other three wars carried the seeds for another war. The outcome of the 1973 war is such that a pacific solution is possible. The others carried with them war as a final issue.

The point is, how do you fit the pieces together and come up with a pacific settlement? I consider, and the Arabs and Israelis, I think, consider, that the military option is gone. War, in my opinion and in the opinion of many other people, is no longer a viable option, whether we are talking about conventional warfare or nuclear warfare. What remains is the political, but more important, the economic option. The final determinant of peace in the Middle East is going to be economic much more than it is going to be political. It is the ability of Israel to survive, or a feeling that they can survive economically, that will determine the outcome of peace in the Middle East.

Let me try to explain this more concretely. If we look at Israel and the Arab world in two contexts, we can look at manpower and training, and equipment. Then we can look at one of the most important aspects, which is willingness to live peacefully. If the willingness to live in Israel begins to dissipate, if Israelis begin to leave, if reverse migration occurs, then it is going to affect manpower, training, and equipment, That is going to affect the balance. What is effecting Israelis most at this moment is economic rather than political. That is the real situation.

HOROWITZ: I know of nobody who can analyze the Middle East in intuitive terms better than Paul Jureidini. Few are as capable at this level of analysis. Yet questions of real moment persist. Was not the rhetoric of secular binationalism resolved almost in a thundering silence, as a result of the Lebanese crisis? Even if we assume, and I know that you have made this point carefully, that we are dealing here with a class phenomenon as much as, if not more than, a religious phenomenon, that a Maronite class is involved, whatever the structural determinants -- economic, religious, political -- has the current malaise of Lebanon reduced it to a status of two alien forces fighting over a corpse, an option virtually untenable with respect to Israel?

Does this create the possibility of hardening and, dare I say it, of renewed hostilities? Or are we dealing here with a purely Lebanese situation, a ohenomenon that has no relevance with respect to a solution in Israel? Of all the nations that you know intimately, this seems to be the one you know most intimately. I find at one level Lebanon takes away the moral armament of the doves within Israel because one need only point a finger at another small nation adjacent to Lebanon, Israel, with much less animosity between Christian and Arab communities, between middle-class, affluent, and neo-proletarian impoverishment.

The dream that Lebanon represented in the United Nations after World War II has come thundering down. Diplomats have long paraded Lebanon as the amazing exception in this whole area, the outpost of

Western democracy, of Western culture. Does the Lebanese conflict not have profound consequences for even a short-run pacific scenario?

JUREIDINI: I think not. One of the problems that the PLO has always had is that it could not articulate a platform. It tended, therefore, to project a negative image. It would not evolve a platform except to refuse to cooperate with the British authorities, with the White Committees. Again, one of the reasons that the PLO began to articulate its nationalist posture was the growth of the Marxist Wing which was absent in the thirties.

The platform the PLO has articulated, and it was for public consumption more than internal, was basically a binational state. But if you look at either the Rabat Conference decision, or what Arafat told Senator Fulbright, the idea of a binational state is no longer valid. Because Israel is not really part of the Arab world, and is not expected to become part of the Arab world, the idea of setting up a binational state does not quite make Israel equivalent to Lebanon. Lebanon is part of the Arab world, and therefore the pressures on Lebanon are going to be different than those that would be applied on a nation that is not part of the Arab world and is not expected to be part of that world.

HOROWITZ: A problem that Israel must undoubtedly face is that in their 28 year history as a nation they have always roared like the Lion of Judah is supposed to. The nation was conceived in combat and struggle, and it has developed an extraordinary degree of what you might call international pretension. Israel may be the size of Vermont, but psychologically and ideologically it was ready to take on the Soviet Union.

As Moshe Dayan once put it, when he was asked whether he feared Soviet intervention, he said: No, not really. They have not had a good war since 1945. One can only say that, whether in jest or partial jest, because Israel's image of itself is larger than life (or a lot of chutzpah), Admittedly, the 1973 war mitigated that image, and in part the problem of contemporary Israel dates from the post-1973 period.

While acute economic problems exist, there is a psychological problem of downward adjustment, the way anyone who has any kind of wealth or power must cope with the fact of downward mobility. The question I have is: How much further downward mobility at the psychological level do the Arab nations expect of Israel? Can Israel, after having been nurtured in both the father and son generation, accept the role of the pussycat rather than the lion? Are they capable of meowing rather than laying out the roars of the lion? Or are the risks so great on the down side that the so-called Masada complex enters in to prevent that sort of further deterioration in the psychic economy of the Israeli society? It is twofold: one, what do the Arab nations want, short of making Israel a pussycat? and two, what can the Israelis accept, short of remaining a lion?

JUREIDINI: Between meowing and roaring there is the old mouse that roared. You can become a mouse but continue to roar. What image do you want to project? A very aggressive mouse that can roar, or one that meows? It depends in a sense also on what the Israelis want. Do they want to be part of the Arab world? Or do they want to survive there and not be part of it? If they want just to be there and not be part of it, not have bridges open, they can remain what they are at this moment. The peace could be forthcoming quickly. If the insistance is on full relations, full intercourse, then it requires a different set of rules. Then the kind of pressures that are applied on Lebanon today to conform, will apply in Israel too.

What is it that Israel seeks? If it is full intercourse in an openness, it is a problem the Israelis have to resolve. If you have full peace and full intercourse, open borders, the process of aculturation will take hold, and within a period of time, I cannot say how much, the Israelis will become 95 percent Arab and maybe the Arabs 5 percent Israeli. Nonetheless, it will change the concept of the Jewish faith per se if you have the peace. If you remain a nation that lives there, is not threatened, but is completely disregarded by its neighbors, you can continue to survive as an enclave surviving by itself. The problem becomes economic. Can Israel survive economically as an enclave?

HOROWITZ: My own work presents this in terms of a Third World problem, which requires a Third World solution rather than a European enclave approach. I am so clearly on record on this question that there is no point in my maintaining an objective standpoint in that I definitely believe that in terms of my own "three ms", modernization, mobilization, and militarization, the Israeli state already is part of the Middle East world. And the question of its being a European enclave, or for that matter a religious enclave, has already passed into history. It is no accident that the second most important language in Israel is Arabic. English has moved to third place. That is only a reflection of a tendency not so much toward Moslemization, but Arabization.

Then the issues become, almost in algebraic terms, what is the cross-over point of Arab modernization meeting what you might call integration into the area; and if that cross-over point can be planned and programmed in a series of stages, you can have a pacification that probably will not satisfy anyone. I have the sneaking suspicion, if I may carry on thie peroration, that it is almost like those people who champion the idea of detente, and an end to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the detente arose, and when the end of the Cold War came, those people who were championing it stood scratching their heads, wondering what they had gotten. By no means was anyone really happy with the outcome. I have the feeling that something similar is going to occur in the Middle East. There is not going to be much happiness at the outcome. Do you feel that way?

JUREIDINI: Yes. My feeling is that even in Israel the public does not understand the full implications of peace. They see it more as signing a piece of paper. If they understood fully, they would fight it like those you are talking about. This is a point that concerns me very much. If there is going to be an Israel, it cannot be as the enclave that we talk about. The time to have peace is now, and not five years from now. Five years from now the modernization process of the

Arab world will be in the hands of multinational corporations of various nations who will not want the Israelis as competitors; they would have no interest, nor could the Israelis offer anything. (Horowitz) Can they offer anything at this point? (Jureidini) I suspect they could -- directly, but not immediately.

PRESSURE, PROPAGANDA, AND PROFESSORS: INTELLECTUALS AS INFLUENTIALS

An Interview with Michael Curtis

Director and Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the American Professors for Peace in the
Middle East. National Headquarters: New York City

PRESSURE, PROPAGANDA, AND PROFESSORS: INTELLECTUALS AS INFLUENTIALS -

Michael Curtis

HOROWITZ: Michael Curtis, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, probably has more factual knowledge than anyone else in this country on organizational aspects of the relationship between American academic personnel, largely Jewish, and Israeli society. He is editor of numerous works of scholarship, but of equal importance, chairman of the American Academic Committee for Peace in the Middle East. It would be wrong to describe Professor Curtis simply as an expert on Israel. In point of fact, he is an expert in British constitutional law, French social and intellectual history, and political theory generally.

His interests in the Jewish question and in Israeli society derives first from biographical and autobiographical perspectives, and later became translated into an organizational effort. He is editor of a number of volumes on Israeli and Middle East themes, many of them largely successful, including: Israeli Social Structure. A new work is coming out, entitled: Israel in the Third World; and a number of conference have been sponsored largely through Professor Curtis' initiative. His organization seeks to influence American foreign policy with respect to Israel. In turn, he is concerned with how the Israeli effort, at the level of policy making, can influence American public opinion.

My first question is: To what degree does an organization like the American Academic Committee for Peace in the Middle East function as a lobbying effort, or a pressure group, and to what degree is it a social science effort directed at factual information that will have the effect of directing American foreign policy toward goals and aims in support of peace in the Middle East? What is the difference between a pressure group comprised largely of social scientists, and a social science body acting on American society per se?

CURTIS: As far as my own organization and efforts are concerned, I am not sure that I see a dichotomy in the two forms of activity you suggested. We have about 15,000 members of our organization who, in some way or another, are associated with the organization. We are not able to engage in the kind of activity that a professional group is. Nor do we have interests which are mundane in some way, as the majority of pressure groups are. What we are eseentially trying to do is to help foster or maintain a climate of opinion that would percolate throughout the intellectual world and the world in which decision making in this particular subject takes place. I would conceive of this as a pressure group in a broad sense. We work through the meetings that we hold, our own writings, through various conversations that we have from time to time with those in the political world who associate with our problems. We are trying to gain information from them on their perspectives, and hopefully to shape their views. It this means seeing members of the executive and legislature from time to time, we do that. We meet with representatives of the different countries in the Middle East. This, in effect, is a two-way process in which we attempt to learn about the shifting currents of this complicated issue. The Middle East is one of the most complicated single issues in foreign affairs that exists.

HOROWITZ: How do you measure success and failure organizationally? Can you give an example of a success that your organization has had, and either a success or a failure in relation to feeding into pipelines affecting American foreign policy?

CURTIS: The success would be that the organization is taken seriously by those who count on decision-making levels. I would not say that one automatically has the ear of Secretary Kissinger, but certainly he knows of our existence. He reads out materials; and from time to time we have had conversations with him. I do not believe we have ever spoken directly to the President, but we have done so indirectly. Some of the members of the organization have had substantial impact. I have gone to Washington on a number of occasions and have spoken to leaders of Congress. Judging by the response, or the kind of questions they asked, and the answers that were given, as well as the interchange that took place, I would think that some impact resulted in respect to the assiduousness with which the legislators attend to the problems and the real conviction they have on a given issue.

HOROWITZ: Would you say that the American Academic Committee functions as a social science effort, in that it would enlist, let us say, Arab social scientists to engage in scholarly dialogue? Is this part of the APPME effort?

CURTIS: Yes. It is an organization which has as its function the fostering of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our primary concern is to insure the security of Israel. But this does not suggest any hostile attitude toward the Arabs. Indeed, if a climate of friendship can be fostered with Arab intellectuals, with Arab diplomats, then this is a desirable endeavor. In various conferences that we have had, and in the books we have put out, we have included a perspective presented either from the Arab point of view, in an authoritative fashion, or a statement which recognizes a particular case that the Arab states have made. In fact, at the meeting which we had recently, my guest was a gentleman who is now the Minister of Information in the Egyptian Embassy. He started off by saying that more important than anything he had to say, was the fact that he was there.

We are perhaps the only organization interested in the Middle East that is able to be a platform in which people of sometimes quite different points of view, enter into some kind of dialogue with each other. We will be trying to do this in an international forum in the near future. When we, as a group, were in the Arab countries last summer, we were hosted well and taken seriously. People we saw were of relatively high rank in the three Arab countries of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, to which we went. There was a frank exchange of ciws in which I believe we had some impact, if not on the policy, then at least on the manner in which a point of view is made.

HOROWITZ: You present yourself as organizationally supportive of Israel. Are there any specific recommendations that you make? Do you speak to Israeli foreign officers? Are you guided by their interests or wishes, or, on the contrary, do they tend to listen to you and be guided by your own orientation?

CURTIS: It is a reciprocal relationship. What we hold in common is the desire to insure the existence and the security of Israel. But be-ond that common objective, people differ in their conceptions of a settlement with relation to the Arab countries; of what the nature of American foreign policy should be; of whether our attitudes toward the Soviet Union are a major factor in the situation. We do not endorse any political candidate because we cannot agree on individuals, both nationally and locally, who we might support at any particular time. When we meet, which is quite frequently, we hear every candidate's viewpoint and do not automatically agree with them or endorse them. I am sure we would be divided on the question of settlements on the West Bank, or the presentation of some kind of Palestinian point of view. There is no monolithic acceptance of the Israeli position at any particular moment.

HOROWITZ: Do you have a particular involvement with social science personnel in Israel with respect to university positions, or their coming to America, or vice versa? Is there any policy exchange that takes place as a result of an exchange of ideas or posts between personnel?

CURTIS: There is a good deal of meeting of the minds. But obviously, it is going to be more direct with Israel than it is with the Arab countries. The responsibility for this should be put on the Arabs who have been somewhat reluctant to send their intellectuals to meet in gatherings of a wider scale, or indeed, to allow the kind of study missions which we have been having twice a year in Israel, in which crucial discussions with senior officials, governmental, academic and military figures take place.

In one relationship with Israeli academics and social scientists with whom we have major contacts, there is a real and genuine exchange of views. We have a number of them over as speakers; we have three at the moment who are on various campuses. As I mentioned, one of our major activities is to have people (we have 600 different campus groups, including one at Princeton) who are active to different degrees; and we have speakers who come and talk to the members on our different campuses.

HOROWITZ: Beyond the normal function of mobilizing a portion of the academic community, is there any systematic effort made to put information in the political process that will have direct policy relevance in the behavior of national governments?

CURTIS: The material we put out is aimed at this. A paper on American interests in the Middle East is addressed to Washington, essentially to reinforce a particular conception of the problem as I have personally seen it. There is an immediate and direct attempt to have an impact, or to deal with the changing situation. This is not on a day-to-day basis; that would be difficult to do for academics who are spending time at their own universities. It does mean taking a long-term attitude and also a view that changes depending upon the different circumstances.

HOROWITZ: Have you ever sponsored research? Have you engaged in a situation where certain research tasks become primary and, as a result, you sponsor those activities on an ongoing basis?

CURTIS: Yes, from time to time. It is difficult to do that to a great extent because we are not a Middle East Institute as, let us say, the Near East Institute at Princeton, nor as we scholars who are primarily engaged in an intensive, elaborate analysis of Middle Eastern affairs. At the moment, we are having a study done that will be published within the next month, on various aspects of Syria. That should be 100 pages of one of the most useful contemporary handbooks on Syrian society and politics, in English, at least of which I am aware.

HOROWITZ: How and where do you generate scholarship on Syria? Or better, is the research you generate accepted by non-Israeli sectors of the Middle East community?

CURTIS: We make use of individuals who have some expertise, and who are prepared to do research. There is a colleague who is currently teaching at a Canadian University, and who is a member of the Shiloah Center at Tel Aviv University, the best institute for research on the Middle East in Israel, who is an expert on Lebanon and Syria. He has written a piece. There is an Arab Lebanese teaching in North Carolina who was asked to write.

HOROWITZ: Is there any Arab counterpart to the efforts of the American Academic Committe for Peace in the Middle East?

CURTIS: The Arabs created an Association of Arab graduate students which is financed by the League of Arab States out of Cairo. There is, however, no academic counterpart. The Association clearly is a group sponsored and controlled by the Arab governments, and is wholly limited in its activities. It has never, as far as I know, had an opposition or critical point of view expressed, nor have its writings expressed the range of positions that ours have, for example in People and Politics in the Middle East. There are three chapters in that book which I would say are Arab positions. Many of them were critical of the Israeli position in some fashion; others were supportive in both directions. Our book, Israel: Social Structure and Change, is useful largely because it is both sympathetic toward Israeli society, and at the same time quite critical of various aspects of the Israeli life. I do not see anything in the Arab products that are self critical in that fashion, or which are open to opposition points of view. My answer would be, no, there is not any counterpart.

HOROWITZ: Are there any Jewish non-Zionist, anti-Israeli, or anti-Zionist organizational efforts directed at the academic community?

CURTIS: There are some, but they are not specifically directed at the academic community per se. They are directed at the general, intelligent public. One of the most prestigious is the Middle Eastern Institute which is headed by a Mr. Brown, who went over to Lebanon a short while ago. I would suppose that although purportedly it is objective in nature, the orientation of the organization is somewhat pro-Arab. There are others that I would regard as somewhat more insidious in nature, strongly anti-Israeli, or anti-Zionist, whereas an organization like the Institute is not.

HOROWITZ: If you had an infinite supply of financial resources for your organizational effort, where would you place those funds? How do you see them enhancing or enlarging the scope of the activities of the American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East?

CURTIS: In a variety of ways. But the most essential one would be a series of international meetings, making sure that Arab intellectuals and social scientists engage in exchanges with the American, Western-European community: fellow colleagues in the social sciences.

HOROWITZ: Is there not an eighteenth-century enlightenment presumption behind this kind of organization? Is there a Kantian belief that when you maximize informational yields, and when you heighten what you might call rationality, in terms of data, that you therefore have a corresponding impact on public opinion or an impact on government or policy-making bodies? Do you feel that what AAPME is dealing with is not subject to what you might call the rationality of discourse? What do you see as the limits of discussive behavior? Is the problem of the Middle East one which exists at a level of morals and sentiments which are not really amenable to intellective kinds of effort?

CURTIS: The intellectual has the power of intellect. Certainly, as a political scientist, I am well aware of the significance of instincts and emotions and rational behavior. In fact, I wrote a book on this problem. We are not a propaganda organization; we do not use the tools of a propaganda organization. For example, when we were in Syria on a study mission, the Gola Heights agreement had not yet been reached. A number of us had seen Kuneitra from the Israeli side before, and therefore did not go. The Foreign Minister was annoyed about this, because for him this would have an enormous emotional impact. Instead, we were subjected to a vitriolic movie that had been made showing Kuneitra as a destroyed town. There was no intellectual argument there. There was no discussion of what had occured in the first two years, in 1967 and 1973. There was only the sheer emotional impact that was to be derived from watching this. I agree that there are limits of understanding. It may be that no sequence of words is as appealing as watching a picture of a refugee camp with someone holding a starving child. But we do not resort to that. It may well be that this is a handicap, but emotional appeals are not our responsibility as a social science group within the organization.

HOROWITZ: Does AAPME have any impact on social scientists in other countries? I know you have an affiliate in Canada. Do you also have a European affiliation? Is there an international association of scholars or academics who manifest a strong political concern for a Middle East settlement?

CURTIS: There are groups of sympathizers. There is a group in England trying to get off the ground. Curiously, there is one in Berlin, in Holland, and one in Japan with a number of scholars of whom I do not think any are Jewish. There are colleagues in different countries who hold similar views and are active in some fashion, but not in the way we are.

HOROWITZ: Are you involved in the kind of programming that Yehezkel Dror does in terms of contingency planning designing scenarios?

CURTIS: The difficulty with Dror's work is that it lacks empirical reference. I like to see tangible emphasis, and I work that particular way. There is nothing wrong with theoretical conceptions, but without a wealth of empirical material to put in the black boxes, the work is not terribly useful. Organizationally, we do not engage in that kind of public policy speculation. It is not rewarding for the kind of work we are interested in doing.

HOROWITZ: Are there any premises or principles of political science, social science, or organizational theory that are particularly valuable in your coming to t-is conclusion about policy-making in an international context? Is there any way in which the work effort that you are involved with in relation to this peace in the Middle East involves basic paradigms or empirical systems within the social sciences? Or is this simply an ex post-facto device whereby after you become involved you begin to look for organizing premises?

CURTIS: In order to have an impact and to produce a climate which is favorable, one must direct one effort to different audiences: to policy makers who do not indulge in speculation of this kind; to the general educated public; to our colleagues, most of whom are not social scientists and would not be willing to engage in that kind of analysis, and who would certainly not find it attractive. This is not an academic exercise; it is not unrelated to political practice. It is a serious endeavor, addressing itself to an issue of major importance not only as far as we are concerned, but as far as the fate of the world is concerned. Therefore, it is one in which analysis of historical and contemporary phenomena would be the significant element, not paradigms of social science that might be applicable for other reasons.

HOROWITZ: Would you say that your personal effort in this area is not part of your social science work?

CURTIS: It depends on whether you are talking about me personally. I am not sure where I should wear my hat as president of the organization. I am, therefore, speaking in a semi-authoritative fashion. In my own work, I have found social science extremely useful. My work on the Middle East reflects on the nature of foreign policy, on how policies come into effect, on which changes take place, on the attitudes of participants, on how slow people in positions of power are to move in different situations, on the substantial constraints on those who exercise power, which make them reluctant or hesitant about engaging in the game. In this particular situation, each side has incorrect perceptions of the other which are difficult to overcome. One can understand and rationalize that, but watching the way in which they try to shape their activity in the changing circumstances, one appreciates how difficult it is. In other words, major breakthroughs in foreign policy making are hard to come by. Maybe they always are, but I would have thought that in internal or domestic affairs they would be easier than I now see them to be in foreign affairs.

HOROWITZ: How did you become involved personally with this effort? Certainly it was not simply a consequence of the kind of scholarship you did earlier in your life.

CURTIS: It happened almost overnight. As a result of the 1967 war I got so welled up emotionally with what then seemed to be the fate of Israel, that I had to lend what support I could. The country was facing overwhelming odds and an onslought of adversaries, and there seemed to be little they had with which to defend themselves.

HOROWITZ: You say you were overwhelmed emotionally. Is that the kind of sentiment that Pareto was describing? Is it not the kind of impulse and response that goes far beyond policy making as a systematic response to social science? And hence, how does one objectify such emotive reaction?

CURTIS: It has an enormous impact and probably accounts for the initial commitment to most political activity. If one thinks of the attraction of communism for many people, perhaps it would be wrong to argue that it is simply a substitute secular religion. But the emotional impact on most people, the idea of the creation of a better society, or the representation of what would seem to be the injustices of the present, would obviously be a more significant element than the diametrical travesty of the Marxist experience.

Certainly intellectuals were attracted because of what they perceived to be the dawning of a better day, or else others who might feel they want to be in consonance with the march of history. I would agree that the initial commitment may be emotionally impacted, or something of a psychological nature.

HOROWITZ: Let me turn to AAPME organizational effort itself. How does one function as an academic? Do you have a staff of non-academics? How does the organizational composition insure the integrity of the organizational effort and permit some kind of impact to be felt on the academic community at large? Beyond that, how is this effort orchestrated by AAPME?

CURTIS: The organizational work was done solely by academics themselves. The organization grew, and it now necessitates full-time people who may have had some association in the past with academics, but who are non-academics staffing the office, and carrying out, in effect, the policies that are made by the leaders of the organization, which exists on different levels throughout the country.

HOROWITZ: Do you have offices in Washington, D. C.? Or are your offices located only where there are large bodies of Jewish people and hence Jewish professors?

CURTIS: We have offices in places where we have been able to staff and fund them: in Boston, Los Angeles,Philadelphia, and Chicago.

HOROWITZ: Are these regional offices staffed by social scientists? Or by intellectuals? Or by professionals concerned with political survival of Israel?

CURTIS: In all cases they are staffed by women, all of whom are not academics themselves, but who either have had some connection with academia or are the wives of academics. The staff is paid.

HOROWITZ: Given your clearly stated political mission, is it not odd that you do not have a Washington office?

CURTIS: Our offices have largely come out of a local response, as a particular region felt a need for organizing.

HOROWITZ: You speak of this as an effort directed concretely toward changing foreign policy. This is largely an American effort.

CURTIS: There is a professional group in Washington called: the American Israeli Committee.

HOROWITZ: Are you affiliated with any other organizations?

CURTIS: No, the AAPME is highly separate. The function of the American Israeli Committee is to maintain contact with members of the legislature and the executive. Partly because of that, it does not necessarily do the same kind of thing. Our activity would seem to be more long run than lobbying. For example, when a specific issue comes up, i.e., on sending Israel the C-130 plane, we do not take a stand, nor would it be in the nature of our activity to see members of the decision-making groups about that. We would not, as an organization, take a stand on a specific day-to-day matter.

HOROWITZ: A number of people who preceded you seemed to have a more exact notion of how they fit into the policy-making system, or network. Does AAPME fit in at the middle echelon or at the top echelon? Is it an executive response that it seeks? Is it a legislative response? How do you measure the organizational success of AAPME in policy terms? I understand the work you do, but I am not sure I understand how you measure your impact.

CURTIS: The impact of our efforts has been on a limited number of policy makers. On politicians as such, our influence is widespread. It is done through the local groups at the local level. People on campus groups will be in touch regularly with their congressmen and senators, as well as their local officials. Nationally, we try to push people at the top. We just sent out a letter of invitation to Secretary Kissinger. It is an attempt to reach senior officials. But that is partly on a personal, as well as an organizational leve. A primary point of our activities is to address ourselves to fellow academics, and to get them to sustain a position which is long-term in nature and will affect the thinking of educated people in general. We ought to have much wider influence than the activities of your guests who presumably claim broad-gauged organizations.

HOROWITZ: For the most part, scholars involved in domestic policy-making provide what is specifically oriented toward social science rather than social policy. They often start from the idea of social science impacting a policy arena. You start with a constituency model rather than a social science paradigm. I would say that the domestic policy types tend to use social science more self-consciously, whereas the foreign policy types tend to be social scientists, and do not aim at analytically satisfying results.

HOROWITZ: Yes. The reason is that there are other organizations that attend to different clientele and to different activities that we do not.

HOROWITZ: Are there any liabilities to engaging in organizational efforts of this kind?

CURTIS: The liabilities are heavy constraints on my own life, and on activity of an academic nature. I give an enormous amount of time to the AAPME.

HOROWITZ: Have you observed differential responses between the parties in the country? Is the Democratic Party more responsive than the Republican Party?

CURTIS: No. There has been a Republican President since our activity began in 1968. With Kissinger himself, largely because he is a Harvard man, we have a strong group at Cambridge. I have done radio and television programs with senators of both parties who are equally sympathetic to our point of view.

HOROWITZ: Are there any peculiar demographics or special properties of the people that you address who you feel are more sympathetic? Beyond that, do you have any preference in terms of party politics or electoral politics?

CURTIS: No. I would suppose that most members of the organization are Democrats, and probably liberal Democrats at that. This is just an impressionistic notion.

HOROWITZ: Would you care to comment on what is happening in Labanon vis-a-vis the warfare between the Christians and the Moslems, and the effect that this could have on peace in the Middle East, and the continuation of Lebanon as a viable state?

CURTIS: A logical, although not political solution for Lebanon would be partition: in which a Christian entity would be given autonomy. The Christians are being driven into such a small area of the country that that now does not seem to be a viable possibility. The only hope is for a stable entity to be created. The question is the Christian community, which is now clearly recognized as a minority element. In other words, the Moslems have had some justification, they have been discriminated against by the way in which the Lebanese bargained to create the constitutional framework in a sense they have changed, and which is now inappropriate because of the demographic changes that have taken place.

It is part of a much wider problem because of the interests of different groups. The Palestinians essentially created the problem by coming in and taking over that part of southern Lebanon which could not be controlled by the Lebanese army, and forcing that population to move North. The problem for the maintenance of peace is considerable because the PLO, which had a potential impact on the situation, is essentially divided on the nature of any kind of peaceful arrangement that could be made. The PLO, despite the rhetoric about it, is not a unified group. There are at least six separate entities, at least three of which are creations of foreign states, namely, Syria, Iran, and to some extent, Saudi Arabia. But the Sa'Aiga group that is significant now is attempting to introduce some kind of lasting amistice there. It is said to be a creation of Syria and an agent of the Br'ath party of Syria. But it is a group which challenges some of the supremacy of Yasir Arafat. Therefore, tension has already been created which has led Arafat to engage in negotiations with Sadat.

You also have the two rejectionist front groups which are the most vitriolicly against any kind of settlement with Israel, or any kind of acceptance of a solution that would be less than the whole of what was formerly known as mandated Palestine. This, therefore, brings in the possibility of tension between Iraq and Israel, if they reject, or do not agree to the settlement that will take place in Lebanon. In other words, it is unpredictable because at least three outside countries are involved. In long range terms, there is the possibility of a union between Lebanon and Syria. After all, the two countries were one until the French decided to create a separate state. It may well be that if President Assad had dreams of greater glory as the leader of the Arab cause, if at any moment he is displaced by another army leader who is more ambitious, either of them could dream of what could be called a "greater Syria," which would comprise Syria, Lebanon, part of Jordan, and some of Iraq, and therefore again create a source of tension of the northern and eastern boundaries of Israel.

HOROWITZ: How do you envision the role of AAPME with respect to political or actual disagreements over foreign policy initiatives between Israel and the United States? More specifically, is the weight of AAPME focused on adjusting the United States to Israeli needs and posture; or vice-versa, influencing Israel to accommodate the United States initiatives? Or do you see the two as so isomorphic that no real policy disagreement need arise?

CURTIS: In essence, American objectives in the Middle East have as many corresponding elements to our organization's commitments: a moral and political commitment to Israel, the preservation of the balance of power in the area, the continuation of friendly relations with the Arab states, and expansion of opportunities to trade with them, as well as the prevention of solid domination of the area, and the fostering of a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. An upholding of the commitment to Israel to insure that it can survive would include: insuring that it will be able to preserve itself as a member of the family of nations. This does not preclude the maintenance or the enhancement of friendly relations with Arab countries. One fact has led very much to the other.

This does not mean to say that there are not enormous benefits to be gained by a policy of great friendship with the Arabs. The commitment is a moral one; it is a commitment of deep, historic links between the two peoples. It is one at an age where restrictions in the world of political freedom is climbing rapidly. According to the Freedom House report for 1975, only 39 percent of the people who work can be said to live in some condition of freedom. The maintenance of a fellow democracy, with a kind of moral strength, social integration, and political stability, is in a sense important in an unpredictable Middle East with governments in the Arab countries which are essentially unstable. From a military point of view, it is highly desirable that there be strong links defending that place--not that Israel should be a base for the United States, but it is the one known constant friend.

The problem of an enlarged Soviet role in Middle Eastern affairs is genuine. The Russians form a constant and growing problem for all western countries. With the range of influence that the Soviet Union has, it forms a great danger to the United States, which cannot remain in any kind of isolationist or neo-isolationist mood.

HOROWITZ: Would you say this view of a Soviet threat to United States interests is prevalent throughout AAPME members? Or is this a point of contention?

CURTIS: Some would emphasize the Soviet Union a great deal more than I would, but I am sure that all would not call for moral and political commitment in as strong a fashion, and make it a key point of their argument.

HOROWITZ: What would be the theological components of your argument? Are there any, or is AAPME an entirely secular effort? Is your organization's effort based on any religious considerations?

CURTIS: No. It is probably non-religious in aspect. There is no religious bond within the organization, other than the fact that a large majority of the members are Jewish. A substantial percentage are not. Those who are Jewish differ in their religious aspects, and religion as such is not the bond.

HOROWITZ: Do you have any demographic information on the organizational composition of your academic members? How many are lawyers? clergy? social scientists?

CURTIS: Such information gathering would require a considerable bureaucratic mechanism, and I am not sure what purpose would be served by it.

HOROWITZ: From my point of view, social scientists are increasingly be called upon to provide, in the name of many causes, a kind of information clearing house. People I know who are actively involved in Lebanese affairs and in Syrian affairs, now are a part of new agencies springing up, like the Abbott Institute, that are, by and large, involved in social science research. They seek out grants; and, as far as I know, a number of these organizations have been uniquely successful in generating research projects that presumably have more than just fact-finding roles.

I am deeply impressed by the size of the membership effort, but I do not see how the expertise of the groups involved in AAPME are brought to bear on the organizational effort. It seems to me that with much smaller numbers, people concerned with Mediterranean studies, Asian studies, or Middle Eastern studies, appear to generate much more clout, and even more funding. Given the kinds of high-powered personnel that you are able to command organizationally, one would imagine a considerable number of cooperative and collective research projects oriented toward certain specific goals: the desalanization projects, projects involving juridical claims of Arabs and Jews; problems of Islamic law and Hebraic law in contemporary contexts. I do not hear any of that resonating in your statements; but this may be simply a result of how our discussion has gone.

CURTIS: A good deal of this is being done by people who are sympathetic and therefore would make use, for example, of the juridical arrangement. We have this enormous book on the legal situation which is highly complicated and technical. This does not have to be redone by any particular group. Some of the other things, which are admirable, are not particularly pertinent to the thrust of the organization.

Some of the people that you are referring to, some of your previous guests and colleagues, are interested in a more limited form of activity, with a more restricted clientele. There are other than social scientists involved in the group of distinguished sponsors that we have. Some are Nobel Prize winners; but they are not social science Nobel Prize winners. The impact of these people is considerable. Their ability to have entre into distinguished and influential circles is great.

HOROWITZ: I am not alien to this effort by any means. It would be inappropriate to simply distance myself from the problems you raise. However, it does seem there are a considerable number of areas of funding that have scholarly, scientific, and social scientific payoffs that would also make the organizational effort substantial financially, and at the same time provide an intellectual baseline that would allow the organization that you represent to in effect claim the mantle of social science and not simply what you might call a special interest or constituency model. I am sure you have given thought to this. At any rate, it seems to me incomprehensible that the organization itself does not seem to care to move in this direction. Perhaps it is because the financial base is so strong that you have no need to entertain these difficult sorts of tasks.

CURTIS: To a degree, not a considerable degree, it is being done on an individual basis. Some of the social scientists who are working in the organization do studies of the economy of Palestine in historical fashion, and so on. Such studies are being done within the framework of an individual's own research. In a sense, we would be directing the work of our academics in a particular direction. Instead of soliciting grants from outside sources, we have directed research on the basis of themes chosen for our numerous conferences and publications. Only in that way have we moved in the direction you have suggested. Perhaps we have not done as much as we might on this particular problem of engaging in research for funding.

SOCIAL RESEARCH, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

An Interview with Pio D. Uliassi
Senior Program Officer
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SOCIAL RESEARCH, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT - Pio D. Uliassi

HOROWITZ: Given your position as Director of External Research at the Department of State, one must say at the outset, that you have described the policy-making syndrome with remarkable candor in your previous work. Having been privileged to examine this work, it is clear that you start with a concept of political stratification, that is to say, policy-making as a function of pyramidal arrangement.

At the bottom of the hierarchy of government administration are high policy inputs, with a few people listening to those who execute policy; while those who execute policy do little listening to those who manufacture and carry out those policies. If this is a correct description of the pyramidal way the State Department, or at least the Bureau of External Research operates, the question which immediately comes to mind is: where does the break between research and policy occur? Why should there be high policy making freedom at elite levels, and so little information, or so few recommendations filtering upward? Is this a consequence of organizations generally, or is it a function of the special nature of the Department of State?

ULIASSI: I would first make a distinction between pyramiding in the hierarchial sense, the decisional sense, and pyramiding in terms of what I consider to be the elements of almost any policy-making. In foreign policy at least, and in most government sectors of policy, one can distinguish among three dimensions: one is the so-called informational base of policy, an understanding of the environment of policy. Second, is a means-end relationship in policy. Assuming we know something about the situation we are in now, and we have some ideas about the situation we would like to be in tomorrow, or the next day, or the next year, we have to have some sense of what it takes to get from here to there. This dimensional policy is the means-end relationship. Finally, there are the goals of policy, the objectives, and presumably the related interests of values of those objectives.

Some sort of hierarchy, or at least a pyramid, is common to what one has in public discourse; whether it is with a larger public or within a bureaucracy, one has a gradually constrictive effect. Whether it is in the State Department or in the Executive, perhaps in any larger system of the environment of public policy, the circumstances in which policy is made, or the circumstances which policy has to take into account, one has a considerable latitude of discourse, far more than people who are not within the Executive realize.

If one moves to the next dimension, the means-end relationship, the range of discourse is constricted considerably. Perhaps some of the reasons for this lie in the realm of social psychology and group behavior. In any case, it seems to me that this is one move from the dimension of an analysis of the environment of policy to an analysis of the relationship of various groups in the process.

If one moves to the level of the objectives, the goals of policy, then bureaucratic discourse becomes even more constrictive. How do these dimensions of policy-making explain the pyramidal phenomenon? For example, taking a social psychological approach, if we looked at various bureaucratic groups in Washington we would find groups such as CIA or State Department, where people work essentially as informational experts, researchers, intelligence analysts, and so on. We find among them tremendous variation, but they also have considerable freedom even when they come together, partly because there are certain group norms involved. The experts acknowledge that they are in a situation of discourse, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in consensus with their peers. The group encounters of people who are informational experts are almost academic affairs.

When you move to the level of a psychological group, an advisory group, or a group which writes a national security study memorandum, (and these are artificial creations) when the objective of the group function is to analyze the means-end relationship, there are greater constraints. Certain people simply do not fall within the fold of certain basic ideas. Even people who might be quite willing at the private level to go beyond the discourse of a so-called advisory group will not, in their official capacity, express their views. The question is, why?

One reason is that for whatever causes, advisory groups tend to establish different norms, or definitions of what is proper behavior. These things are related to their expectations of what that group will find tolerable and acceptable. Many people will often say that certain positions are not defended in advisory group situations simply because they do not have legitimacy in a particular context. For them to take this position would be tantamount to eliminating themselves from further involvement. You would find considerable latitude in informational functions and considerable restriction on advisory functions.

As you move now to smaller and more elite sectors of government, that is, people who actually make decisions, at least on important elements of foreign policy, there is a tendency for even greater constrictiveness. Now one can look at the reasons for this. One is that as we move up the hierarchy there are experts at the bottom, at least the bottom in terms of organizational power, who have a good deal of specific information. Having a far more complex cognitive system, they can tolerate a good deal of diversity. As one rises in the hierarchy, we encounter people who are presumably making decisions about which they do not have expert knowledge. At this level, there is a tendency for a good deal more psychological conformity.

One can look at the pyramidal phenomenon in social psychological terms and come to some understanding of why, if I am correct in assuming that there is restriction at the decisional hierarchy, some of the reasons are social psychological. Members of highly prestigious small groups are quite often reluctant to be dissenters in small, powerful groups if that means to be read out of the elite group eventually. So to the extent that one wants to remain a member of an importand decisional group, then one tends to restrict the area of his or her dissent. I suppose that George Ball, at the time of the Vietnam War, provided the classic example: a small group can move far to coopt the dissenter and make him an in-house devil's advocate with no real impact on the final decision-making process.

HOROWITZ: The kind of formulation you have just offered can be interpreted either in Platonic or Machiavellian terms. The structure you outline entails an intellectual stratification reminiscent of the Republic; you are describing types of beings, not just performers. On the other hand, the type of beings that you are describing are not gifted by gold; that is, they are not uniquely endowed with wisdom. This policy hierarchy is more akin to the Machiavellian concept of virtue, opportunity, and fortune, with an emphasis on good luck. Are you describing a federal hierarchy that has a capacity to listen and respond? Or are you describing a hierarchy that performs only administrative chores? Behind your rhetoric there are two distinct images of government use of policy relevant data: one based on intellectual elites; another based on administrative servants. Do these two types really exist, or are they distinct strategies of processing people, no less than information? Being, as you are, an influential figure involved in the political process, is it fair to reduce the policy process to a matter of individual or idiosyncratic behavior? Is this not a disturbing non-political perspective?

ULIASSI: The social sciences have a good deal to contribute to policy analysis and policy discourse. One has to understand the world one is operating within. Discourse is open even within the bureaucracy, not as open as perhaps some of us would like it to be, but quite open in many respects. But there are limitations at the informational level of discourse within the bureaucracy; in any social system there are probably constraints in discourse.

Social science has had much less to contribute as we move on to the cause-effect kind of question that policy-makers have to deal with. Scientific answers to questions of means and ends are more difficult to arrive at. As a result, other than scientific criteria come into play when people make decisions with regard to what we do in a given situation in order to achieve whatever we have in mind to achieve. The answers provided by social scientists about what one can do in a situation are not usually all that certain. There are many alternative possibilities one can legitimately consider. Therefore, the decision maker is in a position to pick and choose, depending upon his psychological predisposition , past behavior, the restrictions of the environment, and so on. To the extent that intersubjective criteria become less valid as we move from description to selection, and personal identification of core values, then social science has less to do with the way decisions are made.

If you take them as the object of policy, the achievement of certain ends, there we really run into all the value questions. Not all of them because many goals are essentially instrumental, but they can take on high personal stakes. They are value goals rather than instrumental objectives. At that point, social science has even less to say. Because it has less to say, decision-makers especially, will often resort to ideology, personal predisposition, political positions, the atmosphere of Washington, the desire of particular political leaders, and so on.

Let me backtrack a bit. I am not sure whether the distinction between values and non-values as the object of intellectual discourse is fully valid. But let me put that to one side for the moment, and say that social science, at least as most people understand it today, can add much to the discussion of the so-called world out there. Social science has a lot less to contribute to the definition of desirable and stakes. My question to you then would be: Is it the social sciences, the humanities, or whatever, that can lead to wider and more rational public discourse on private values? I am not sure that social science can always do that, or can uniquely do that.

Several years ago, to bring this matter down to specific terms, there was diffused sentiment in the State Department that there ought to be a more rational way for doing policy analysis: some way of our sitting down and identifying what are our objectives in foreign policy. Can we establish a hierarchy among our major objectives? How does one relate basic cultural values to those objectives, in a systematic manner, seriously applying ourselves to a rational analysis of foreign policy? If we can do that, can we then begin to identify immediate goals that presumably make some contribution to these objectives? Can we then step back further and identify a particular action we can take that would contribute to these goals? It becomes a fascinating intellectual exercise.

In a number of experimental projects that we carried on at the State Department, it became clear that the social sciences might, by certain methods, perhaps even certain concepts, be able to generate empirical findings and generalizations that would help in the earlier phases of this kind of argumentation. Little in the social sciences, and perhaps less in philosophy, which is not a field I am familiar with, would really help the State Department to do a rational analysis of our interests and objectives.

HOROWITZ: There is, in the rhetoric that you are using, a lack of distinction between the social sciences and policy science. You are using these terms in an interchangeable manner. From my own vantage point, and I try to make this clear in my own work, there is no such animal as a policy scientist. The breakdown, the collapse of the Lasswellian synthesis occurred when everyone went around looking for the beast that wasn't, a sociological Loch Ness monster. Many people one meets in Washington are like the Loch Ness monster. They respond to shadows. Those doing the bulk of social research are not university based social scientists, but private entrepreneurs turning out research on demand. They are social scientists with specific tasks and missions.

The analysis of bureaucratic structure has a long and honorable tradition, dating back to Weber. It certainly is not outside the realm of discourse. You have done work on the limits of policy performance. What is involved, in some measure, is a certain spillover, more in rhetoric than in reality, between policy science and social science. Social scientists often have little sense of the specific organizational limits of the work that they are involved in. A central psychic characteristic of social scientists doing work for the federal government is the secular sin of pride. The act of being involved in federal levels of work becomes more important than the work done.

It is not my role, nor intention, to pursue a line of inquiry urging further polarization of the social sciences in relation to the policy sector. However, existing levels of this dichotomization can be quite healthy. A certain amount of adversarial relationship between the two communities is a plus to both sides. It is rather Jesuitical to assume that higher involvement automatically insures better social science. Certainly your own experience belies that kind of sentiment. Higher involvement does not automatically guarantee better social science. It does guarantee a certain toughmindedness, rhetorical sophistication, an ability to provide testimony in proper decorum. Many people have not been involved in the policy process who by their very indirection may have had a greater impact on the policy process than direct participants. Whether it be a Schumann or a Morgenthau, they have had a much greater impact than private research agencies who do research without questioning the premises, even the accuracy of the presumptions. Thus, I am not entirely certain whether turning the question on its back and asking me about university irrelevancies addresses the question of the empirical status of the policy scientist.

ULIASSI: I thought at first you were going to say that higher level involvement does not necessarily mean better policy, but you reversed it and said better social science. Maybe the two are not really in that much conflict. My feeling is pessimistic. A good deal of thinking which is identified with policy systems and policy processes, essentially with the executive branch of the government. This has severe limitations. I do not for a moment deny that agencies in the foreign policy field should try to get the best possible social science to perform whatever function they perform.

Yet, definite ideological limits can be accepted within any given society. It does not necessarily have to be the executive. But let me restrict myself to the executive for the moment. At certain historical points, a given social system has a tolerance for a certain range of values and ideas. At other times it may not have quite so wide a range. If I were to pinpoint one weakness in policy thinking, particularly of political scientists in the field of foreign affairs, it would be the common assumption that the only way in which one influences policy is by gaining access to the executive. That may well be true for the top range of policy, but not policy-making as an everyday activity involving wide numbers of personnel and many areas of policy-making. In other words, social scientists can effect policy by pegging their activities to concrete d-cision-making units, and not always to an executive system at the top.

HOROWITZ: Does the State Department actually generate policy-oriented research, or does it simply put on window-dressing conferences in which policy issues are discussed without any sense of either intellectual innovation or practical direction? More gently, does your agency filter academic research, or try to create new directions for foreign policy?

ULIASSI: Conferences are very popular. When it comes to longer term research projects, it is a more difficult problem. We have tried to get access to people in higher levels by involving them in research. For example, one of our experiments for three or four years was to have every research project formulated in considerable detail by working with one or more members of the Policy Planning Staff, the Geographic Bureau (usually a fairly high-level member who was particularly interested in that problem area), and an analyst from the Research Bureau, at least a three-sided kind of committee. They would formulate the research problem. When the proposals came back, usually these things are done on a competitive basis, they would evaluate them, eventually accept one, award a contract, and then reconstitute themselves as a monitoring committee, and follow the research from beginning to end, usually through a succession of meetings with the researcher.

We discovered that for certain kinds of problems it is easy to get fairly high-level involvement. That is true of non-geographic areas generally. If you have an economic study, you are likely to get a high level of involvement of State Department economics people in project monitoring. If on the other hand, you deal with a geographic area such as Europe, the Soviet Union, Africa, and so on, it is difficult to get the best officers in the Geographic Bureau to become consistently involved in the research. The political officers in the Geographic Bureau generally have a lower degree of exposure to research. I am not sure how we can overcome this. To this day there are subcultures within the State Department system. The West Europeans, for example, have generally been biased against research. They just never thought, with the exception of people in political, military affairs they would have their own culture within the subculture. They have not been hostile to research, but indifferent to it. There has been a general notion that every American university really knows Western Europe, so you really do not have to look for academics to tell you much about the area.

The Soviet types, the Kremlinologists, for bettter or worse, have an intimate relationship with not only State Department officers, but with CIA officers and officers of other parts of the government who work on Soviet affairs. They have since the 1950s had close ties of a personal kind with Soviet specialists. And you find variance of this kind in the State Department. One would have to study the organization closely both to see the various degrees of interest in outside research in different sectors of my particular bureaucracy, and perhaps try to develop some explanations for why this should be so.

The Africanists in the 1950s were intensely interested in academic work on Africa. It is obvious why they should be, although they did not know the field; it was a rapidly changing situation. It was also one of the few areas in which government people began to adopt the vocabulary of current social science. The Almond and Coleman book was a bible among Africanists in the State Department. No one could possibly say that about any Europeanists: not that there was really that much modern research going on in Western Europe.

HOROWITZ: Are there any outstanding illustrations of failure and success in terms of social science inputs into the policy process that you recollect? I do not mean in terms of the filtering of agency personnel toward West European types or Africanist types. But is there any specific research in the two decades that you have spent in the Department, that you recall starting out at the level of information, moving through analysis into evaluation, and ending up with actual policy implementation?

ULIASSI: I find it virtually impossible to point to any single area of research and say: "There is an area in which research made an impact on policy." It seems to me that the schema you suggest, and I have suggested, is not the complete schema of what goes on in policymaking, even in an analytic sense. Most research performs an informational function: it is not policy research. It does not address the question what should our objectives be? And what actions can we accordingly take? With what degrees of probability? What are the costs and benefits of these objectives?

Most research, commissioned research and most research done within the government, is an analysis of situations. They can be simple, journalistic kinds of reports: the Cabinet met yesterday and this was the final result of that meeting. Or they can be a more sophisticated, long-range analyses. But ninety percent of all the research that goes on, both commissioned and internal, deals with the question of what the world out there is like. It does not deal with the question of what we can do about it; or what our objectives should be. That is a different function for research, if you look at it in those terms.

HOROWITZ: Then the paradox, perhaps even failure, as it exists, involves a high amount of research but a low quantity of policy-relevant indicators.

ULIASSI: We may have an unrealistic set of expectations for social science. When I say I cannot point to a single example of conspicuous success in social science, I am not sure that is because social science is a failure. It may be that you have put an unreasonable question to me. Social science may not be in a position to give the unambiguous answers that people want when they say: "Show me what social science has done."

HOROWITZ: You are in the business of soliciting and buying information. I have always been struck by the paradox that such solicitation is done in a rather hearsay manner: You might say, who knows this field? You call people you know who can supply information. But one curiosity is that you rarely go to the established sources of information in which there exists a body of knowledge. The journal article, actual research monographs, or original dissertations seem not to be widely referred to. Work that you commissioned does not always get filtered into the pipeline.

Is it not a fair question to ask if some funds should not be spent for information retrieval and the development of social science citation indices, rather than in purchasing what might well be replicative or duplicative research by people who are merely providing a non-annotated version of what may have earlier appeared in journals? How can the State Department reconcile the rather paradoxical under-utilization of available data, and over-utilization of experts, who often turn out to be the same people whose established writings are ignored?

ULIASSI: The work done does become a consideration, except that there are limits of knowledge. There are many instances where people know the work of a particular person or group of people, and call upon them for a specialized analyses because they have first-hand knowledge and experience with their writings, their earlier work, or what the person is capable of. Quite often, it has to be done because we cannot always know who are the people out there who are the experts. We have to go on the basis of hearsay, and start calling around to see who knows this field or that field. There is less of that than may appear. I do not know who the people are, and I cannot find people in the State building who know who the academic experts are, so I pick up the telephone and call three or four friends and try to find out who is doing work that is respectable and to whom we ought to listen. We have to take on faith advice that we get from our friends.

HOROWITZ: Ignoring the impact measurement, have your sponsored any research which you feel is a contribution that would not have been made otherwise? Or have you don the kind of sponsored work which has merely gone right back into journals of mimeographed formats that are not read? How would you describe the part of the work?

ULIASSI: Until recently we never thought of ourselves in the State Department as being in the position to sponsor so-called basic new research. It would be paradoxical if the work we sponsor by and large itself constitutes an addition to the knowledge of development, or what have you. It can be quite reasonably and accurately said that the State Department has not done that kind of work. Other agencies have. The Office of Naval Research over the years has funded a vast amount of work in social psychology, especially in small-group behavior, that has been a real contribution to the development of social psychology. In the early fifties, the air force funded its most famous project perhaps, the Harvard study of the social system.

I would call that a fundamental contribution to knowledge, whatever impact it did or did not have on government policy making. I suspect it had quite a bit. A lot of people in the social field are people who came out of the Columbia-Harvard complex. It was one of those times in American history where the policy makers in the government and the scholars outside, had close ties. The Air Force and the Advanced Research Projects Agency funded a lot of basic research. Now the National Science Foundation has picked up some of it in quantitative approaches to international politics.

Many of them had doubts as to what this achievement really amounted to. Nevertheless, the justification for support over the years was enormous in quantitative terms. It is not that so often the work being done would lead automatically to usable methods, theory, or empirical findings. But it would help somehow to build American political science, at least in aspects of international relations, into a real science.

The State Department has not had that kind of money and orientation. It has never seen its mission as supporting basic research, partly because it never had the money, and partly because it never had the internal support. Our general conclusion has been that to the extent we have money, we use it, not so much to create new knowledge, but to transform in some useful way, the information out there into something that we can find more useful to the people within the State Department, and for that matter, in other agencies. The State Department, that happens to be the bureaucracy in which I work. But at least in our program we also involve other agencies in our seminars, conferences, and quite often even in joint sponsorship of some of our studies.

The funding of new, original research has not been a primary objective. In the last year we have gone through a variety of research policies of the last seven years, since we have had money to spend. In the last year or two we have shifted from the policy of support on a small scale of a vast variety of small projects to more concentrative support -n a few big areas. We are now funding research on mid-term problems on United States social relations, on United States-China-Latin America relations. In each of these areas we are giving about three or four contracts of $50,000 to $70,000 each. This is not in itself a major contribution in financial terms. Columbia and Harvard, for example, have gotten some money from us for economic study on independence, and the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Chicago, amounts which in themselves are modes: $25,000, $50,000, or $75,000 is not all that much. Yet, these funds have served as a catalyst. In the last year or two we have done a good deal to revitalize the Russian studies program at Harvard, to cite an example.

We have provided a modest amount of money, but we have been able to bring in scholars from many universities; they have conferences and seminars at Harvard, and elsewhere. The small input of funds from us has been able to stimulate significant intellectual work at Harvard, and the academics who are involved are happy; but I am not sure that the State Department is happy. Although the work itself may be useful, and we require that every one of the small projects Harvard does gets translated to at least one seminar in the department, we are not sure that the perceived impact is enough to sustain the support on the part of our managers and our financial agencies that will enable us to go on with this kind of program. We are doing something good for academia which does not generate internal support in the Department.

HOROWITZ: Could you expand on the operational framework within which the Office of External Research gathers and disseminates information?

ULIASSI: I am a research administrator and handle approximately one-third of our program: western Europe, educational and cultural affairs, and then whatever projects we handle in research methods or policy processes. That is, things to do with the internal workings of State Department studies having to do with the internal workings of State Department studies having to do with recent developments in the methodology of the social sciences as it might apply within the government. This falls wit-in the area of my responsibility. We have a variety of program areas. These three happen to be my three main areas.

I also now handle the project I mentioned earlier, or set of projects, on international independence. I do not do research; I am a paper pusher, and a research administrator. So far as our office is concerned, we are called the Office of External Research. External research in the State Department has been traditionally defined as any research that is not done by regular government employees. I do not know whether you are familiar with other government agencies in foreign affairs, and the way in which they handle research.

Basically, the agencies in Washington, such as the CIA, the Defense Department, and the USIA, had to some extent, internal research staffs of greater or smaller size. They have over the years developed different traditions of support for either internal research or external research. Some agencies, for a variety of reasons, tended to develop strong internal research staffs, numerically strong at least, and at times qualitatively strong. Other agencies have tended to emphasize funded or commissioned research. DOD is a prime example of an agency which has been a major sponsor of commissioned research in the foreign affairs field. After World War II, when the Intelligence and Research Bureau in its various incarnations, was established as a separate components within the State Department, it made an early decision to concentrate on internal research. For many years it had a large internal research bureau. In the last ten or fifteen years this has declined. For somewhat related reasons, the Bureau also concluded it would not sponsor commissioned research. It would concentrate on research done internally rather than funded exernally.

Now this has changed. There have been changes in the character of the Internal Research Bureau. For the first time, the State Department has become a significant sponsor of so-called commissioned research. We have a budget that waivers about a million dollars, perhaps a bit more when we include funds occasionally transferred to us from other agencies. Our offices include the Office of External Research, which handles commissioned work and does such things as coordinating (allegedly coordinating) other agencies. But our program presumably serves the whole department, not only our Bureau. We basically have done that in two ways, since 1971. For a long time, we had an elaborate cluster of 13 committees, each of them chaired by someone in our office. I chaired about six of them that covered 13 different substantive areas. Five of them were the traditional geographic areas: Europe, Africa, and so on. The others were functional areas.

For each of these areas we had representatives at a high level in the State Department. In the West European Committee, which I happened to chair, we had a representative who was a special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for European affairs. Then we had a member of the Policy Planning staff who worked on Europe; sometimes there were two members. Usually the office director for Western Europe formed a small committee to get together once or twice a year and pull together all suggestions for research we might want to commission. The other 13 committees did the same thing. These ideas came from their bureaus. That is, the policy planning people would come up with a half-dozen ideas, the European Bureau people with their ideas, etc.

The Committee would meet and end up with a list of 30 or 40 research suggestions for each of these 13 areas. It was a fantastically complicated job. We ended up with about 200 suggestions for research. Often, a lot of arguing would take place, reducing the suggestions to about a half-dozen, and they would be listed in order of priorities. Then each of the 13 groups would meet in a sort of plenary session, or so-called research council, which again represented a whole department. Out of the mass of suggestions we would try to select, as a result of the priority listing of each of the 13 groups, those projects that would be considered for funding on a priority basis.

The result of that would usually be an annual program consisting of 15 so-called major projects in which we would be willing to spend $15,00 to $50,000 and perhaps a backup listing of 20 or 25 so-called minor projects, brain-picking projects basically. We would have a topic we thought we could cover adequately by simply finding someone who was willing to do a paper for $3,000. So we would have that kind of backup listing. During our annual meeting, and at other times during the year, we would get suggestions from all over the building for seminars and conferences. These are organized on an ad hoc basis throughout the year. The upshot of this was on an annual basis, perhaps a dozen big projects a year (big by our standards; not big by Pentagon standards) 20 small projects, in which someone does a more or less serious paper forus, and 40 or 50 conferences. That constitutes the program of the External Research for the State Department.

HOROWITZ: Why do certain policies seem to have no fit whatsoever with the politics they address, even if one accepts as valid the articulated values of those policies? At some level of your typology, somebody or some group of people, is totally incapable of grasping what is going on simply because they do not have the kind of ideological expansiveness that will permit them to grasp it. This mind-set is defined by tradition which, in turn, is circumscribed by the organization they serve. Therefore, they cannot figure out what is going on. As a result, someone is hired to tell the State Department what is going on. In order to tell State Department personnel so that they can understand the information, they have to describe things in a way that distorts the essence of what is going on. Eventually, the distortion, not the facts shape policy that is carried out.

ULIASSI: I have problems with the concept of distortion because it seems to me there is hardly any phenomenon one can observe that is not legitimately subject to a variety of interpretations. I am, therefore, not about to say that any interpretation of the world out there is not legitimate. There is an infinite variety of interpretations that are legitimate on the basis of reason and evidence, and commonly accepted canons of evidence. So it is difficult, except in gross instances where there seems to be almost complete detachment between the world that is perceived and the world that seems to be out there. By and large, the kind of errors that you suggest are not really errors. They are different interpretations. Quite often they are legitimate. I can think of instances right now.

If I were an academic I would be more open about this. But I can think of instances of key decision makers who, in my view, have some funny notions about certain developments in Western Europe. But I cannot say that their interpretations of developments in that area are fundamentally wrong. They are different from mine, and different from a number of other people in the building who presumably are expert in these matters. But in some areas I would say, yes, they are wrong. But in many other areas their's is simply another way of looking at the world, and may be justified.

Quite often, it is difficult to see this relationship between research and policy precisely for this reason. Take an area that I know well: the Italian-Communist movement. Everyone is agreed that the Communists won the election last June by an unexpected margin. To try to analyze why they won those elections, immediately gets you into controversy, not only among people in our building or other agencies in town, but controversy among so-called academic experts who have studied Italian political behavior closely in recent years. Take that one step further, and policy analysts want to take it one step beyond that. You ask about the past only because you want to anticipate what might happen. You try to make a prediction on what might happen on the Italian Left in the next elections. You get further controversy. You can get a consensus on why the communists did well in the last election. But you get less consensus when you try to anticipate what they are likely to do in the next election.

As you begin to move away from the crude empirical fact, to some kind of analysis and interpretation of this fact and projection into the future, the range of controversy becomes wider. A lack of consensus among social science panelists gives the policy maker the option of choosing whatever interpretation is most convenient. You can present policy makers with a variety of interpretations, each of which can be sustained by a good deal of evidence and logic. The one he is going to take is the one that causes the least amount of organizational change in his cognitive system (to go back to social psychology); the one that makes him most comfortable, the one that is most easy for him to live with politically, or what have you. But given the ambiguity of the social world, the policy maker has a wide range of choices in the interpretation that becomes the basis for his actions.

HOROWITZ: Could you give us more background on the effects of fiscal cutbacks in the capacity of the State Department to carry out its research mission? And have such cutbacks, rather than considerations of ideology, changed the activities of the Bureau of External Research?

ULIASSI: The State Department started out with a large Internal Research Bureau after World War I. Until the late fifties, there were about 300 professionals in the research bureau. Most of these people were not regular foreign service officers. This was almost a revolution in the foreign service: the idea that within the State Department there was a large bureau consisting of non-foreign service officers. This was a major change in the organization of the State Department. Not all of these people were expert social scientists, but many of them were. They were civilians who were committed to some kind of research, committed to a different career in a different bureaucratic organization. They were civil servants. They were not subject to foreign service screening. So what you had then was a separate bureau which carried on research, much of it long range.

The National Intelligence Studies, for example, were surveys that were done on almost every country after the war. They were done largely in State, although it is no secret that the funds the State Department was using were transferred from the agency: that the agency was paying for the personnel who were hired by State to carry out a national intelligence survey. These were encyclopaedic surveys of all major constitutional systems, social systems, political parties, and so on. So State did have, for a period after the war, a large, relatively expert body of researchers dealing with longer term research problems, and bureaucratically independent of the foreign service.

This resulted in intellectual work which was greater in volume than the work the State Department produces now. It tended to be more long range and basic research than the work it does now. In terms of intellectual independence, the Department had a good deal more than is now normally the case because many people working in the bureau did not perceive of themselves as foreign service officers. They were researchers. They had their own reference groups. They often could afford to take a stand contrary to the stand of an Embassy or a Bureau. Indeed, it became a matter of pride to do so because your own self identity depended on being able to demonstrate that you did view your role differently from that of the Embass- or the Bureau. So the whole system, both in terms of expertise and organizational patterns, and again, the very psychology of the system, meant that there was a kind of adversary relationship built into the research bureau.

When Roger Hilsman became the Director of INR in the Kennedy administration, he made a decision to eliminate what used to be called the National Intelligence Survey function, and return it to the CIA. This is in the public realm; I am not revealing great secrets to anyone here. In many respects, his was a legitimate decision. The argument was that this was basic intelligence gathering, analytic work that might best be placed back in the CIA. He wanted to develop in INR the remnants of his bureau, now much smaller numerically. He wanted to develop a more specialized policy analysis staff: a group of researchers who were less engaged in more descriptive, longer-range research, or in research that was focused on policy problems. He did not conceive of this being simply a simplified version of The New York Times. He thought of this as a serious intellectual function of policy analysis.

For a few years, it seemed to work. A small number of people in INR were expert in their particular area and did have a manddate to produce serious longer term work. They also had the independence because they were largely outside of the foreign service system, and they had the incentive to do so. A number of events have happened, especially in the last 10 to 15 years. Because of personal policies within the State Department, there has been a tendency to discourage the maintenance of an independent research staff. The notion has been that anyone in the State Department ought to belong in essentially the same personnel system. As a result, there was, for a long time, virtually no hiring of anyone from the outside. Over the years, from about 1964-65 to a year or two ago, INR must have hired practically no academics. It was not only a matter of state policy. This was the period of the Vietnam War and it was also difficult to get good academics to work for the government. This means that even the good people who were not foreign service officers who remained, became somewhat jaded. Certainly they became older; and most of them moved up to administrative positions. I probably am an example of a person who moved from an analytic job to an administrative post. So what you have now is the body of experts that existed in the past gradually declining in number: perhaps in intellectual vitality, and declining in terms of their formal functions in the system. They have now become administrators.

At the same time, there is a rule within the government that bad research (Grehem's Law) drives out good research. That is, intelligence tends to drive out research. Just as policy planning is difficult to establish in the bureaucracy, so research is difficult to establish. There seems to be something inherent in the system that makes people want quick reports of what happened yesterday, or what is likely to happen tomorrow morning: something that does not allow people the time or encouragement to work on longer term projects. It just is not the internal market for longer term problems. As a result, what you had was a decline in numbers, a decline in quality, and an incline in the demand for research. The final result is that INR, which once was a stellar organization, has become no more than a second-rate, journalistic operation. This is a distressing development. Some people within the bureau are conscious of this, and there are efforts being made now to hire people from outside the government where possible. Fortunately for us, the academic market is such that we can more easily find people who are willing to come in than we could in the past. There is even talk of allowing the bureau to engage in longer term research.

There are two minimal conditions for research within the government: that you have people who are professionally qualified to do it; and, with some exceptions, foreign service officers are not. They are capable of doing it. Indeed, some of them are highly trained. They are simply not interested, and they do not maintain their contact with academic life. Unless there is a separation of function so that a unit which is engaged in short-term intelligence work is organizationally different from a unit that is engaged in longer term research, then the short-term demands are going to drive out the longer term work.

There is a great deal of controversy over this, but in my opinion, to get really independent research in the bureaucracy you need a separate personnel system. With all the merits that the foreign service officers may have, when it comes to research, you are likely to have -reater independence from people who have a separate career system from the foreign service. One could go back for historical evidence and find again and again that people who are not part of the foreign service, and who are researchers, are more willing to fight good fights than people who were part of the foreign service system. They work in a different kind of social system, with different kinds of rewards and punishments. Sometimes they are rewarded for dissent. Often, a foreign service officer is not rewarded for dissent.

HOROWITZ: How has the "spiritual" climate at the Department of State changed from the McCarthy period to the present Kissinger era?

ULIASSI: The conventional wisdom is that the McCarthy period had a traumatic affect on the foreign service. I am willing to believe that it did. It certainly affected the China section. Whether the McCarthy experience can still be used to explain the frequent caution and conservatism, not political conservatism, and not even intellectual conservatism, but bureaucratic conservatism, is debatable. I am not sure that period can still be used to explain what goes on in the Department now, or that State Department officers, or foreign service officers, are more cautious or more conservative than any other bureaucrat. In many respects they are not. They are more lively, vigorous, and certainly more intelligent than other bureaucrats. But their performance does not always reveal this.

HOROWITZ: Sometimes commissioned research is referred to as the politics of bulk. What is the perception of the effect of commissioned research by policy makers, those who supposedly use data? Do people on bureaucratic levels consider whether commissions are initiated as crowd pleasing, legitimation devices, or do bureaucrats see commissions as a possible mechanism to effect some kind of incremental change?

ULIASSI: The most recent research commissioned in the foreign affairs field is the Murphy Commission. I do not know what anyone thinis of the effects of the Murphy Commission's report, or how representative it may be of other commissioned work and functions in the foreign affairs world. Certainly, in terms of its short-run effects, I see no evidence that the Murphy Commission has had the least effect within the State Department. Indeed, it is hard to find anyone in the State Department who has even read the studies done by the Commission. I organized a series of seminars to bring in people who had done some reports for the Murphy Commission as a device to publicize within the building some of the background work that had been done. Because of its composition, and the quality of its report, I am not sure that the Murphy Commission itself is likely to have that much effect on either Congress or the wider public. I am curious to see what the impact of the Murphy Commission Report may be on the organization of foreign policy makers here in Washington. I see it as an exercise in futility. It will provide excellent material for academic study of the foreign machinery process. Beyond that, I am not sure what its effect is likely to be either directly, within the bureaucracy, or in the United Nations, Congress, or the public at large.

HOROWITZ: Could you give us a description of exactly how the State Department Bureau of External Research functioned in a specific instance, in Angola? Most of your research is in response to particular problems that arise. Would it be possible to capsulize what role external research played in dealing with world events in the past year?

ULIASSI: So far as external research is concerned, virtually none, with the exception of whatever influence on the thinking of people in the government might have been exercised by teh few people we had in as consultants who happened to be specialists on Portuguese Africa. We had a series of conferences and seminars on Portuguese Africa and Portugal itself in the last couple of years. To the extent that there are American experts on Angola, there were a few, mostly transplanted Brazilian specialists, as it turned out, with a language background. To some extent we tried to tap whatever expert knowledge existed in the American academic community. We asked questions such as: What forces were at work there? What were the major political groups? What kind of outlook did they have? What kind of support were they likely to have from the country? But we did no formal research on Angola.

We do have people in the African Bureau itself, and in INR, who are very knowledgable about Africa: perhaps not in a profound social science sense, but knowledgable in the sense in which a good, smart journalist is knowledgable. They have followed events there for a long time; they have a commonsense grasp of what goes on. They had a levelheaded and accurate sense of developments in Angola. Whatever our virtues or vices may have been with regard to Angola, they cannot be foisted upon those who presume to be experts on African affairs. Information about the key acts and the likely developments were fairly accurate in the State Department and in other agencies. Policy is another matter. But the policy itself really transcended any analysis of the local situation. Our policy toward Angola had nothing to do with research being done on the situation in Angola itself.

HOROWITZ: When the research generated requires moving far beyond the organizational capacities of the Department or Bureau, what are the repercussions of doing that? Beyond that, is there research the State Department would like to get into but cannot, because of organizational constraints?

ULIASSI: That is the kind of question that is prototypical. If we do this, what is likely to happen? That is the kind of thing that INR people deal with all the time, more and more explicitly as time goes on. There used to be a kind of self-denial clause in INR mandates. Never ask what the implications of American actions are. Analyze the world out there without taking into account what we are likely to do. It is an artificial thing; and expedients were developed over the years to get around that, such as hypothetical questions such as: What might be the consequences of doing this?

There are people all over the government doing scenarios, not only in INR but in Policy Planning in the State Department, the Defense Department, the ISA especially, and the CIA. For all my personal feeling about the inevitable limits of intellectual discourse, and certainly dissent on certain elements within the system, I cannot overemphasize the diversity of analyses and opinions that are expressed. It is astounding; it is equally astounding to see how little effect they often have on policy.

HOROWITZ: Assuming some familiarity with the uses of policy research in the USSR, are you concerned about contrasting notions of research within a policy context? How would you characterize policy formation in the Soviet Union and in the United States? What differences do you see in the process? How narrow are they? How constricting? And what are the respective advantages to a social science and/or a Marxian manner of conducting research for policy ends?

ULIASSI: People have tried to apply the bureaucratic politics model to Soviet decision making in foreign affairs. I assume that there is greater latitude at various levels. For example, until recently, the Foreign Policy Section in the United States Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences did not have much influence on the Soviet foreign office. There is increasing evidence that Soviet policy makers are turning to their own academics, to their own research specialists in various institututes. This was not true in the past. I would deduce that there has been a perceptible change in the Soviet Union toward an increasing tendency on the part of political leaders to draw in specialists in policy deliberations. The model that the Soviets drive toward will not be that different from our model. Both sides may be more likely to rely on journalists to get analyses of the situation than to listen seriously to specific policy recommendations by scholarly types.

HOROWITZ: To what extent does the problem of secrecy and privileged information interfere with, rather than support, your intelligence gathering functions? Beyond that, do the fiscal limits of the State Department research sections place them at the mercy of mission-oriented agencies like the CIA, which have clear tasks that have little to do with authentic research?

ULIASSI: On the question of secrecy, there may be things going on that I do not know about, but there seems to be a fundamental change in the government-academic relationship that has taken place in the last ten or more years. Camelot, in some ways was a watershed. It certainly has a symbolic function. Camelot, and other things, brought about a fundamental change in the government-academic social science research relationships.

There is far less government funding of foreign affairs research now than there was ten years ago. In 1966 or 1967 there must have been perhaps $45 or $50 million a year invested in various executive agencies supporting research on foreign affairs, broadly defined. Not all of this was research funded for so called operating agencies. Some of it came from the NSF, but better than one-third came from the Pentagon, and a certain amount from CIA. So the relationship between outsiders and insiders changed, in part, because of the quantitative nature of the financial support. Today, only about $25 million a year is invested in foreign affairs research. That does not even account for inflationary changes. It would be more accurate to say that compared with ten years ago, we have roughly one-third of the financial support for foreign affairs research than we had in the past.

Another basic change has been that a higher proportion of the research comes from domestic agencies and foundations, as I mentioned in the piece I did in The Use And Abuse Of Social Science. A lot of the research at once came predominantly from the so-called ooerating agencies, and has now shifted over to NSF, HEW and the Humanities Endowment. This is a significant shift. Years ago, much foreign affairs research depended for its financial support on the Pentagon in the amount of $14-$15 millions dollars a year out of the $5 million or so, down to three or four million dollars a year. So academic work is not funded as heavily relatively and absolutely as in the past by the operating agencies of the government, whether it is CIA, DOD, or even the State.

Much of the secret work which was funded with universities, in which both the nature of the projects themselves and the identity of the relationship was secret, does not hold anymore. If it does, it is a violation of the spirit of the public statements that have been made from the Johnson administration on. There should be no secret relationships between any operating agency of the government and any academic institutions. Furthermore, the State Department has never engaged in a classified project with any university. It is against our principles; and we have stated explicitly that we will not do it. We will, however, infrequently do classified work with academics on an individual basis. I cannot speak for other agencies, but to me the tendency has been for funding agencies not to do classified work even on an individual contract basis with academics. Government-supported research has tended to shift away from academic support on the part of the operating agencies to non-academic institutions. This is a whole area we have only slightly touched on here.

This may have important consequences, favorable and unfavorable. Among the favorable consequences are that non-academic research institutions are more likely to develop policy research rather than policy-oriented research. On the other hand, you are likely to find more professionally marginal people in non-academic institutions, and they are more willing to listen to the tune being played by potential clients. This may be a gross libel of a great number of people and organizations, but as a statistical generalization, I am willing to stand by it.

HOROWITZ: In making a distinction between research drawing upon individual academics and utilizing private research organization, can you tell us the advantages of the former for your own operational framework?

ULIASSI: It can be a distinction made in our operation only in the sense that we make a contract either with the institution, and go through the contract office ofsay, Harvard, or the University of Chicago, Yale, or Princeton, or we do it with an individual scholar who happens to be located in that institution and is moonlighting. For us, there are advantages and disadvantages. We generally do not have classified work even with independent academics. As a matter of fact, I am not aware of any instances where we have made an exception to that. But we certainly have no classified work with an institution. The major advantage of doing research with the individual academic is quite often we can get it a lot cheaper.

The cost of social science is horrendous. When you pay 65 percent to 70 percent overhead to buy one professional man year at a major institution, that costs now somewhere between $60,000 and $90,000. We do not have that kind of money. We often can do the same thing by eliminating overhead and finding someone who happens to be on sabbatical who will work for $15,000 for a year. The disadvantage, and it is a serious one, is that we find it difficult at times to get performance from an individual academic within a reasonable amount of time. Apparently, the institution itself exercises a kind of discipline, and they are more likely to turn the screws to get reports in a reasonable time, whereas individual academics sometimes go on and on, and we may not get a report for two years after the contract.

An important observation to be made is the implication of the shift of policy research from an academic setting to a non-academic setting. This is an important development, and one that ought to be dealt with at some point in discussions such as this one. We find ourselves commissioning much of our so-called practical work with private agencies. We have had mixed results; much of it has been unhappy. You are much less likely to get independent work from non-academic centers than you are from work commissioned through academic centers.

HOROWITZ: A university is a strange and ubiquitous place. It puts enormous constraints on entrepreneurial behavior, as well as academic performance or mission-oriented work. With a private agency you have a guaranteed product. But the product you receive is often overly accommodative. Many of the reports that I have seen from such private agencies, Lincoln, Abt, Rand, etc., tend to have a thin patina of scholarship based on relatively highly efficient information retrieval systems rather than the kind of creative output that people like yourself are anxious to receive. In part, the answer to this dilemma lies in the further creation of mediating journals. Greater support should go into independent kinds of scholarly activity. This will involve a sense of balance on both sides: the State Department will have to interpret its research mission more broadly, while the scholars and agencies of social science will have to distinguish between accepting support funds and rejecting inherited ideological bastions. The chores are many, the workers are few. However, with people like Pio Uliassi, the goal can at least be clearly perceived, if not immediately achieved.

FROM GOVERNMENT POLICYMAKER TO COLLEGE PROFESSOR

An Interview with Ritchie Lowry
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FROM CAMELOT POLICYMAKER TO COLLEGE PROFESSOR - Ritchie Lowry

HOROWITZ: My purpose is to find out if it makes a difference to have been trained in social science, and if so, what that difference has meant in terms of input into the policy system. There are many ramifications and aspects to this issue, and only some of them are subject to interview techniques of analysis.

Professor Lowry is a person who himself has wide practical experience in government work. He was involved with the Special Operations Research Office of the United States Army (SORO), which was itself directly connected with the Camelot Project as parent organization. We had our first contact in that context when I studied the project and its supervisors and ramifications. We have remained professional colleagues and personal acquaintances since that time, some twelve years ago. It is interesting and important to get an idea of an insider perspective that has had a great consewuence and bearing on the subject of how social scientists perform in national policy contexts.

Let me begin with the central question: does it matter that one is trained in social science in terms of the job performance within the bureaucracy? If it does matter, in what sense; and if it does not, why not?

LOWRY: Perhaps I should state a preface before giving an answer. My policy experience has been essentially in the area of national security (with the exception of some work I have been doing in the last year or so). You may find scientists who have had experience in Health, Education, and Welfare, the National Institute of Mental Health, or other nonmilitary-related contexts who have had different kinds of conceptual and structural constraints placed upon them. The national security context does contain some special problems, for example, the concern for formal secrecy. This statement is a kind of caveat. What I am saying does not apply to everything or everyone in policymaking, but some of it may apply.

It does make a difference if you are a social scientist, but it does not make the kind of difference that you think it is going to make when you arrive in the government. I went to Washington to work because I thought I could take social science knowledge about warfare and the changing role of the military in contemporary society, and perhaps do something constructive with the military, perhaps make a special kind of contribution by seeking new, less bellicose roles and forms of involvement. I got there and found that I could do nothing at all about problems like militarism, war-making, and aggressive foreign policy. Therefore, my sociological training was not relevant in this context. What I did daily was to perform what you have described as mandarin or janitorial service. Most of the time, we at SORO worked on descriptive reports; the military did not really want substantive or critical analytic work. However, being a sociologist did eventually make a political difference.

What I discovered was that you could begin to analyze the contents, uses, purposes, and consequences of the kind of report work we were doing. I began to see things that I might not have othereise observed. For example, I began to see the consequences of the bureaucratization and routinizstion of scientific advisory work. I found that being a sociologist was helpful in daily interaction on the job. Sociological knowledge could help in discovering ways to effectively work the system. However, this kind of skill takes a long time to acquire. You have to become attuned to special personalities, roles, statuses, and aspects of the system you have contact with. I had to quit after two and one half years because I would otherwise have developed chronic ulcers or some other nervious disability. It was just about at quitting time that I began to see possible ways for working the system to some kind of advantage.

For example, you can deliberately use a particular methodology, not for substantive reasons, but rather because you know that it will lead to the kind of political or policy outcome you desire. The military could be partially influenced to consider different options if certain concepts or perspectives were utilized (or avoided) in one's work, in preference to others. I have had a recent experience which dramatizes this. A few weeks ago I received a call from the director of a project to study secrecy in Washington bureaucracies. This man was conducting the research for the Commission on Federal Paperwork. When he said, "I want you to write a paper on federal paperwork," I thought he was putting me on. I spent about three weeks sending many drafts of papers to Washington - not because I do not know the various theories of bureaucracy and secrecy in organizational contexts, but because I could not get a clear sense of what this man wanted in terms of eventual policy uses.

He rejected one draft which dealt with the dysfunctional aspects of organizstional secrecy for the performance of daily work. Finally, he indicated that he had a political problem and a special need. The problem was that he did not want "national security kinds of terminology° (secrecy, covert actions, surveillance, and so on) to be used. His basic interest was the nonmilitary agencies of government, and they would feel threatened and insulted if compared to the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition, he wanted a paper which could be given to a congressman as a basis for legislation dealing with the problems of secrecy and privacy in government contexts.

It took me many drafts of possible studies to decide that the paper should focus upon problems of information flow and avoid the analysis of covert behavior per se. In short, I had to match my theoretical orientation and methodology to his goals and desires, and it took me a long time to see what he wanted, and why he wanted it. Once I discovered this, I could at least manipulate the kinds of things I discussed in order to influence him, and in order for him to influence his eventual policy targets. Therefore, being a sociologist matters, but this is not the kind of sociologist we tend to be trained to become in graduate work, or that we tend to be in the ivory-towered academy context.

HOROWITZ: Project Camelot was a social science project. Despite all the people I have recently interviewed about social science and national policy, you really are the only one who was intimately involved in a project which was in fact run by social scientists, and not merely a social scientist plugged into the general system of decision making. What did that mean operationally? What kind of social science did you do in relation to military requisites? What flowed in or, better, what was filtered out? What was the residual that remained from all that training background and social science input that you had at the university level? In other words, your particular mandate was as a special science input. What went on, from your memory and perspective, that represented a special way of viewing social science projects, and who was involved in doing what kinds of research?

LOWRY: Camelot was a project run by social scientists. In fact, Ted Vallance, who was the director of the task force, was a psychologist in the Washington bureaucracy. In addition, we had an economist, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists in the organization. But there was an exceptional aspect to our work. We were hierarchically located in an organization that was a part of the military structure of DOD. This meant that we were subject to military influence and control. They controlled the purse strings for SORO, and this constituted considerable latent power.

Furthermore, we might draft some type of sophisticated analysis of the nature of revolutionary processes and how military units might be better off not responding directly to revolutionary terror from outside or directly, only to have these returned to us. The military leadership said that this sort of thing did not make any sense. It became evident that the only things that made sense to military personnel were products like area handbooks. Not that we were prevented from doing good, fundamental research, as long as we did this more or less on our own and incidental to the formally approved projects. But this latter type of research could never lead to a usable product. Usable products were considered to be nuts-and-bolts, policy-neutral, particularistic studies: handbooks describing the culture and social organization of foreign areas; ways of implementing some kind of approved recruitment policy; reviews of the literature on war and the military; and so on.

HOROWITZ: I really am trying to find out if Project Camelot was an open-ended grant, or whether it was funded on a sole-source basis with the presumption that whatever you came up with would be worthwhile on its merits. There is a question that further plagues me a great deal. In a social science project like Camelot, where the relationship between the people of different disciplinary backgrounds was manifest, did it matter that Hopper was from sociology, or Vallance from psychology, or Nuttini from anthropology? Was that merely a kind of patina or gloss, or did it yield a kind of confusion as to what the emphases were or what the stykes of work were? How did you and your colleagues adjudicate the fact that all of you came from different social science training or perspectives? What intellectual adjustments were necessary?

LOWRY: The interdisciplinary character of SORO and Camelot created a variety of different political, methodological, and substantive problems. A couple of examples: The anthropologists would typically want to do field research. Specifically, they wanted to do field research in developing Third World nations. However, militarily, in terms of the political concerns of our sponsor, what areas were the most sensitive? Obviously, Third World, potentially revolutionary contexts. In addition, the anthropologists usually wanted to conduct in-depth interviews or observation in order to investigate, for example, the impact of military involvement in local life. If you are going to do a serious anthropological study of a developing and changing Third World area, the researcher must ask questions about (or observe) sensitive issues such as family life, sex relationships and roles, and religious values.

These kinds of questions drove the military out of its mind. It did not see any necessity to ask them, and it was frightened by the possible uproar if DOD-sponsored social scientists were discovered wandering around Africa or Latin America looking into sexual behavior or religious practices. It also led other social scientists with different training and perspectives (for example, psychologists) to question why these sorts of issues should be of interest in the first place. They would often simply assume that the anthropological research was either shoddy or poorly constructed.

Another kind of conflict developed which was related to the particular branch or field of anthropology, psychology, or sociology that a scientist came from. When I got to Washington I became aware that the research bureaucrats in the top positions of influence and power in DOD (for example, the elite at SORO) were usually psychologists. However, they were psychologists with a special background and training. Their perspectives often conflicted with those of other social scientists working for them in organizations like SORO. Because the psychologists were in positions of leadership they could red-pencil, disapprove proposals, drafts of studies, or final products. To understand how this came about, one must look at a history of social mobility in the military policymaking community of Washington.

Some of the first social scientists to work for the government were psychologists during World War II. Specifically, at that time the army needed experts to design IQ tests and other devices for measuring skills and abilities. The first need was to get qualified people into military service and to weed out severely disadvantaged people from the draft pool. The second need was to assign people in the military on the basis of qualification for service in infantry units versus radar units, versus support activities, and so on. After the war many of the psychologists did not return to the academy; they remained in the DOD research bureaucracy and over time worked their way to top positions of influence.

We might call these kinds of psychologists "training-and-education" specialists. Their orientation and skills were of a particular type. They had been asked by the military to design measurement instruments, not to test or formulate hypotheses and theories. They favored statistical and quantitative techniques. As a consequence, when different kinds of social scientists started arriving in Washington in later years, at the time organizations like SORO were formed, conflicts were inevitable. Functionalists and abstract theorists were an anathema to the psychologists; they could not perceive of what one would do with general theories of revolutionary processes, or analyses of changing military roles. One day an assistant director of SORO, a psychologist, red-penciled a proposal from another social scientist with the comment, "This study is of no use; it merely formulates hypotheses and then proposes to test them. This isn't research which can be of any use to the military."

HOROWITZ: When you were engaged in government work did you have any self-image of partially, at least, slowing down a war machine or negating the machine? Did you ever develop a program of civic action that would lessen the need for colonial behavior on the part of the military? What were the self-images that you and your colleagues at Camelot had over and against the kind of criticisms that were later to be leveled by people like Johann Galtung on the Left and Robert Nisbet on the Right? For that matter, do you recollect what the self-images of government social scientists were?

LOWRY: That is difficult to answer honestly, and the reason is obvious. I do not know how much I am now rationalizing after the fact. What prompted me to enter government work was a belief in the need to become relevant. The Kennedy administration seemed to offer such an opportunity for social scientists in Washington. I also went into the government for personal, somewhat selfish reasons. After doing graduate work for many years and then teaching at a small California state college, I felt buried alive professionally. Going to Washington was a big leap forward in social mobility for me.

In addition, what was attractive about SORO was the problem of war and the military. In contrast, for example, at the same time I was interviewed for a research job at the National Institute of Health they were doing social science studies for dentists. You may recall that all kinds of professionals had suddenly discovered social science, and the dentists had gone mad with anticipation. They had significant funding available for doing studies of issues like fluoridation, how programs could be established in communities where conservative groups opposed these programs through effective organization. Frankly, I felt that the social problems of dentistry were less interesting and fulfilling than the problems of war and the military.

Also, there was the attractiveness of what you have said about power. Even if you are not in the Pentagon end of things, even if you are just in the routine research end of it, government work is exciting. There is always the chance that you might influence policy. On a manifest level, I guess most of us in Camelot and at SORO rationalized. We thought we could humanize the military. I doubt that we thought we could end the war. Many of us were sharp critics of our involvement, even in the early days of the Vietnam War. This was not a popular position in Washington during the mid-1960s. Actually, we were some of the first in-house critics of the way, long before anyone else. We would spend hours arguing with people from the Pentagon, at work and at cocktail parties. We felt that perhaps our mere presence might result in some humanistic impact.

Some of us did think we could humanize civic action. We felt that in those Third World nations where our military forces were involved in training for civic action purposes, we might be able to harness this capability to bring about needed social and economic changes. As a matter of fact, an economist and I spent many months designing a study of civic action on Taiwan with the hope of identifying the desirable and undesirable aspects of such a program. Unfortunately, the proposal vanished into the DOD bureaucracy and never returned to us. We learned later through informal sources that the project had been taken away from us and given to someone higher up in the bureaucracy (a psychologist) because the study looked too important, sensitive, and I suspect potentially rewarding. In short, we felt we could teach DOD to bring about changes in a humane, more democratic, and less authoritarian fashion. In retrospect, this was certainly a well-intentioned but probably terribly naive position.

HOROWITZ: Looking at your participation in the national policy arena, wou'd you do it again? Would you do it differently? Would you take a position of non-participation? How, in retrospect, with the wisdom of hindsight that we all have, would you evaluate your participation more than a decade later?

LOWRY: I would do it again, but I would not do it in the same context. I would not go to work for an SORO-type of organization. I would not go to work for a research component so manifestly committed to and influenced by the military. I might go to work for RAND. I would want more guaranteed independence. I would also want a portion of the work (like RAND does) to be "frivolous" or purely experimental and tentative.

There is a reason for this which transcends personal preference. The more I investigate the connection between social science research and public policy the more I am convinced that we do have an impact, but that that impact is not what we usually want or assume. To borrow a military concept, the distinction might be made between tactical impact and strategic impact. Sponsors (like DOD), decision makers, and the public want tactically significant knowledge, the generation of research results which can be applied to immediate, specific, and practical problems. However, I do not think that social science is good at this sort of thing, and the more we try the more problems and frustrations we encounter. I do think that social science research often has an important strategic impact, long-range, universalistic, and general.

One of my favorite examples is Emile Durkheim's concept of anomic suicide. I have a friend who established a suicide prevention center in San Francisco several years ago. He utilized Durkheim's notion (though not necessarily consciously) as a basis for organizing the work of the center. Telephone emergency hot lines, counseling, and training as well as education programs are used to combat urban anomie which might result in suicidal behavior. Therefore, Durkheim had an impact on a community policy program, but it happened a century later in a general and hard-to-specifically-trace way. Another example: all the social science research in the world is probably not going to prevent a Bay of Pigs operation if it has been decided upon at the level of policymaking for certain personal and political reasons. However, after a Bay of Pigs takes place, sharp social scientific analysis of its causes and consequences (for example, Irving Janis's book: Victims of Groupthink) may help prevent similar events in the distant future. For example, Janis shows how when social scientists are present in the tactical context, they do not act as social scientists but rather as policymakers like everyone else. When considering the Bay of Pigs operation planned by the CIA, Arthur Schlesinger, as a member of the Oval Office decision makers, had some reservations. These, however, were easily handled by Robert Kennedy, who threw his arm around Schlesinger's shoulders and asked him to join the team and support the president in a difficult decision.

Janis's analysis does indicate the pitfalls of the need for team consensus during bureaucratic decision making concerning major crises. This knowledge can be used to alert leaders in future situations to such dangers. As a matter of fact, studies have suggested that during the Cuban missile crisis the Kennedy administration used decision-making processes which differed from the Bay of Pits situation, with the result that alternative, less militaristic views were given a fairer consideration. Therefore, we can have a strategic impact, but sometimes we never see the result becsuse it takes place far in the future or in some unobservable context. In addition, even having a strategic impact is not without some pitfalls because the real world of government policymaking is a complicated place. At SORO and elsewhere I do not think that we social scientists had no impact on counterinsurgency programs; we were able to show the futility and dangers of such efforts. We turned the armed forces away from the notion of designing formal ways of preventing or impeding natural revolutionary processes. But we may have paid an unanticipated price for this impact. There is some evidence that political leaders were willing to let the armed forces eschew counterinsurgency work because they could always rely upon the CIA to perform the same function in a clandestine way.

HOROWITZ: When Camelot came to an abrupt end, that did not necessarily mean that your own services came to an end. What kind of research work was done after the Camelot Project was terminated by SORO? Was there a period of subterranean activities that still involved social scientists in covert affairs? What happens to a bureaucracy when a calamity occurs and a specific research project is called off, or when funds are transferred out of an agency and into another? What happens to the kinds of people involved? Were there any sociological lessons that were derived from the failure of a project? What happens to social scientists operating within a lame duck context? And what are the overall behavioral lessons that you would draw in retrospect from the fall of Project Camelot?

LOWRY: I would be inclined to say that, all things being equal, all social scientists in Washington are lame ducks. Everybody is a lame duck. You can never be sure when a project or organization will be canceled for political or economic reasons. When this occurs, however, organizations merely change names, or they may evaporate into a number of smaller private organizations. In Washington there is constant job insecurity in the sense that you never know when your work will be considered dangerous, undesirable, or unimportant. At the same time, though, there is constant job security because rarely is anyone fired or positions terminated. My informants tell me that when SORO was abolished some of its work was reinstated under Pentagon supervision within DOD. In other words, it is still there.

Similar types of adjustments take place within organizations. When Camelot was canceled because of pressure from the State Department and Congress, existing SORO personnel were told to go to work thinking about what they might do. But specific direction was not supplied by either SORO leadership or the Pentagon. I went in to see Ted

Vallance and asked, "What do I do?" He said, "Do what you have been doing." I said, "What do you mean do what I have been doing? What I have been doing are studies of the role of the military in revolutionary processes, since these types of studies were related to Project Camelot. We do not have Camelot any more." He said, "Don't worry about it. You'll get there." A few social scientists left SORO but most merely went to work in other Washington research contexts, often with letters of recommendation from former SORO and Pentagon bosses.

HOROWITZ: What kind of social science training models should be required that would prevent the Project Camelot fiasco from happening again? Is it a matter of bargaining more appropriately with government agencies before a contract? Is it a question of working to achieve more outright grants and less contract work? Should there be special areas of research work that are funded by, but not controlled by, the hiring agency? Should there be university attachments to all these kinds of sensitive projects? Or are they, as in the case of American University during Camelot, only serving as a dummy corporation? What operational procedures would you insist upon at this point in time that may not have been available a decade earlier, given even the remote possibility that you had the same $6 million pie to carve up or eat whole?

LOWRY: I like the RAND model. One reason they have tended to succeed on the whole, where many other organizations have failed, is its autonomy at the organizational level. The original money was somewhere in the area of $10 million from the air force. At least $2 to $3 million of that was guaranteed to RAND as "frivolous" or in-house money. Right from the start the air force gave RAND $10 million and said, "Close to 25 percent of your budget is free of constraint; you can do anything you want with that amount. If you want to have think sessions in rooms where people get together and draw up ideas, do that." SORO's budget had no unencumbered money and none of that kind of activity. Frivolous kinds of money can be turned to things that concern us as social scientists and to projects that may eventually have strategic impact. This type of noncontract funding can also sponsor research activities that would question or critically evaluate the official projects of the organization.

I am not at all impressed by the university connection. In a more major league way you can see the same problems arising at an MIT as we at SORO experienced with American University. You get dummy corporations, the CIA would call them "proprietaries," you get a nice name that you can put on the letterhead. In exchange, the university drains off more than 30 percent overhead of the budgeted funds to write checks and perform other paperwork, and when a crisis arises (like the disclosure of Project Camelot in the popular press) the university claims no prior knowledge or responsibility. The totally independent research organization often has greater independence. It needs to make money to survive. This is not necessarily bad because it means that researchers have to, in a hard-headed way, figure whether a project is going to pay off in some concrete fashion and what the pitfalls might be.

A third requirement to avoid past problems is the necessity for the scientist who works for or in the government context to maintain some meaningful academic ties and allegiances. The way agencies like SORO are structured, social scientists in government rapidly become bureaucrats. Going to work in the government context makes one a mandarin and leads to a loss of scientific orientation and perspective. Furthermore, the government usually controls the use of the knowledge produced by the research activities, which makes the sharing of knowledge in the larger academic community impossible. This situation not only inhibits the sicentific process but it also asks the individual scientist to resign himself or herself to a perpetual position of academic obscurity.

HOROWITZ: There is an interesting phenomenon that has become more important in the last several years, and that is the inexorable superiority of private, corporate social science research over university-based research. RAND Corporation, Abt Associates, Lincoln Labs, and so on, seem to be getting larger shares of funding over and against the university-affiliated, or direct policy participation within the bureaucracy to do the social science. We now seem to have a much more carefully structured entrepreneurial model of social science research. The private middlemen are more efficient, more proficient, and turn out the work on time. They do not have the moral problem of social scientists who work in government, nor do they seem to have the organizational problems of social scientists working in the academy. The entrepreneurs do not seem to be disturbed or perturbed by ethical or organizational questions: they put out the work. What does this do, however, to the nature of the social science enterprise vis-a-vis the making of American public policy, both domestic and foreign? What does the rise of social science capitalism in terms of social science product, both now and in the long run, mean?

LOWRY: I agree entirely with your observations on what is happening. The problem is the conflict between two types of research-policy models. The first model is the typical academic concept of a value-free, unregulated research. The second model is an engineering one, a kind of occupational, vocational, and entrepreneurial sensibility, which is one thing we do not give to our graduate students. We do not train social scientists like engineers are trained. When one studies how to become an engineer, one studies not only how to build a bridge, but also how to go to work for a company which builds bridges. When you take a major in chemistry, you even learn in a sense how to work for Shell Oil Company.

Somehow we have to get that ingredient and component into social scientists coming out of the academy. We must make social science viable, even if it leads to an entrepreneurial social science. I may not agree with all of the RAND conclusions, but they do solid and useful work. During the Vietnam War they did some of the best critical analyses (for example, the disadvantages of massive bombing) because of, rather than in spite of, their pragmatic, entrepreneurial orientation.

HOROWITZ: Let me ask you, then, a different kind of question. Are we heading toward an era in which the social sciences and the policy apparatus will be more clearly separated than ever before, or more integrated? Or are we going to have an entirely different set of disciplines? Are we going to have universities of social science where we develop basic methodological and theoretical frameworks along classical and critical lines, having little or nothing to do with entrepreneurial payoff matrices? On the other hand, are we moving toward a world of social science research going on without much identification with universities, and hence a world of policy personnel who will not be in any way accountable to the university environment from which these social scientists may have emanated?

The growing entrepreneurialism is so pronounced that many of the people I have discussed this with have been of the unshakable belief that within the next several years it will be almost impossible for university personnel to get the kind of government agency support, the kind of funding, which they have gotten in the past. Under such circumstances what is the bifurcation that we are observing going to signify for the world of learning in which we have grown up?

LOWRY: The obvious answer to that is that it depends on what we do. If we let the current trends develop without even recognizing them, or if we take no kind of action, then that crass entrepreneurialism, the undesirable commercialization that you speak of, the separation of the academh into a small pipedream in social philosophy, and out there somebody else using knowledge for policy purposes, will all take place. That would be a disaster. But this split does not necessarily have to take place. The fact that we have meetings and seminars of this sort and are discussing the question of policy anew, is an attempt to begin to understand what we can do to bridge these growing gaps.

HOROWITZ: At both end, where there are policy centers like Berkeley and Yale, or for that matter, Eagleton at Rutgers, or Woodrow Wilson at Princeton, and the Lyndon B. Johnson Center at Texas, amongst a bevy of other places, what is emerging at those centers is indeed philosophizing about policy rather than policy guidelines as such.

What is achieved at Abt Associates is another kind of product. They offer specific research designs of the relat-onship of water supply to environmental protection, or planning agencies to EPA guidelines. I wonder if our reaction is medieval. Perhaps we are medievalists, whether our abhorrence and our sense of horror, and even our negative reaction to Camelot in part derives less from some of the structural inadequacies of the project as it did by virtue of its taint upon university affiliation. Perhaps we are really concerned with the problem of virtue, of a kind of pretensiousness about doing objective work that no longer is manifest at Abt, Lincoln, or RAND.

If that is true, then it seems that we are fighting a rearguard action against a bureaucratic concept of university life. I now take a position akin to that of J. Robert Oppenheimer: a university is a medieval luxury which wealthy bourgeois societies and wealthy socialist societies alike are able to support. Indeed, as Schumpeter noted, they must support research in the absence of any other mass vehicle of learning. What possibility exists within a system that is out of control? What possibility is there of developing counterpoint to the point of developing critical responses? Do we have to create an alternative entrepreneurial model like the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington? That is, the Richard Barnet and Marcus Raskin approach seeking to do radical scholarship with conventional modes of support? Are we transferring to the private sector an ideological struggle that formerly was at any university and in the government? What do you think is taking place at this level of research design? Finally, how do we relate to these new events that are going on in a world that we did not create, but that we nonetheless have to live with?

LOWRY: As long as the academy remains the basic training grounds for those who go into the entrepreneurial world, a meaningful link must be developed. The trouble now is that we are not doing this in social science, whereas some hard scientists, like engineers, do. I like the work that has come out of the Institute for Policy Studies, but I am bothered by its proximity to Washington. That remains a problem.

HOROWITZ: The reason I raised the British model is its relatively inexpensive aspects. It seems to me that such a model has a high payoff in terms of its potential for legislation precisely because of its frank espousal of political party platforms and partisan considerations. Of course, this also leads to the absence of any genuinely innovative theoretical framework, but it is questionable whether policymaking has ever involved fundamental theory alterations. That is a basic division between social science in the political arena and social science in an academic context. In part, the problem may be that the appeal within the United States is to orient policy toward the executive branch, and hence to assume a universalism which is more apparent than real. These appeals make a real difference. The British concept of policy is clearly political; the American concept of policy is clearly based on expertise, and the constituency model used by each does seem to make the difference.

LOWRY: The work we social scientists do in preparing studies for a Seantor or congressman who wants to make a reputation based on legislation to be drafted illustrates the problem of alternative modes of policy research. The scientist may be interested in universal goals, but the politician is interested in particularistic ends. In my own efforts at SORO all of my work went for naught, since I could not prove its relevance to producing pending legislation or immediate programs of social action.

HOROWITZ: Let me return to an earlier question. Is there any way in which being a sociologist can specifically help in dealing with these kinds of legislative and governmental considerations? Or are you simply faced with problems of managing a bureaucracy, very much like others in government service?

LOWRY: As I indicated earlier, being a sociologist does help you to work the system better. For example, in her recent book on presidential commissions, Mirra Komarovsky has a piece by Charles Westoff on his experiences on the Nixon Commission to study population problems in the United States. That commission was faced with the political problem of influencing a conservative president who would obviously oppose birth control and widespread educational efforts. It decided to use open public hearings as a research device because they were sure that most Americans, including Catholics, would testify to their desire for adequate birth control information and techniques. Indeed, this is what the commission found in its hearings. The point is that in the policy context a decision about methodology or theoretical orientation may become political rather than substantive.

HOROWITZ: I would add an observation to your point: there is a change in the substance of sociological work when it is transferred from the university to a bureaucratic context. This is particularly so with respect to the private agencies such as Abt, RAND, and others, where the bulk of the money now goes for the purposes of producing social science research.

As the budgets of these private agencies have skyrocketed, the uses of social science research have become increasingly tailored to meet the needs of the donor. Quite apart from the dangerous tendencies this implies, one wonders whether Project Camelot would have raised even a minimal outcry were its activities in the hands of a private research organization rather than a directly government-sponsored program. I am led to the conclusion that the shift over a decade has been far less ethical (namely, less an outcry over the abuses of social science) than programmatic (that is, under whose sponsorship such activities take place). One is led to inquire simply if this means that the universities will be responsible for theory construction, and the private agencies for policy manufacture, hence leading to a breakup of the social science paradigm as we now know it. Or do you envision a bitter struggle for the control of the social science product?

LOWRY: Perhaps the answer is again in terms of an engineering versus a basic model, that is, an applied versus a pure model of social research. For example, it rarely occurs to the policymaking agencies to raise the kinds of considerations you are mentioning because it never occurs to them that there are all kinds of system implications to the research they are conducting. The very nature of sponsored research limits more abstract inquiries into both the way and the purpose of the research itself.

In my own opinion, it does not really matter much whether research is sponsored from a university or a private agency. That is to say, given a particular assignmend, the end product will be roughly as good or as bad in one place as another. But I do admit to having a lurking feeling that in a university there is a much higher level of open accountability than in a private agency. With the possible exception of the RAND Corporation, private agencies do not have the kind of discourse or debate on the research that is sponsored. They simply go on unquestioningly with the policy-relevant work that they are paid to perform.

HOROWITZ: Is there a notion of social science beyond an adversarial model, or are we foreclosed to represent only a part of the truth, that part for which the research itself is sponsored? More broadly, is there a capacity of social scientists within the university community probably, and outside of that community possibly, to transcend an interest group model of information gathering and evaluation? It is time to ask once again whether there is a notion of social science as a system of validation quite apart from partisan groups. It is not only the university of science that is an issue, but the possibility that science itself is something apart from the political spectrum it presumably serves in a policymaking arena.

LOWRY: Perhaps the truth, if there is any such thing in an absolute sense, emerges in the crucible of partisan conflict itself. Maybe it is the struggle between the Public Interest Research Group and Abt that serves as a catalyst for producing sound general theories of social science. For example, if Project Camelot had not been only under direct military sponsorship, perhaps the implications of its research design, the conditions under which revolution should be stifled and counterrevolution can be stimulated, could have been questioned, and another major social science problem of great political interest could have been raised (namely, the conditions under which revolutions should be enhanced). In this sense the removal of policy science from a particular political or partisan arena, or the sponsorship of policy science in consciously conflicting arenas, may be necessary correctives to the tendencies which have gone on unchecked over the past quarter century.

HOROWITZ: Actually there may be different levels of success and failure in policy, as in science generally. We tend to forget the large number of successful cases that have been a product of policy-directed research. In my own work I have found that the key intervening variable is mass consensus or the absence thereof. The social science cannot effectively operate in a political context which is bifurcated along partisan lines, or where the nation itself is divided. Hence all the social science research in the world could not salvage the American effort in Vietnam, and Lord knows that the personnel and programs were there. But the social sciences cannot create a national will, and they cannot recreate the nature of the political universe simply to suit its benefactors. It is amazing that so many social scientists actually thought that they could manufacture a consensus given only time and money. This clearly was not the case. However, when there is a mandate for change, as in areas such as racial and sexual equity, then social science programming toward those ends becomes not only a powerful incentive to reach the desired ends, but has an excellent chance of success. And programs and projects operating within a general consensus, usually at a national level, have had exactly that success.

My final observation is that Project Camelot was involved in variables beyond the control of the American political system, and certainly beyond the American military capability. A national regime cannot control the outcomes, or manipulate the variables, in the world at large, the way it can within communities or cities of this country.

Hence the problem of policy is in part contextual. The tragedy is that those concerned with foreign policy seem to be more immodst and produce less results than those involved with domestic policy. This, in part, perhaps helps to explain the failure of Camelot and the return of its prodigal sons to the academic world.

SOCIAL SCIENCE PARTICIPATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

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We have reached an historic watershed in the profession of social science. No longer are the majority of personnel trained in psychology, sociology, economics, and anthropology, the five basic social sciences, mainly occupied in the teaching roles or university contexts. The tilt point has been reached. A slender majority of social science personnel are now employed mainly outside the academy and in the world of policy. This does not signify that everyone working for the Department of State or the Environmental Protection Agency occupies a top rank in the bureaucracy. Indeed they do not. For the most part, social science personnel are bookkeepers of the soul. They are involved at the level of generating data, compiling facts, and evaluating information; they are not central to the discharge of policy or decisions effecting future policy. Nonetheless, it is clear that a qualitative new era in social science has begun, and requires careful analysis in order to establish a better appreciation of the contours of social science, not only for the balance of this century, but for the twenty-first century. Futurology begins with the study of the present, and this research in dialogue form is dedicated toward that end.

This series of protocols is not intended to examine the relationship between social scientists and policy-makers, but more specifically, a collective portrait of how social scientists who function in government view their role and performance. As a result, my concern is not a broad range of issues covered elsewhere. Whereas my earlier interests were in the relationship between two broad groups, my concerns are in the comparatively narrow, but nonetheless crucial, spectrum of social science personnel who trade gown for governance, who leave academic life (in full or in part) for the purpose of exercising a direct procedural and policy impact on agencies and bureaus of the United States government.

I

The first essential distinction that has to be made is between social scientists working as full time emoloyees of national, state or local government agencies, in contrast to advisory types who function strictly in terms of policy inputs, whose primary sources of income remains either the academic institution or, as is increasingly the case, private research organizations. There is nothing pedestrian in calling attention to the obvious: the way in which people make their livelihood has a great bearing on types and levels of commitment. Thus, Henry Kissinger was a full-time employee under President Ford, whereas Zbigniew Brzenski was a part-time advisor to candidate Carter. After the elections of 1976, their roles were reversed. Both are political scientists; both have strong inputs into the Republican and Democratic parties respectively, but their primary allegiance is quite different.

Similarly, this is the case with presidential advisors like Daniel Patrick Moynihan in contrast to Eli Ginzberg. For the most part, Moynihan's recent activities have been in a full-time government capacity, whether as United Nations Ambassador, United States Ambassador to India, or as a member of the White House staff during the Johnson, and later the early Nixon administration. Ginzberg, for his part, while being an advisor to seven presidents, never really left Columbia University nor its comforting intellectual environment. This distinction between full-time participants and part-time advisory types has a considerable ripple effect in how these people respectively view their roles at the policy level, both in terms of their policy inputs and a sense of responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

II

When dealing with social science personnel in government, a significant factor to be accounted for is that these are basically, if not exclusively, appointed offices and not elective offices. With the rare exception of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's successful election to the United States Senate, social scientists are content to perform a role as experts, and hence rest their cases on specialized knowledge rather than public approval. As a result, social science personnel are largely involved in those agencies at cabinet and sub-cabinet posts having to do with departments and bureaus of the government directly under executive order. They tend to be less central to the activities of Congress and the Courts. Of course, where there are special Supreme Court needs, or specific legislative requirements, social science inputs do not take place. But these are of an episodic and highly selective nature rather than representative of a continuing function. In this sense, the importance of the social scientists is not only their profound belief in expertise, but also, indirectly at least, their contributions to the malaise concerning mass political participation per se: a feeling that it does not matter who wins since the same kinds of expertise for decision-making purposes are required, while policy options are rarely exercised by political leaders on the basis of party platforms. In short, it is policy rather than politics, appointments rather than elections, that determine the actual decision-making processes. And at this level, social scientists in government are not so much above partisan strife as they are indifferent to such strife.

III

The success of social science personnel in government generally depends on low ideological profiles and high adaptation to policies, techniques, and above all, style. However firm an intellectual posture may be, it must be addressed from the standpoint of administrative intelligence rather than partisan politics. As a result, there is a strong tendency toward ideological neutrality among social scientists in government. They share in the general American rhetoric concerning the distant goals of achieving equity, justice, and democracy. Differences become sharp in areas primarily concerning proximate goals: namely, problems of implementation, rates of teaching these goals, and new areas of exploration of inequities or the government implementation of fair treatment. In other words, the social scientist has an easily transferable political allegiance since the definition of his or her role in government has to do with practical implementation rather than party affiliation; and the quality of transferability, of the interchangeability of functions is a characteristic of bureaucracy as such.

IV

There is a near universal agreement among people working with social scientists in government that the real contribution of social science has been positivistic. New techniques of analysis, methodological devices for implementing programs, and middle-range theories addressed to evaluating finite groups of limited size, these become central to the utilitarian view of social research. There is a corollary of this: a near universal rejection of social science as a critical system, or as a critique of systems. As a result, large-scale analyses and broad-gauged critiques of the social system tend to be eschewed in favor of specific programs or efforts to implement either presidential or legislative directives. The closer the social scientist is to a critical posture, the further he usually is from government service. Similarly, the more attuned to concrete measures of rehabilitation or revitalization of specific programs, the closer he is to government participation. As a result, positivism is not simply an approach to social science; it is the operational codebook for doing social science within a governmental context.

V

Despite the near unanimity of social scientists in government on the worthlessness, or at least the general lack of purpose of their university training, there remains a strong residue of belief in social science itself as an ideology. That is to say, the use of reason as a way to achieve conflict resolution. Thus, while there is a rejection of grand theory, or critical analysis, there remains a belief that the meliorative role of positive social science at such middle levels of study as urban affairs, criminology, and deviance, itself is a task which warrants increased social science participation at an even more extended level within government.

VI

There is a strong overall sense of consensus, even as there is a diminished belief in the importance of differences within each discipline. People trained in sociology maintain significant identities apart from those trained in psychology. This is reflected in their orientation toward problem solving, and in their statement of the solution. Even though there may be extremely sharp differentiation in background training variables within each "school" of a discipline, overall consensus is clearly manifest. For evidence of this one need look no further than the way in which different agencies employ their social science personnel: the high incorporation of political scientists by the Department of State; the equally dedicated utilization of psychologists by the Department of Defense; the broad use of sociologists by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and finally, the almost exclusive reliance on people trained in economics by the International Monetary Fund, federal regulatory agencies, Council of Economic Advisors, or the General Accounting Office. All of this indicates an exceedingly high degree of accommodation by the disciplines themselves for agency needs. At the same time, there is a selective utilization by the agency of their social science personnel: needs based on the ability to rationalize the work of the agency more than the actual capabilities at policy levels of the individual social scientists involved.

VII

There is hardly any significant concern by government policy personnel with disputations or contradictions within each social science field. The sorts of adversarial relationships which characterize the academy, for example, between functionalists and existentialists in sociology, monetarists and structuralists in economics, pluralist versus elite in political science - all of these inner discrepencies tend to vanish for social scientists under the strains of government supports and requirements. The fact of being trained in a particular social science, rather than the kind of ideological persuasion is clearly the crucial factor. In some measure, the reason for the widespread sense of hostility and even bitterness pertaining to university education manifested by social scientists working in government, is directly connected to a feeling of the meaninglessness within the government and policy-making contexts of these older theoretical and methodological disputations within each social science discipline.

VIII

As a phase rule, different social scientists tend to be more conservative or more radical, not in terms of specific training, but rather in terms of constituencies served. Hence, political scientists often perceive themselves as linked to the needs of top political and military elites, and behave accordingly; whereas sociologists, having as a constituency everyone from huge numbers on federal food stamp programs, to those involved in aid to families of dependent children, tend to behave more liberally in terms of domestic needs and requirements. One has to carry this to a further step of refinement. For example, economists who adapt a strong structuralist vision will view the dispensation of funds simply to beef up economic transactions, as something which negates the real foundation of economic growth, namely, industrial production.

On the other hand, those who see increased commodity output as simply a response to market stimulants, will have a more favorable reading of the inflationary consequences of monetary policy. In other words, what social science provides, whether sociology, political science, or economics, is a surrogate language for fighting significant political battles, and for expressing very strong ideological preferences of parties, agencies and bureaus in the rather murky language of social science concerns and considerations. If the language of social scientists within government tends to be politically neuter, the consequences of social science clearly is not neutral. It contributes enormously at various levels of data-gathering information, evaluation, as well as policy, toward tilting federal programs to greater or lesser expenditures, and greater or lesser commitments to the select publics which each government policy serves and each bureau preserves.

IX

Social scientists in American society respond to market requirements. Thus, when there is a heavy emphasis on programs for the needy, there will also be a large influx of sociological personnel into government work, since in the mind of the political bureaucracy, that is what sociology does best. Similarly, when cost-benefit considerations take over, and market requirements become dominant, along with concerns for balanced budgets, then the economists loom large in terms of bureaucratic personnel needs. To chart the huge penetration of social psychologists and sociologists in the sixties is to understand how these particular personnel came to represent a constituency, and even create an articulate interest group demanding wider access to government. In the seventies, the larger role of institutions like Brookings, or the Presidential Council on Economic Affairs would indicate, similarly, a shift of emphasis not simply toward economists and away from sociologists, but toward a belief in a savings policy and away from a spending policy. Clearly, there are lags and there are inconsistencies in these patterns. But as an overview, it is fair to say that the sixties were the decade of the sociological penetration of government, and the seventies, the era of the economic penetration of government. Of course, specific social scientists can and do accommodate to changing fiscal policies, but then selective emphasis contributes to the articulation of that policy.

X

A singular distinction amongst those interviewed involves a belief in the relationship of policy to equality (the state of being equal), or a contrast belief in the relationship of policy to equity (the quality of being fair and just). Here the issues seem to be joined directly. For while policy oriented social scientists all agree on the meliorative potentials of the system (otherwise, why bother) they divided sharply on whether policy should guarantee a uniform starting point in order to reach diversified goals, or whether the guarantees should be on relatively similar outcomes. Much like handicap racing, some policy scientists believe the task is to so weight the participants that socioeconomic outcomes should be close, as in a dead heat. If one permits stretching this analogy further, the more laissez-faire spirited types prefer to make sure that the ground rules at the starting gate are meticulously observed, whereas the collective spirited types seem more concerned with reducing conflict and obtaining consensus by insuring a narrow rather than a wide band between wealth and poverty, and opportunity and success. The rise of interest group politics has clearly sharpened this dichotomy within social science thinking about policy issues.

As social scientists move from the academy to government, from the gown to the centers of governance, one can anticipate several tendencies: first, an even higher concern with policy-related matters among the social science community; second, a declining interest in critical theory in favor of positivist models; and third, a much closer integration of pure social science with applied disciplines. For areas like housing, welfare, and penology, social scientists seek and find closer coordination with their opposite numbers in social work, penology, and deviance than they have in the past. The widespread participation of social science in the world of government has occurred neither with a bang nor with a whisper; neither with ideological bombast nor with backdoor arrangements. It has taken place in response to inexorable market needs. These economic requirements have become an American way of life in which social scientists in government are measured along with their non-social science counterparts, by their contributions to the common good of the commonwealth. What is gained is a measure of participation in the decision-making process. What is lost is the capacity to sharply criticize that process. A trade-off is neither victory or defeat; it is a realization that ideas (like things) of worth are negotiable commodities in competitive societies.